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Japan’s population is rapidly contracting. If current trends continue, its population will 
fall to just one third of its 2010 peak by as early as 2095, with even faster declines in the working 
age population. Scholars are unsure how population contractions in Japan and the rest of the 
developed world will alter or uphold existing status hierarchies. On one hand, those at the top of 
the economic hierarchy may strengthen their grip on a shrinking number of good jobs. 
Alternatively, labor shortages may create new opportunities for formerly disadvantaged people. 
In three papers this dissertation examines the forms and causes of economic inequality in the 
context of Japan’s demographic decline. It uses original data collected from 539 white collar 
workers at twelve large Japanese firms.  
The first paper on gender inequality finds little evidence that firms exclude women from 
good jobs. However, within jobs, firms continue to pay women less than men, even after 
adjustments for performance. The results indicate that labor shortages do induce firms to admit 
more women to good jobs, but may even increase their incentives to discriminate against them 
within jobs.  
 The second paper compares economic outcomes for skilled foreign workers and their 
Japanese counterparts. After adjustments for acculturation and human capital quality, the data 
show that Western immigrants to Japan earn more even than Japanese doing similar jobs, while 
East Asians earn less. This pattern of stratification suggests that context of reception—
particularly the attitudes of Japanese people towards members of different groups—is more 
influential in generating stratification within firms than the acculturation of foreign workers.  
The third paper tests directly whether ethnic and racial attitudes matter for inequality 
between Japanese and foreign workers. Using the results of a survey experiment on attitudes, I 
show that in firms where coworkers are more biased against non-Japanese East Asians, 
inequality between Japanese and other Asians is greater. Similarly, in firms where coworkers 
demonstrate more pro-Western bias, Western employees are at a greater wage advantage.  
Together, the three papers show that, in a context of demographic decline, outsiders do 
move into good jobs, but do not overturn existing status hierarchies. 
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CHAPTER 1 
WHEN DO FIRMS DISCRIMINATE? COMPARING EVIDENCE FOR 
DISCRIMINATION IN JOB ASSIGNMENT AND IN PAY DETERMINATION AT ELITE 
JAPANESE FIRMS 
Introduction 
 The gender wage gap is a fixture of every industrial economy in the world (Polachek 
and Xiang 2014), ranging from over 25% in Japan, to under 10% in Denmark and New 
Zealand (OECD 2014). But despite decades of research, the evidence on the gender gap in 
pay remains inconclusive on several key points. Most strikingly, we still know relatively little 
about how important employer discrimination is to wage gaps overall, compared to supply-
side factors like workers’ performance or decisions about where to work (see Blau and Kahn 
2007). Secondly, if employers discriminate, we do not know if discrimination occurs 
predominantly in assortative employment processes (e.g. hiring, promotion, and termination), 
predominantly in wage determination processes (e.g., in how employers set wages for classes 
of jobs or individual employees within those classes), or relatively evenly across both sets of 
processes. Answers to these questions are of both theoretical and practical importance. The 
theoretical aspects can help us understand why the gender wage gap persists, and the practical 
aspects are crucial for designing policies that can most effectively combat discrimination.  
 This paper addresses the key question: Where is discrimination most likely to occur? 
Specifically, I examine whether discrimination is more likely to occur in hiring, as Petersen 
and Saporta (2004) argue, or in wage determinations within jobs, as Castilla (2008; 2012; 
2015; Castilla and Benard 2010) suggests. I conduct these analyses using recent matched 
employer-employee data from 420 workers nested in 77 teams at twelve elite Japanese firms. 
These firms present an intriguing case study in their own right—Japan’s level of gender pay 
inequality is unusually high compared to peer nations (Estevez-Abe 2013). Researchers agree 
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that many institutional constraints, such as a tax code that favors families with one 
breadwinner and an oversubscribed public childcare system, contribute to this pay gap 
(Brinton 1993; Boling 1995), but it is unclear to what extent direct discrimination plays a role 
after one takes into account women’s and men’s responses to other institutional constraints.  
 
Evidence on Gender Wage Gaps and Discrimination  
 A massive literature documents the wage gap between men and women across the 
developed world, but determining whether discrimination is to blame is a thorny problem in 
any context (see Blau and Kahn 2007 for a review).  
 We know that, in the United States, and in most other industrial societies, men’s and 
women’s segregation into different types of jobs is responsible for a sizeable portion of the 
wage gap (Reskin 1993; Petersen and Morgan 1995; Charles and Grusky 2004). However, it 
is less clear to what extent segregation occurs because men and women make different 
choices in the labor market, and to what extent employers exclude women from high paying 
positions, either by not hiring them for such positions in the first place or by failing to 
promote them from lower-paid jobs.  
 It is possible that self-selection is primarily or even solely responsible for job 
segregation. Beginning at early ages, boys and girls report different career aspirations and 
choose different classes and majors in high school and college (Jacobs 1995; Correll 2001). 
Among adults, attitudinal studies show that men are more likely than women to say that high 
income (Gorman 2000) and promotional opportunities (Tolbert and Moen 1998) are the most 
important characteristics of a good job. Women, on the other hand, are more likely to say job 
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content is the most important (Tolbert and Moen 1998). 1  These same trends have been 
observed in decades of U.S.-based research stretching back to the 1930s (see Konrad et al. 
2005 for a review). These differences in aspirations, interests, and priorities may be the main 
reason job segregation is so pervasive.  
 To test this possibility, in recent decades researchers have begun to examine more 
explicitly gender differences in job application patterns, and whether and how employers 
respond differently to male and female candidates in their applicant pools. Like the attitudinal 
data, these recent studies support the intuition that the bulk of segregation stems from the 
supply side, not the demand side. For example, in Fernandez and Sosa’s (2005) study of 
applicants to customer service positions at a call center, the pre-screening applicant pool is 
67% female. This job could thus become female-dominated even in the absence of demand-
size processes disproportionally steering women into this position. Studies that consider 
applications into multiple types of jobs also demonstrate that women self-select into lower-
paid work. For example, in a study of applicants to a high-tech company, Fernandez and 
Campero (2017) find that, even after adjusting for education and experience, women apply to 
jobs at a lower hierarchical level than do men. Similarly, among male and female MBA 
students at the same university, Barbulescu and Bidwell (2013) show that women are less 
likely to apply for jobs in finance and consulting, where pay is particularly high, in part 
because the women MBAs value work-life balance more than their male classmates do.  
 The evidence that discrimination may also play a role in job segregation is more 
limited. Audit studies in which large numbers of employers receive resumes for candidates 
whose backgrounds are identical, but whose gender the researchers have varied randomly, do 
                                                 
1 Differences in attitudes tend, however, to be small in magnitude (Tolbert and Moen 1998; Konrad et al 2000) 
and do not appear in all populations. A study of MBA holders found no differences in stated preferences for 
high pay between men and women (Barbulescu and Bidwell 2013).  
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not find systematic evidence that employers call female applicants back at lower rates. On the 
contrary, some studies even show a female advantage (see Neumark 2016 for a review; but 
also see Correll, Benard, and Paik 2007).  
 However, these null findings may be because audit studies focus only on callbacks, not 
on job offers. Employers may be just as likely to interview women, but less likely to hire 
them. Fernandez and Sosa’s call center study offers a test of this possibility. They show that, 
to the contrary, hiring managers interview and hire women at a higher rate than men with 
similar qualifications, further increasing female overrepresentation in the customer service 
position at the target firm.   
 Null findings in audit studies may also be a result of the type of jobs it is possible to 
test with an audit approach, which are mostly entry-level or early career jobs. At the upper 
end of the labor market the story may be different. Indeed, at the tech firm in Fernandez and 
Campero’s (2017) study, women are more likely to receive offers for entry-level jobs but less 
likely to receive job offers at the mid-career and experienced stages, even after the data are 
adjusted for education, work history, and managerial experience. Similarly, in a study of 
executive search, Fernandez and Fernandez-Mateo (2016), after adjusting for candidates' 
experience, find that search firm screeners are more likely to deem women candidates for 
executive jobs as “unsuitable.” Barbulescu and Bidwell (2013), however, find that men and 
women MBAs are equally likely to get job offers in male-dominated fields once they have 
applied. Thus there is some inconsistent evidence that firms may discriminate against women 
in upper-level jobs. But even when studies detect possible discrimination, the magnitude of 
these effects is small. For example, in Fernandez and Fernandez-Mateo’s study of executive 
search, women’s probability of being deemed unsuitable is just 3.6% higher than men’s.  
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 These findings may be reason for optimism if discrimination occurs more in hiring than 
in other stages of the employment process, as Petersen and Saporta (2004) argue.  Petersen 
and Saporta discuss how transparency matters for eliminating discrimination, and note that 
hiring processes are notoriously opaque. If a firm chooses not to offer a woman a job, it is 
almost impossible to document that she was turned down because she is a woman. Not only 
is information about other candidates for a position difficult to obtain, it is also likely to be 
ambiguous; firms assess job candidates on various dimensions and do not necessarily 
quantify them or weight them consistently between candidates. These opacities in the hiring 
process, Petersen and Saporta maintain, will make it easier for firms to discriminate when 
hiring than when determining pay within jobs, where plaintiffs have access to others in the 
candidate pool and decision making standards are more formalized and explicit. If their 
hypothesis is correct, employers’ gender discrimination may be a relatively small contributor 
to remaining gender pay gaps in OECD countries.  
 But Petersen’s and Saporta’s claim has never been empirically tested. Their own study 
does not ask whether firms’ hiring processes are biased. Rather, the authors use data from a 
large U.S. service firm to test whether women and men earn the same salaries within job 
grades, and whether the likelihood of promotion differs by gender. They find that within 
hierarchical levels of jobs men earn 3.6% more than women at time of hire, but that the 
within-grade gender difference vanishes as employees acquire seniority. This small pay 
difference at point of hire may be due to discrimination, or it may be due to gender 
differences in experience prior to the workers’ employment at the study firm. Petersen and 
Saporta find no evidence of discrimination against women in promotion.   
 The lack of data to compare potential discrimination at hiring has led others to dispute 
the claim that discrimination is more likely in this stage of the employment process. In 
counterpoint, Castilla (2008: 1502), argues that discrimination is actually even more likely to 
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occur in pay determinations. Consistent with this, in a single-firm study he finds after 
adjusting for performance that women’s annual wage growth is 0.4% lower than men’s, a 
substantively small but statistically significant difference. The reason for this, Castilla 
suggests, is that pay determinations are as opaque to employees as their hiring decisions. 
Hiring decisions are, however, visible to other employees and to regulators at least in 
aggregate—it may become obvious over time if a company hires or promotes unusually few 
women and minorities. Castilla argues that individuals are more likely to interpret aggregate 
patterns as evidence of discrimination than individual experiences, which are too rich to 
allow for clean comparisons (1515-1516). Because employees almost never see aggregate 
wage data for employees by group, in Castilla’s framework discrimination is more likely to 
go undetected and unquestioned in pay determinations than in hiring.  
 Like Petersen and Saporta, Castilla emphasizes the importance of transparency for 
constraining employer discrimination. However, Castilla differs in his assessments of both 
the information that must be transparent, and the audience for that information. While 
Petersen and Saporta suggest the relevant information is the treatment of oneself and that of 
peer applicants and employees, Castilla suggests it is the general pattern of how the firm 
treats different groups on average. While Petersen and Saporta argue that the audience who 
must perceive this information is the employee who experiences discrimination, Castilla 
implies that more general audiences are of greater importance, including perhaps company 
managers, other employees, members of the community, and government regulators.  
 However, also like Petersen and Saporta, Castilla does not compare evidence for 
discrimination in hiring with evidence for discrimination in pay. Although he finds a small 
amount of “performance reward bias”—firms’ tendency to offer lower rewards to women 
than men with equivalent performance—the administrative records he uses do not permit an 
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investigation of potential gender bias in the way in which the firm allocates jobs to women 
and men in the first place. 2  
 The current study is, to my knowledge, the first to look for evidence of discrimination 
in both initial job allocation and in pay determination within jobs. This analysis can help 
adjudicate between the two accounts of “the opportunity structure for discrimination” 
described above. It also provides new insight into the empirically interesting Japanese case.  
  
The Japanese Case 
 Since becoming the world’s second largest economy in the 1960s, Japan’s economic 
development has paralleled that of the major Western economies. However, gender inequality 
has declined much more slowly in Japan than in peer nations, leaving it an outlier (Brinton 
1993; Gender Equality Bureau Cabinet Office 2007, 2013; Estevez-Abe 2013; Nemoto 
2016). Today, Japan’s gender pay gap is the third highest in the OECD, following South 
Korea and Estonia. What processes maintain Japan’s unusually high gender wage gap? In 
addressing the theoretical questions outlined in the previous section, this paper also addresses 
this empirical puzzle.  
 On some indicators of women’s wellbeing, such as education levels and health rates, 
Japan compares favorably to countries with similar levels of development. Japanese women’s 
labor force participation rate of 66% even exceeds the OECD average of 58% (OECD 2015). 
However, other labor market indicators reveal high levels of gender inequality. For example, 
the unadjusted gender pay gap is 27%, nearly twice the OECD average of 15% (OECD 2014) 
and in 2012, women made up about 42% of employees, but only 11% of managers, in 
                                                 
2 Like Petersen and Saporta, Castilla (2008) finds no evidence of discrimination in promotions. Gender-neutral 
promotions are consistent with both Petersen and Saporta’s and Castilla’s frameworks.  
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comparison to 30% in Germany and 43% in the United States (Gender Equality Bureau 
Cabinet Office 2013).  
 Scholarship on Japan has identified how various structural features of the economy 
contribute to the gap. As in other countries, men and women are unevenly distributed across 
industries and occupations. Japanese women are, for example, more likely to work in the 
service industry and less likely to work in construction or transport; they are also more likely 
to do clerical work (Gender Equality Bureau Cabinet Office 2013). However, the degree of 
industry, occupational, and workplace segregation, like the labor force participation rate, is 
comparable to that of other developed countries (Mun 2010), and explains less of the gender 
pay gap than in other contexts (e.g. Kumlin 2007 for a comparison with Sweden; Avent-Holt 
and Tomaskovic-Devey 2012 for a comparison with the United States; Tachibanaki 1998). 
Rather, women’s segregation into certain labor arrangements within occupations, industries, 
and firms explains more of the gap (Brinton 1993).  
 Women’s shorter tenures and concentration in contingent employment are perhaps the 
largest structural contributors (Brinton 1993; Yu 2013; Kim and Shirahase 2014; Boling 
2015). In Japan, regular fulltime employees (seishain) with long tenures at one employer 
have the highest incomes (Holbrow 2015). But many women quit their jobs and leave the 
labor force temporarily when they have children (Brinton 1993; Yu 2009), reducing their 
tenures relative to men who do not interrupt their careers. Further, at all stages of the life 
course, women cluster in irregular jobs, which tend to have few fringe benefits and low wage 
growth (Song 2014: 97, 173). In 2015, about a quarter—22%—of men worked in irregular 
positions such as contract, temporary, and part-time work, but a majority—56%—of women 
did (Statistics Japan 2016).  
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 In addition, even among regular workers, women’s employment categories differ from 
men’s (Kanai 2013). Although current law prohibits Japanese firms from explicitly 
differentiating between men’s and women’s jobs (Mun 2010), some companies maintain a 
two-track system for full-time employees that creates de facto gender segregation 
(Kumamoto-Healy 2005; Mun 2016). The two-track system consists of a management track 
(sougou shoku) and a general track (ippan shoku). Management track employees are expected 
to work long hours, rotate jobs to get a well-rounded picture of their firm’s business 
activities, and accept transfers to distant locations. General track employees work in more 
limited business areas and are not assigned long-distance job postings. Although relatively 
rare in small and medium firms, about 45% of firms with over 1000 employees used the 
tracking system in 2012. In 59% of firms with a general track, over 80% of the general track 
hires were women and in 72% of firms with management tracks with nation-wide job 
transfers, over 80% of the hires were men (Ministry of Health, Labor, and Welfare 2013).  
 Like women’s segregation into contingent employment, the tracking system 
contributes to the gender pay gap (Kanai 2013). A survey of 394 firms found, for example, 
that at workers’ peak earning year (age 55), the average monthly salary of a general track 
employee with a college degree was only 55% of that of a management track employee with 
identical education (Keidanren 2014).  
 There is thus extensive evidence that job sorting contributes to Japan’s gender wage 
gap. There is, however, no data on the extent to which sorting reflects workers’ choices. 
Indeed, there are many reasons to believe that Japanese women prefer to opt out of the most 
demanding jobs. Work conditions in Japanese firms are notoriously punishing, and many 
employers expect regular, management track workers to put in long hours, either by 
pressuring them to remain in the office until their supervisor leaves for the night, or by 
encouraging extensive, unpaid after-hours socialization with coworkers and clients (Rebick 
 
 
10 
 
2005). In addition, Japan has one of the lowest levels of job satisfaction among OECD 
countries (OECD 2009), perhaps because job mobility is so low (Ono 2010; Holbrow 2015), 
and workers in regular employment find it difficult to switch jobs to improve job fit. Unlike 
men, women have a culturally acceptable alternative to working long hours year after year in 
a job they do not particularly like by choosing contingent employment or general track jobs.  
 Women with children may also have little option but to select contingent or general 
track jobs, because Japanese women bear a larger portion of the childcare and housework 
burden than women in many other OECD countries. Among married couples with children 
under the age of six, employed men spend an average of 67 minutes per day on housework 
and childcare, compared to 356 minutes for employed women (Gender Equality Bureau 
Cabinet Office 2013). Japan is also the only OECD country where women are more likely 
than men to say that their jobs interfere with their non-work responsibilities (Ruppanner and 
Huffman 2014). Because of a comparatively heavy burden of household labor, Japanese 
women may work less productively and voluntarily choose less demanding roles more often 
than women in other developed countries. 
 It is also possible, of course, that discrimination pushes women into lower-paid job 
classes. For example, Mun (2010) finds that in 1995 (before the government outlawed 
gender-specific jobs), advertisements for entry-level jobs for high school graduates that 
targeted women offered lower pay than advertisements targeting only men. Whether in the 
absence of this practice many women would have applied for higher-paying positions is 
unknown, however.  
  Data that would allow researchers to estimate the magnitude and causes of within-job 
pay gaps are even more difficult to obtain. National surveys do not collect information on 
track status, making it impossible to use their results to compare wages of similar women and 
 
 
11 
 
men within tracks, much less within jobs. Private data from single or multi-firm studies also 
usually lack tracking variables (e.g. Aiba and Wharton 2001; Avent-Holt and Tomaskovic-
Devey 2012; Hashimoto and Sato 2014). The one exception, a study of a single firm used HR 
data from over 10,000 employees, and after controlling for skill, job grades, and work hours 
the researchers (Kato, Kawaguchi, and Owan 2013) found no significant gender differences 
in pay.  
 Setting aside questions about the magnitude of within-job pay gaps, researchers also 
speculate on their causes but lack the data to test their hypotheses. Historically, age and 
tenure have been important variables in Japanese firms’ wage determinations (Kalleberg and 
Lincoln 1988; Tsuru, Abe, and Kubo 2005). Because women tend to interrupt their careers to 
have children, these human capital differences may be solely responsible for within-job pay 
disparities between women and men.  
 However, as in the United States, Japanese firms have increasingly linked pay with 
short-term performance (Mitani 2010; Conrad 2009; Kato and Kodama 2015; Heneman and 
Werner 2005; Burke 2005). If women perform similarly to men, this change may have 
reduced or eliminated within-job pay inequality, because it flattens the relationship between 
age or tenure and wages that tends to advantage men (MHLW 2002; Kataoka 2005; Mitani 
2010). On the other hand, performance pay may perpetuate wage inequality because women’s 
performance is unlikely to match that of men in a corporate environment that requires 
management-track employees transfer to distant posts and dedicate extensive after-hours time 
to their work (Nakashima 2013). In this case, gender wage inequality would persist in 
analytic models with adjustments for human capital, but disappear after adjustments for 
performance, as in Kato, Kawaguchi, and Owan’s (2013) study. 3  Finally, firms may simply 
                                                 
3 This study cannot detect whether gender bias distorts managers’ assessments of female employees, as some 
suggest it might (Aiba and Wharton 2001; Kato and Kodama 2015).  
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discriminate against women, and pay them less than male counterparts with the same human 
capital and performance.  
 In sum, there is extensive job segregation in Japan, but little evidence on the relative 
impact of selection and discrimination on shaping this pattern. With regards to within-job pay 
gaps, few data sources allow researchers to estimate their magnitude, and consequently, 
whether and how discrimination may produce them is still largely a matter of speculation.  
 
Data  
 To investigate to what extent discrimination impacts the wage gap, and at what stages 
discrimination occurs, I use a novel employer-employee matched dataset I collected between 
February and April 2015, called the Survey on Workplace Environment and Diversity 
Management. The data are a cross-sectional sample drawn from employees at twelve elite 
firms contacted through the Japan Association of Corporate Executives’ (JACE) sub-
committee on diversity issues. JACE sent a research request to the CEOs of all 205 sub-
committee member firms. Of these, twelve firms (5.8%) agreed to participate. The 
participating firms represent a range of industries including manufacturing (three firms), 
business services (five firms), and consumer services (four firms). The average size of these 
organizations is very large—ten of the twelve firms have more than 1000 employees and 
three have more than 10,000. Using the same selection strategy as Lincoln and Kalleberg 
(1990), participating firms chose several white-collar work teams and distributed an online 
survey to every employee on the selected teams, for a total of least 25 workers per firm.  
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 The twelve participating firms distributed the survey to 909 employees, for a return of 
539 valid responses, and a response rate of 59% overall. 4   This response rate exceeds the 
mean response rate of 52.7% in organizational surveys (Baruch and Holtom 2008).   
 Response rates varied by firm, ranging from a low of 34% at one firm to a high of 
100% at five firms. 5  Assuming that demographic characteristics of the workers at each firm 
are similar, I can compare the results for those with 100% response rates to those with lower 
response rates to assess patterns of non-response. There is no evidence of non-response bias 
by gender: 26% of the workers in the firms with high response rates were female, compared 
to 31% at the other firms, a statistically insignificant (p = 0.28, two-tailed test) difference. 
However, workers at the high-responding firms were significantly older (p > .001, two-tailed 
test, 95% confidence interval 1.3 to 5.1 years). Again, assuming similar demographics across 
firms, this implies that senior employees were less likely to respond to the survey in low-
response firms. Because gender inequality is generally higher among older workers in Japan 
(Kumlin 2007), this implies that residual wage gaps will be downwardly biased in low-
response firms and overall.  
 The survey took 30-60 minutes to complete and covered a rich variety of topics, 
including job satisfaction, information about the respondents’ job history, job content and 
salary, respondents’ attitudes towards work, and demographic backgrounds. Descriptions of 
the coding process for the variables used in these analyses appear in Table 1.1.  
                                                 
4 One firm declined to specify how many workers received the survey. To calculate the total response rate, I 
therefore assume that that the response rate at the firm with missing data is equal to the mean response rate of all 
firms (78.6%). Because I received 50 responses from this firm, the estimated number of survey recipients is 64. 
This estimate is included in the response rate denominator of 909 employees.  
5 I did not disclose response status of individual respondents to their employers, and survey materials made clear 
that participation was voluntary. To increase response rates, I sent periodic updates to my contact at each firm 
with the percentage of workers who had responded at their firm. At the firms with high final response rates, the 
contact person sent out periodic reminders to all targeted workers to complete the survey. 
 
 
14 
 
 The mix of subjective measures such as job quality and objective measures such as 
earnings, job class, and job content is a strength of this dataset, as is the coverage of multiple 
firms. To my knowledge it is the most comprehensive employer-employee matched dataset 
collected in Japanese firms by any researchers since Kalleberg and Lincoln’s seminal data 
collection effort in the mid-1980s (1988; also see Lincoln and Kalleberg 1990), and the only 
one to include contract workers employed alongside regular employees. As such, it presents a 
unique opportunity to update our understanding of inequality in Japanese firms after three 
decades of economic, social, and demographic change.  
 Of course the data have limitations as well. Because the dataset includes only large 
firms and white collar workers, the results are not generalizable to other labor market 
segments. In addition, because the data are self-reported and respondents are sampled, this 
dataset is more subject to error than administrative HR data used in several recent studies 
(e.g., Hashimoto and Sato 2014; Kato, Kawaguchi, and Owan 2013). Unlike the single-firm 
studies using administrative HR data, it covers twelve firms in three major industries, 
creating a broader basis for generalization among white collar employees of large firms.  
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Table 1.1: Description of Variable Coding 
Dependent variables   Description     
Job quality  Mean value of respondent’s answers to questions about the interest (1 = Very boring, 5 = Very interesting), value (1 = 
Complete waste of time, 5 = Very worthwhile), and relative quality (1 = Much worse than most; 5 = Much better than most) 
of his or her job.  
Monthly base pay  Respondent’s pretax income (including base salary, overtime pay, and allowances) from the previous month in 1000s of yen.  
Total annual earnings   Respondent’s pretax monthly income (including base salary, overtime pay, and allowances) from the previous month, 
multiplied by 12, plus total value of annual or semi-annual bonuses received during the previous year, in 1000s of yen.  
Independent variables   Description     
Performance (bonus rate)  Total value of respondent’s annual or semiannual bonus from the previous year as a proportion of previous month’s earnings 
multiplied by 12. Top-coded at 95th percentile.  
Job class  Respondents were asked separately about their contract type and job track. If workers said they are on a fixed term contract, 
they were coded as contract workers. Workers who selected no contract, indefinite contract, or don’t know are coded as 
regular workers. Among regular workers, respondents who selected general track are coded as general track. Workers who 
selected management track, not applicable, or don’t know were coded as regular workers on the management track.  Workers 
who said they were contract workers and on the general track were coded as contract workers. 1 = Regular, management 
track employee, 2 = Contract employee, 3 = Regular, general track employee.  
Control variables   Description     
Sex 0 = Female, 1 = Male.  
Education  1 = Less than BA, 2 = BA or equivalent, 3 = MA or higher.  
Age Respondent’s current age in years. Missing values set to gender mean.  
Tenure Respondent’s year of entry into the current firm, subtracted from survey year (2015). Missing values estimated from years of 
education and number of jobs.  
Number of previous employers  Respondent’s total number of past employers, excluding current employer.  
Work hours Respondent’s typical work hours, selected from a range. Values are coded at range mid-points. Top category (60 or more) 
hours coded as 66. Missing values set to mean (43).  
Job content Respondents selected the type of work they do from a list of 10 options, including accounting,  human resources, legal or 
intellectual property, product design or engineering,  aales or business development, clerical, information technology, 
nanagement, public relations or advertising, and research. Respondents whose work did not fit the assigned categories 
completed a text response box. Two additional categories, Business consulting and consumer service, emerged from the free 
entry responses, for a total of 12 job types and 1 one group of missing or uncategorized. 0 = Non-clerical, 1 = Clerical.  
Authority   Number of subordinates the employee supervises, selected from 5 ranges. Values are coded at range mid-points. Top 
category (20 or more) coded as 23. Missing values set to 0.  
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  Finally, because the data are cross-sectional, I cannot observe exits from the firm. This 
may lead to an underestimate of discrimination if workers who experience discrimination are 
more likely to quit.  
 There are also several other reasons why these data might be less likely to reveal 
discrimination than a randomly generated sample or a census. Companies that are aware of 
gender disparities in wages would be unlikely to participate in a survey on diversity 
management, and firms with a commitment to gender and cultural diversity would be 
unlikely to send the survey to work teams where gender discrimination is more severe than 
elsewhere. As such, the analyses below can be interpreted as a conservative test for 
discrimination. If I find evidence of discrimination in this context, it is likely its effects on 
white collar workers in other large Japanese firms are as large or larger.  
 In the analyses below I exclude 100 non-Japanese employees, because the intersections 
between nationality and gender and their relationship to wages are outside the scope of this 
paper. I also exclude 19 Japanese respondents with missing data on gender, income, or job 
quality, which leaves an analytical sample of 420 workers.  
 
Research Design, Measures, and Hypotheses 
 I use these data to investigate whether there is any evidence of discrimination at two 
stages of the hiring process—employees’ assignment to job class (management track, general 
track, and contract jobs) and their pay within jobs.  
 As a background for my investigation of whether and where discrimination occurs, I 
begin by examining descriptive statistics on women’s and men’s representation across the 
three job classes. I then describe the observed wage gaps between men and women, 
beginning with unconditional differences, followed by estimates of within- and between-job 
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gender wage gaps that account for gender differences in representation across firms and 
sections and for gender differences in human capital. I estimate these wage gaps by modeling 
total annual compensation, including both base pay (measured in the most recent calendar 
month and multiplied by twelve) and bonus pay (measured as total bonus payments received 
during the previous fiscal year) in a mixed, or hierarchical, linear model. Human capital, job 
characteristics, and job content are modeled as fixed effects. Team- and firm-level effects are 
modeled as nested random effects (see Gelman and Hill 2007). I use this same hierarchical 
modeling approach, which adjusts for the dual nested structure in the data, in all analytic 
models below. After giving a descriptive picture of gender job segregation and the size of 
within-job wage gaps, I turn to the main theoretical questions about the role of discrimination 
in job allocation and in pay determination.  
 My first analytic concern is whether firms discriminate against women by placing them 
on the lower-paying general track or in insecure contract jobs, not only at a disproportionate 
rate, but also contrary to the women’s own preferences. The classic approach to this question 
is to compare the qualifications of women and men in the applicant pool, and the firm’s 
decision about how to hire and place them. Unfortunately, as in studies by Petersen and 
Saporta (2004) and by Castilla (2008) data on the applicant pool are not available. 
Nonetheless, subjective measures taken in the survey allow me to examine whether or not 
placements produce an effect that is consistent with employer discrimination in job 
placement.  
 To look for evidence of discrimination in job placement, I consider respondents’ self-
assessed job quality. I measure job quality using a composite variable, constructed from the 
Job Descriptive Index, the most widely used measure of job satisfaction (van Saane et al. 
2003). Respondents were asked to rate how interesting their jobs are (ranging from “very 
boring” to “very interesting”; whether their job was worthwhile (ranging from “a complete 
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waste of time” to “very worthwhile;” and how their jobs compared to other possible jobs 
(ranging from “current job is much worse than most” to “current job is much better than 
most”). All these variables are measured on five point scales; I take the mean to generate the 
composite. 6  Cronbach’s alpha for the three components of the job quality measure is 0.84, 
indicating a high degree of inter-item correlation, and validating the combination of these 
three measures as a reliable index of one underlying construct (Carmines and Zeller 1979).   
 Even without direct information on the applicant pools for different job classes, we can 
infer that, in the presence of discrimination, women in female-typed job classes would report 
lower job quality relative to women in management track jobs. The logic of this is as follows: 
even among graduates of top universities, some women aspire to the management track and 
some women aspire to the general track or to contract work (Unozawa and Kimura 2015). 
However, if firms reserve management track jobs for less qualified male applicants, some of 
the women seeking management track jobs will enter the pool of workers applying for 
general track jobs. The timing of the job market for new graduates has historically 
encouraged this: until 2015, most firms would accept applications for general track positions 
only after they had made hiring decisions for management track jobs (Unozawa and Kimura 
2015). This allowed applicants at a particular company who were not selected for 
management track jobs to reapply for general track positions. Thus, if firms do discriminate 
in hiring, post-hire pools of female workers in the management track are likely to rate their 
jobs particularly highly, knowing perhaps that they have beat the odds in landing such a job, 
while post-hire pools of female workers in the general track or in contract positions are likely 
to rate their jobs more poorly on average, because at least some of the workers in these 
                                                 
6 For respondents with missing data on one or two of the questions, I take the mean of non-missing questions. I 
exclude from the sample respondents who answered none of the job quality questions.  
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positions did not get their first choice of a place on the more remunerative management track, 
and instead turned to their second-choice jobs.  
 As this discussion shows, if there is discrimination in job placement, we can predict 
that:  
Women in contract jobs (H1a) and in general track positions (H2b) will report lower job 
quality than women in management track jobs, ceteris paribus.   
 Of course, this same pattern could occur simply because of competition. If there are not 
enough management track jobs for every worker who aspires to such a position, women 
aspiring to management track jobs could still end up in general track or contract jobs, even if 
firms do not disproportionally exclude them from management track jobs. However, the same 
is true of men in the absence of discrimination. On the other hand, if firms do discriminate, 
the post-hire pool of women in jobs off the management track will contain a larger 
percentage of dissatisfied workers, on average, than the post-hire pool of men off the 
management track. We can thus predict that, if firms do discriminate:  
The gap in self-assessed job quality between workers on the management track and workers 
in other job classes will be larger for women than for men, ceteris paribus (H1c).  
 To test these hypotheses, I use job quality as the outcome variable in a hierarchical 
linear model with random effects at the team and firm levels. I include fixed effects for age, 
tenure, education level, and work hours, as these affect, independently of gender, the quality 
of jobs to which firms assign employees. I interact a male dummy variable with the variable 
for job class (management track, general track, or contract job) to generate job quality 
estimates for men and women in different tracks, net of human capital differences.   
 Next, I look for evidence that discrimination occurs in wage determination within jobs. 
I define a job as the same work content, in the same job class, with the same level of 
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supervisory authority, on the same team, at the same firm. 7  I model job content, job class, 
and supervisory authority as fixed effects and random effects for teams and firms. Because all 
firms in the sample use performance pay, it is of particular interest whether differences in 
men’s and women’s assessed performance explain within-job gender wage gaps.  
Figure 1.1: Relationship Between Performance and Compensation at Japanese Firms 
 
 
 Figure 1.1 describes how most large Japanese firms calculate compensation, and helps 
to illustrate the logic behind the analysis of within-job pay gaps. As this graph shows, 
workers’ compensation consists of two main parts: Base pay and bonus (see Rebick 2005; 
Tsuru, Abe, and Kubo 2005 for detailed descriptions of pay setting policies in large Japanese 
firms). Base pay is also a function of a number of variables, such as age and tenure. I adjust 
for these in my analytic models, but for simplicity’s sake I omit them from Figure 1.1.  
 Employers generally conduct annual or biannual performance evaluations, which 
generate a performance score for each employee. Based on this score, employees receive a 
                                                 
7 In the interests of parsimony, I model job content as a binary variable for clerical and non-clerical work; using 
the full thirteen categories of job content available in the dataset does not change the main results. 
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raise, indicated in Figure 1.1 via the arrow connecting performance score with base pay. 
Because in previous periods, performance scores will already have created differentials in 
raise amounts, base pay for employees doing the same jobs may already be different in any 
given period, as indicated by the arrow connecting past performance to base pay.  
 Recent performance scores also determine the size of the bonus, which firms calculate 
as a percentage of (pre-raise) base pay (Rebick 2005: 44, 47). 8   As in most datasets, I do not 
observe workers’ true ability or their true past performance and true recent performance. 
Further, because the data are self-reported, I also do not observe the employers’ assessments 
of recent performance directly. I can, however, estimate these assessments by reversing the 
calculation that firms make to calculate bonus amounts. I divide bonus amount by annual 
base pay to obtain a proportion. The resulting proportion is an estimate of unobserved recent 
performance scores, and removes the direct mathematical relationship between bonus and 
base pay that we see in the raw data. I can then use this proportion to investigate the 
relationship between recent performance and compensation for men and women within jobs.9   
 If recent performance is not representative of career-long performance, we cannot draw 
conclusions about the relationship between career-long performance and pay from this 
measure. However, as long as the relationship between long-term performance and recent 
                                                 
8 In this sample, the mean response to the question “How much do the results of your individual performance 
review influence your bonus?” was 3.7, in between “A moderate influence” (3) and “A large influence” (4) on 
the 1 to 5 scale. For effects of individual performance on raise, the mean value was 3.5.  
9 Because performance is estimated from the previous month’s base pay and from the previous year’s bonus, the 
calculations used here will bias estimates of the relationship between performance and compensation towards 
zero. The magnitude of the downward bias will be greater for higher performers. Imagine two employees, both 
of whom were earning $100 in Period 0, which was unobserved. Employee A receives a raise of $1 and a bonus 
of $1 (representing the lowest possible performance, a score of 1). Employee B receives a bonus of $20 and a 
raise of $20 (representing the highest possible performance, a score of 20). For Employee A, we thus observe a 
Period 2 base pay of $101 and a Period 1 bonus of $1. For Employee B, we observe a Period 2 salary of $120 
and a Period 1 bonus $20. Our estimate of assessed performance will fall only slightly below the true value of 1 
for Employee A (1/101 or 0.99%). However, for employee B, our estimate will fall further below the true value 
of 20 (20/120 or 16.67%). The magnitude of this bias depends not on the bonus amounts, but on the size of 
raises, and will lead to underestimates of the strength of the true relationship between performance and 
compensation. However, this downward bias should not hamper our ability to look for gender differences in 
returns to performance, because in the absence of discrimination it would affect men and women equally.  
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performance is similar for women and for men, we can still test if gender differences in 
within-job base pay disappear after I account for estimated recent performance, or if gender 
gaps in pay deepen or remain unchanged after performance adjustments. If there is 
discrimination, we can predict that: 
An unexplained within-job wage gap will remain between women and men after adjustments 
for performance, ceteris paribus (H2).  
 For this analysis, I model both monthly base pay and total annual compensation as a 
function of human capital and job characteristics, with performance (measured by bonus 
transformed into a proportion, and capped at the 95th percentile to minimize the effects of 
influential outliers) as a predictor variable. I use both quadratic and linear terms for estimated 
performance, because visual examination of the data show a curvilinear relationship between 
estimated performance and total compensation.  Because all respondents are from the same 
teams on the same firms, the data do not have a long right tail, and a log transformation of 
base pay or total compensation is unnecessary.  
 The focus of these two models of performance effects on compensation is the 
difference in the intercept of pay for men and women. However, it is also possible that the 
slope of performance on compensation varies by gender.  Psychological experiments suggest 
that people respond negatively to those who violate gender stereotypes and that these 
reactions penalize women who engage in stereotypically masculine behaviors in the 
workplace (e.g. Eagly and Karau 2002; Rudman and Fairchild 2004). Because stereotypes 
paint women as cooperative and caring, rather than competitive and agentic, employer bias 
would be particularly salient for high-performing women, who likely violate these 
expectations. This is especially true in Japan, where women’s traditional role is servile and 
obedient (Pharr 1984). I therefore expect that the slope of performance on base pay will be 
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steeper for men than for women and that the gender gap in compensation will widen with 
level of performance. Specifically, I interact performance with gender to test whether:  
The gender gap in compensation will be largest among high performers, ceteris paribus 
(H3).  
 I generate one interaction model with base pay as the outcome variable, and one with 
total annual earnings as the outcome.  
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Results 
Analysis of Job Segregation and Pay Inequality 
I begin by comparing descriptive statistics for male and female workers, shown in Table 1.2. 
Table 1.2: Descriptive Statistics 
 Women (N=124) Men (N=296)  Comparison    
 Mean or %  SD  
Mean 
or %  SD   
Personal    
Education   ** 
Below BA 16.13 6.42   
BA 71.77 70.95   
MA or higher 12.10 22.64   
Age 37.94 8.54 40.73 9.03  ** 
Job characteristics    Weekly work hours 40.67 7.52 43.15 8.44  *** 
Clerical work  20.97 7.43   *** 
Job class   *** 
Management track 57.26 81.08   
Contract job 25.00 12.50   
General track 17.74 6.42   
Authority (# of subordinates) 1.48 3.74 4.41 7.03 *** 
Job history   Tenure 9.69 8.61 12.31 9.84  * 
Number of previous employers 1.09 1.20 0.72 1.00  ** 
Performance (bonus rate) 0.24 0.25 0.31 0.24 * 
Family characteristics    
Married  35.48 73.99   *** 
Parent  21.77 59.80   *** 
Outcome variables    Self-assessed job quality (1-5) 3.74 0.69 3.92 0.82 * 
Monthly base pay (1000s of yen) 389.34 196.87 552.54 239 *** 
Total annual earnings (1000s of yen) 5820.69 3160.52 8791.20 4307.75 *** 
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05 (t-test and chi2 tests) 
 Female employees are about three years younger on average, and have three years less 
tenure than men. They are less likely than men to have an advanced degree, and more likely 
to have completed their educations without graduating from a four-year college or university. 
Although the gap between men’s and women’s ages is not large, men are about twice as 
likely to be married as women. Men are also about three times more likely to have children. 
These suggest that while women (or their parents: see Brinton 1993) underinvest in education 
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compared to men, household duties are an unlikely explanation for any gender gaps here: 
most of the women in the sample have focused on their careers, perhaps to the exclusion of 
family life.   
 Turning to the statistics about job sorting, we see that women are overrepresented in 
jobs that at a national level are female-typed. Although a majority of women (57%) hold 
regular jobs on the management track, women are still twice as likely as men to hold short-
term contracts and are about three times as likely to work on the non-promotional general 
track. In terms of job characteristics, women are more likely than men to work in clerical 
roles, and have less supervisory authority.  
 Turning next to the gender pay gap, the unadjusted gap is 34%, with women earning 
approximately 5.8 million yen ($58,000) on average, compared to 8.8 million yen ($88,000) 
for men. I also estimate the size of the gender gap after making adjustments for other 
variables that may affect it. I do not display the coefficients of these models, but they are 
available from the author on request. A summary of the findings appears in Table 1.3. 
 As this table shows, adding random effects for teams and firms does not change the 
estimated gap very much—with these effects, the estimated gender gap actually rises slightly 
to 36% (Model B), indicating that sorting into teams and firms with lower pay does not drive 
the female wage disadvantage in this sample.  
 Adding adjustment variables for education, age, age squared, tenure, tenure squared, 
number of previous jobs, and work hours does narrow the gap, but does not eliminate it 
(Model C). With these adjustments, predicted annual earnings for women rise to 7.1 million 
yen ($71,000), compared to 8.8 million yen ($88,000) for men. This still represents a sizeable 
gap of 19%.  
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Table 1.3: Summary of Analysis of Gender Pay Gap 
Controls Model A Model B Model C  Model D 
Random effects for teams and firms        
Education      
Age and age2      
Tenure and tenure2      
Number of previous employers 34%*** 36%*** 19%***  15%*** 
Work hours      
Job Content    
Authority    
Job Class    
Shaded portion represents which adjustment variables the model includes.   
Percentages represent the unexplained wage gap between men and women.  
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05 (significance of gender difference)  
 Surprisingly, adding job-level variables, including controls for job content (clerical 
versus non-clerical), supervisory authority, and job class (management track, general track, 
and contract), has only a relatively minor impact on the residual gap between men and 
women (Model D). After these adjustments, women’s predicted earnings are 7.3 million yen 
($73,000), compared to 8.6 million yen ($86,000) for men, a gender gap of 15%.  
 These analyses of income indicate that within-job pay gaps contribute more to overall 
gender inequality than between-job pay gaps in this context. In all three models, the 
substantively large pay gaps between men and women are also statistically significant, even 
after job-level adjustments in Model D. This final model suggests that between-job pay gaps 
also exist, but only between regular and management track jobs, not between contract and 
management track jobs. Predicted earnings for an employee on the management track are 
$7.7 million yen ($77,000). For an employee in a contract position they are $7.3 million yen 
($73,000, a statistically insignificant difference), but in general track jobs, predicted wages 
are much lower, at 5.8 million yen ($58,000). The gap between general and management 
track workers (25% ceteris paribus) is thus larger than the within-job pay gap between men 
and women (15% ceteris paribus), but within-job wages differences contribute more to the 
gender pay gap overall because the majority of women work in the management track.  
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Analysis of Discrimination and Preferences in Job Placement 
 Next, I look for evidence that discrimination drives women’s concentration in contract 
and general track jobs, using job quality as an outcome variable. The results from this 
regression appear in Table 1.4.  
Table 1.4: Regression of Job Class on Job Quality 
 Model 1  
Individual-level variables  Beta SE 
Male 0.17 0.10 
Age  0.02*** 0.01 
Educationa 
BA  0.05 0.15
Above BA 0.00 0.17 
Tenure -0.01+ 0.01 
Work Hours 0.01 0.01 
Job classb 
Contract 0.01 0.18
General track -0.12 0.20 
Contract * male 0.08 0.22 
General track * male -0.34 0.26 
Constant 2.95***  0.33 
Model information 
Observations 420
Number of firms 12
Individual-level variance component  0.54
Team-level variance component 0.00
Firm-level variance component 0.04   
Results are from ANCOVA with random effects models (HLM). All slopes are fixed.  
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.10  
a Reference category is less than BA 
b Reference category is Management track  
 None of the main effects for job class are significant, indicating that differences in self-
assessed job quality between women in the two female-typed job classes and women in 
management track positions are statistically indistinguishable from zero. The main effect for 
men and the interaction effects between job class and the male dummy are also insignificant, 
showing that there are no statistical differences between job quality for men in any job class 
and women on the management track.  Predicted job quality for men and women by job class 
appears in Figure 1.2.  
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Figure 1.2: Predicted Self-Assessed Job Quality by Gender and Job Class 
  
As Figure 1.2 shows, substantively as well as statistically, job quality does not differ very 
much for women in the three tracks. Job quality for women in contract and management track 
positions is equivalent, and job quality for women on the general track is only 3% lower than 
that of women on the management track. There is thus no support for Hypotheses 1a and 1b. 
Only men on the general track rate their jobs notably lower than other groups; because the 
gap in subjective job quality for men on the management track and the general track is larger 
than for women, there is also no support for Hypothesis 1c.  
Analyses of Discrimination and Performance in Wage Determination 
 Next I turn to the analysis of within-job wage determination. As described above, large 
unexplained wage gaps between women and men remain, even after standard controls. Could 
this gap be attributable to performance, or employers’ assessments of performance? As we 
can see from the descriptive statistics, as a proportion of base pay, women’s bonus payments 
are about 21% lower than men’s on average (0.24 versus 0.31). Depending on the 
relationship between performance and base pay, this could entirely explain within-job wage 
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gaps. I generate four additional models to examine how men’s and women’s performance is 
rewarded. Results appear in Table 1.5.  
 Models 2 and 3 use monthly base pay as the outcome variable, while Models 4 and 5 
use total annual income, including both base pay and bonus amounts. Models 2 and 4 
constrain the slope of performance to be identical for men and women, while Models 3 and 5 
permit the slope of performance to vary by gender.  
 I turn first to Model 4, which is identical to Model D, but with the addition of a 
curvilinear term for performance. The main effect for men is substantively large, and 
statistically significant. This indicates that the intercept of performance on pay is higher for 
men, and that recent performance does not explain away the gender pay gap in total pay. 
Indeed, adding the performance term does almost nothing to reduce the unexplained gender 
pay gap. Predicted pay for women and men in Model 4 is 6.8 million yen ($68,000) and 7.9 
million yen ($79,000), respectively, a pay gap of 14% compared to 15% in Model D. 
Similarly, Model 2 produces a large male effect on wages, and estimates a 13% gender gap in 
base pay, net of performance and other adjustment variables. These results provide support 
for Hypothesis 2. 
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Table 1.5: Regression of Performance on Monthly Base Pay and Total Annual Earnings    
 Model 2 (Base Pay) Model 3 (Base Pay) Model 4 (Annual Earn.) Model 5  (Annual Earn.)     
Individual level variables  Beta SE Beta SE Beta SE Beta SE 
Performance -406.98*** 100.51 -7.84 172.81 -2,242.99 1,546.02 2,687.50 2,614.53
Performance squared 399.51*** 107.81 -35.67 187.65 10,261.80*** 1,658.19 2,026.15 2,839.05
Male 66.51*** 17.81 137.24*** 33.04 1,129.23*** 273.97 1,490.87** 499.85
Male * performance   -573.32** 204.49 -6,807.59* 3,094.01
Male * performance sq.   621.11** 219.99 11,449.58*** 3,328.57
Age  25.34** 8.12 26.88*** 8.10 324.35** 124.91 395.94** 122.59
Age squared -0.11 0.10 -0.13 0.10 -1.26 1.47 -2.10 1.44
Educationa   
BA  64.76* 30.15 65.14* 29.89 1,003.10* 463.60 1,092.63* 452.10
Above BA 65.87+ 34.56 65.86+ 34.25 947.14+ 531.46 1,021.53* 518.06
Tenure 2.43 3.61 1.75 3.60 89.01 55.58 60.25 54.46
Tenure squared -0.23* 0.10 -0.21* 0.10 -4.70** 1.50 -3.81** 1.47
Number of prev. employers -18.51+ 10.73 -17.87+ 10.65 -245.48 165.04 -264.26 160.98
Work Hours 1.60 0.98 1.63+ 0.97 20.08 15.04 19.67 14.65
Clerical work -80.11** 28.23 -79.48** 28.49 -1,462.19*** 433.33 -1,135.38** 430.57
Authority  8.29*** 1.32 8.23*** 1.30 124.35*** 20.23 122.23*** 19.71
Job classb   
Contract -45.68* 22.08 -42.43+ 21.92 -673.67* 339.58 -575.69+ 331.39
General track -92.43*** 27.43 -96.00*** 27.54 -1,571.33*** 422.11 -1,384.07*** 416.56
Constant -416.65* 166.05 -489.15** 166.80 -6,290.16* 2,550.49 -7,970.49** 2,518.37
Model information   
Observations 420 420 420 420
Number of firms 12 12 12 12
Individual-level var. comp. 9634 19143 4622294 4380537
Team-level variance comp. 2486 2304 551498 537006
Firm-level variance comp. 19479        9844        2033000        1951602      
31 
 
Notes to Table 1.5: Results are from ANCOVA with random effects models (HLM). All slopes are fixed.  
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.10. a Reference category is less than BA; b Reference category is 
Management track 
Figure 1.3: Performance and Compensation Residuals for Men and Women 
Y axes represent actual income minus expected income, where expected values are calculated from education 
level, age, age squared, tenure, tenure squared, work hours, number of previous employers, job content, job 
class, level of supervisory authority, team, and firm. Lines represent expected values accounting for these 
variables plus estimated performance and gender.  Points have some random jitter for visual clarity. Estimated 
performance cannot fall below 0. 1 million JPY ≈ 10,000 USD.
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 Turning to Models 3 and 5, curvilinear interaction terms between the male dummy and 
performance are also significant, indicating the slope (as well as the intercept) for 
performance on pay differs for women and men. I show a visualization of these effects in 
Figure 1.3.  
 The points on the graphs in Figure 1.3 represent the compensation residual—
respondents’ actual income minus their expected income. To visually preserve the 
relationships between gender, performance, and compensation illustrated by the coeffecients 
in Models 3 and 5, the residuals represented by points are calculated using all model 
components except for gender and performance. The predictions plotted by lines show 
expected values of compensation given gender and performance. Y values above zero 
represent respondents who earn more than expected, given their human capital and job 
characteristics (but not their gender or performance), while Y values below zero represent 
respondents who earn less than expected, given these background characteristics. If recent 
performance has a positive impact on wages, we would expect more Y values above zero on 
the right side of the graph (among high performers) and more Y values below zero on the left 
side of the graph (among low performers).  
 Turning first at the results for base pay, we see that indeed, most men (69%) with high 
performance (above 0.45) have Y values above 0. In other words, men with high performance 
tend to have higher compensation than we would expect given their background 
characteristics. However, we do not observe the same result for women. On the contrary, only 
about half of women with high performance (44%) have higher than expected wages; the 
slope of female performance on base pay is flat and there is no evidence that female high 
performers earn more in base pay than comparable women with average or below average 
performance. Of course, as we can see in the graph for Model 5, when bonus amounts are 
factored in, women with high performance do earn higher total incomes than other women. 
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But because we do not see this relationship in base pay, we can infer that high performing 
women’s earning advantage comes solely from the bonus itself, not from higher base pay. In 
comparison, for men in Model 5, we see a much steeper slope of performance on total 
compensation than we do for women. This is because high performing men are advantaged 
both in terms of base pay, as we see in Model 3, and in terms of bonus.  
 Overall, the results plotted in Figure 1.3 support both Hypothesis 2 and Hypothesis 3. 
Unexplained pay gaps remain between men and women after adjusting for recent 
performance, and these gaps appear larger among the highest performers. However, there are 
also some unexpected results. Turning again to the visualization of Model 3, we see that the 
Y values for men with performance below 0.45 are not concentrated below 0. Rather, 58% of 
men with estimated performance below 0.45 also have Y values above 0. So although a 
higher percentage of high performing men have higher than expected salaries, a majority of 
low performing men do as well. Indeed, a small number of men (20) have very high base pay 
(more than 0.2 million yen higher than expected) and well below average performance 
(below 0.2). These men’s presence generates the left-hand side of the U-shaped predicted 
relationship between recent performance and base pay for men. This relationship is less 
apparent in the model for total compensation, because bonus is such a major component of 
total pay, so by definition here low performers cannot earn the highest salaries. However, a 
distinct group of highly paid people (predominantly, but not exclusively men) with 
performance below 0.2 is still apparent in the Model 5 graph.  
 On the other hand, women with estimated performance below 0.45 are about as likely 
to be undercompensated as overcompensated based on their human capital and job 
characteristics. 49% of women with performance of 0.45 or below have base pay that is 
higher than expected, similar to the proportion among female high achievers who do. There 
are a handful of women (4) with very high pay and below average performance, but their 
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performance is not as low and their pay is not as high as the men in this group. Moreover, 
their presence is counterbalanced by a much larger number of women with low performance 
and low pay, such that we do not observe the same U-curve for women that we do for men. I 
discuss potential reasons for these unexpected results further in the following section.    
  
Discussion  
 The analysis above examines whether there is any evidence of gender discrimination in 
Japanese firms’ job placement and pay determination processes. I find no evidence of gender 
discrimination in job placement. If the firms in this study exclude women from the 
management track, we would expect women on other tracks to rate their job quality lower 
than women on the management track, because discrimination would push some women who 
prefer the management track into what they see as less desirable jobs on other tracks. In fact, 
women’s job quality is substantively and statistically equivalent across tracks. If anything, it 
appears that men are more likely to working in general track jobs when they would prefer 
management track jobs.  
 Unlike studies (e.g. Fernandez and Sosa 2005) that examine how companies treat their 
applicant pools, and how that treatment differs by applicant gender, this approach cannot 
specify the magnitude of discrimination, because we cannot know how women who may be 
been excluded from the management track responded. Certainly not all of them would apply 
for general track jobs at the same firms, nor would it be likely that everyone who is working 
on the general track unwillingly had previously applied unsuccessfully for a management 
track job at that same firm. However, given that general track jobs at prestigious firms still 
offer relatively generous salaries, it seems likely that if women are excluded from the 
management track, some of them would apply for and win jobs on the general track. 
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Moreover, the fact that women excluded from management track jobs at other firms might 
apply to general track jobs at the firms in this sample makes it more likely that we would 
detect discrimination in this instance, not less so. The null finding here thus suggests that, 
despite the general assumption that the tracking system is a way to hoard the highest-paid 
opportunities for men (e.g. Kumamoto-Healy 2005; Mun 2016; Nemoto 2016), women are in 
some cases content  to forgo those opportunities.  
 At the same time, the results do not suggest that Japanese firms treat women equally 
within jobs. We observe sizable wage gaps of around 15% between women and men doing 
the same work, in the same job class, on the same teams, in the same firms. These results are 
not attributable to gender differences in recent performance.  
 But is the within-job gender wage gap attributable to discrimination? I considered 
several other possibilities in supplementary analyses. Firstly, it is possible that firms 
compensate workers directly for earning professional certificates and participating in training 
(e.g. Tam 1997). While I do not know in detail how much training workers have undergone, I 
asked survey respondents to select up to seven types of training they participated in at their 
current employer, including training in business manners, computer skills, international 
management, supervisory skills, negotiations, sales, and legal compliance. On average, 
women participate in approximately one fewer training types than men, even after 
adjustments for tenure, age, and track status; but participating in more trainings (or in 
particular types of trainings) is not associated with higher wages. It is therefore unlikely that 
training differences account for observed within-job pay gaps.  
 Alternatively, it is possible that assumptions I rely on to estimate performance are 
violated. Although the analysis does not require performance to be constant over workers’ 
careers, in order to detect discrimination, I assume that the relationship between recent 
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performance (which is captured in the measure of bonus), and past performance (which is not 
captured by bonus) does not vary by gender. However, this assumption may be wrong if, for 
example, women’s performance varies more over the life course, depending perhaps on the 
ages of children. If women’s life course variance in performance is large, this could explain 
why current performance has a null relationship with base pay for women, since women who 
performed highly in the most recent period may have performed poorly in the past, and vice 
versa.  
 If variation in household responsibilities over the female life course makes women’s 
performance more unstable than men’s over time, we might reasonably expect this effect to 
be concentrated among mothers. I therefore reran Model 3 without mothers to see if, among 
childless women, the relationship between recent performance and base pay would more 
closely approximate that for men. Specifically, we might expect to observe more mothers in 
the lower right quadrant of the charts in Figure 1.3 (e.g. current high performers with 
surprisingly low pay), and perhaps the upper left quadrant (e.g. current low performers with 
surprisingly high pay). This was not the case. There were only four mothers who were high 
performers, but they were equally distributed in the upper and lower quadrants on the right 
side. There were 23 mothers with low or average performance, and they were also evenly 
split between the upper (11 women) and lower (12 women) quadrants on the left. In sum, 
there is no evidence that life course variation in performance drives the different relationships 
between men’s and women’s performance and their compensation.  
 Thirdly, estimates of performance I derived from bonus amounts may also be biased by 
gender. This is unlikely to generate the gender differences in returns to performance I observe 
here, however. Castilla (2008, 2015) finds that in a large U.S. service firm, women received 
lower bonuses than men with identical performance ratings. If this occurs in this study 
context, it would bias our estimates of female performance downwards, relative to men’s, and 
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reduce rather than exaggerate estimates of the difference in male and female returns to 
performance.  
 Because of the weaknesses of these alternative explanations for within-job pay 
differences net of performance, it seems most likely that discrimination causes the residual 
gender pay gaps. Moreover, the evidence suggests that discrimination is the single most 
important contributor to the overall gender gap after adjustments for human capital in this 
sample. Men’s and women’s preferences for different jobs also produce wage differences, but 
because most women in this context do not work in female-typed jobs, job segregation 
contributes relatively little to the overall gap. Performance differences, on the other hand, 
contribute almost nothing. 
 Lastly, I discuss the reasons for the unexpectedly high number of men with low 
performance and high base pay. I suspect that these are men who accumulated large raises 
during previous periods when their performance was high. In the most recent period or 
periods their performance was low, but because base pay reductions for poor performance are 
smaller and less likely than salary increases for high performance (Tsuru, Abe, and Kubo 
2005), the base compensation of these men remains high even though they have performed 
poorly. There are few women in this group, because as suggested by the flat relationship 
between performance and base pay for women, women do not receive raises commensurate 
with performance, and thus do not have the same opportunities as men to earn high salaries 
while resting on their laurels. 
 
Conclusion 
 Theory on “the opportunity structure for discrimination” (Petersen and Saporta 2004) 
generates contradictory predictions about whether discrimination is more likely in job 
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allocation or in pay determination. While theorists agree that transparency is likely to reduce 
employer discrimination, they differ in their emphasis on what information needs to be 
transparent and who must be able to see it. Petersen and Saporta (2004) suggest that 
information about how the firm treats a worker’s peers is required, and the plaintiff herself 
must have access to that information. Castilla (2008) suggests that more general aggregate 
information about average treatment of different groups is necessary, and visibility to more 
general audiences, such as other employees, the public, or government regulators may be 
more important than transparency to the immediate persons concerned. This analysis 
examines, for the first time, evidence of discrimination in job allocation and in pay 
determination in the same context. I find no evidence of gender discrimination in job 
allocation, but I do find evidence that strongly suggests discrimination in pay determination.  
 These findings support the perspective that general information about group treatment 
needs to be available to general audiences to constrain discrimination. Consider first the 
availability of information about pay for men and women within jobs at Japanese firms. Even 
anonymized data about pay at Japanese companies are extremely rare. My data and those of 
Hashimoto and Sato (2014) and Kato, Kawaguchi, and Owan (2013) are unusual exceptions. 
However, individual women and men do have some sense of their pay relative to their peers. 
Receiving higher total compensation or base pay than expected based on human capital and 
job characteristics (the Y values plotted in Figure 1.3) is strongly associated with 
respondents’ likelihood of saying that they earn more than similar peers at their firm. But 
regulators, researchers, and the public have very little to go on to consider whether or not 
firms discriminate against women in pay within jobs.  
 Conversely, there is extensive evidence in the public sphere about job segregation. 
Private companies have collected and sold company-level data on women’s representation 
among new hires and in management since the 1980s (Mun 2016). More recently, this 
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information has also become publicly available online through a government clearinghouse 
website (Ministry of Health, Labor, and Welfare 2016). The data provided on the website are 
not necessarily consistent across companies, and can be ambiguous—there is little to indicate 
whether a firm that hires few women does so because it makes many offers to women, and 
women reject the offers, because the firm excludes qualified women, or because the female 
applicant pool is of lower quality than the male. Nonetheless, even if the data available do not 
permit straightforward accusations of discrimination, companies with “bad numbers” may 
face uncomfortable questions from activists, the media, and the courts. This added scrutiny 
may prompt companies to reconsider problematic hiring processes preemptively.  
 The findings also raise new questions about other mechanisms that cause 
discrimination to occur in one stage of employment but not in another. The results of this 
study are consistent with the transparency mechanism, but I do not test it directly here (for 
one such test, see Castilla 2015). Thus other mechanisms may also be at work, in addition to 
the transparency mechanism. For example, the apparent lack of discrimination in job 
placement accompanied by a comparatively high level of pay discrimination suggests that 
there may be tradeoffs between different metrics of equality. In particular, as women’s 
representation in male jobs grows, so do the costs of raising women’s pay to match men’s. I 
do not suggest that employers deliberately collude to keep women’s wages low—but in order 
to control labor costs senior managers in firms with many women in traditionally male jobs 
may quietly choose not to investigate wage inequality closely enough to find evidence of a 
problem.  
 A body of recent research (e.g. Kalev, Dobbin, and Kelly 2006; Dobbin, Schrage, and 
Kalev 2015) tests the effects of changes in human resource practices on gender and racial 
integration of managerial ranks, and has found that some policies and practices have positive 
effects on integration. However, the findings of the current paper suggest that the same 
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policies that promote the gender integration of jobs may have null or even negative effects on 
within-job pay gaps, depending perhaps on levels of transparency in pay. Investigating 
whether and under what conditions particular policies have consistent effects across different 
measures of gender inequality is a fruitful area for future research.  
 What do these results tell us more broadly about gender inequality and human resource 
practices in Japan? Scholars agree that interlocking institutional processes all contribute to 
Japan’s high level of gender inequality, including but not limited to Japan’s tax policy 
favoring a breadwinner model, the oversubscribed public childcare system, men’s low 
contributions to household tasks and childrearing, and the gendered tracking system in 
employment (Boling 2015; Estevez-Abe 2013; Nemoto 2016). However, we have seen here 
that even women who work at some of the most progressive firms in the country, many of 
whom have never married or had children, still earn less than their male counterparts doing 
the same jobs. In other words, even if all other barriers to gender inequality disappeared 
overnight, the unequal way in which firms compensate men and women’s performance 
within jobs would perpetuate a high level of gender inequality.  
 The results also demonstrate that even in firms that emphasize performance in 
determining compensation, women’s pay disadvantage does not disappear. Age-wage profiles 
have become less steep as firms have put a greater emphasis on performance (Mitani 2010; 
Tsuru, Abe, and Kubo 2005) Theoretically this could benefit women, whose careers at a 
single firm may be shorter than those of their male counterparts, and who thus accrue fewer 
of the benefits to age and seniority (Nemoto 2016). But even if performance pay has shrunk 
the pay gap between men and women, we see here that it has not closed it, and that high-
performing women are even less able to close the pay gap with men than low-performing 
women.  
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 Moreover, the findings cast serious doubt that performance pay effectively motivates 
either male or female employees at large Japanese firms. The results suggest that men can 
accumulate large raises through high performance early in their careers. However, after 
reaching a certain income level, some men may decide that the marginal returns to high 
performance have diminished and subsequently reduce the effort they put into their jobs. 
Theoretically, these men could coast along with poor performance and high base pay for 
years to come. Women, on the other hand, have less incentive to perform well in the first 
place because they do not appear to have the same opportunities as men to increase their base 
pay through high performance. It would not be surprising if part of women’s relative 
underperformance compared to men in this sample is simply a rational response to their 
negligible returns to performance.  
  The Abe government has made building “a society where women can shine” (Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs 2015) a centerpiece of its economic policy, and has argued that Japan 
needs women’s economic contributions to break out of its three decade long economic slump. 
To promote gender integration, the government encourages companies to promote women to 
management roles and has set (non-binding) targets of filling 15% of managerial roles in 
private companies with women by 2030. The current study suggests that these already 
unambitious efforts are likely to fall flat. Because women see lower returns to performance 
and thus have less incentive to perform well, firms may struggle to identify women 
appropriate for promotion. Further, unless firms also face greater pressure to equalize wages, 
within-job wage gaps will persist in spite of (or perhaps because of) women’s greater 
representation in management.   
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CHAPTER 2 
CAPITALS OR CONTEXTS? FOREIGN WORKERS’ ECONOMIC ASSIMILATION IN 
JAPAN’S HIGHLY SELECTIVE IMMIGRATION REGIME  
Introduction 
Why do some immigrants succeed economically while others struggle? Since the 
early days of scholarly interest in this question (Glazer and Moyinhan 1963; Gordon 1964), 
scholars have debated the relative contributions of two families of predictors: capitals and 
contexts (e.g. Alba and Nee 2003; Kasinitz et al. 2008; Portes and Rumbaut 2001). Scholars 
agree that immigrants’ economic resources, their human capital and training, and their social 
capital facilitate economic assimilation. But, at the same time, immigrants’ ability to 
assimilate is not solely a function of their individual and family characteristics. Laws, 
institutions, norms, and attitudes in the host society—the contexts into which immigrants 
integrate—also help or hinder their economic attainment.  
Recent scholarship in the capitals tradition has focused on refining measures of 
economic and human capital and estimating how fine-grained differences in the quality of 
capital are associated with immigrants’ earnings (Chiswick, Lee, and Miller 2005). For 
example, rather than simply quantifying immigrants’ years of education, researchers have 
distinguished between human capital acquired in the host country and human capital acquired 
in the origin country (e.g. Friedberg 2000; Zeng and Xie 2004). Human capital acquired in 
the origin country can be further differentiated by its “quality,” where education obtained in 
wealthy countries of origin facilitates speedier economic assimilation than education obtained 
in poorer origin countries (e.g. Kaushal 2011; Bratsberg and Ragan 2002; Li and Sweetman 
2014).  
These refinements in the measurement of human capital have reliable associations 
with labor market outcomes but nonetheless suffer from two methodological and conceptual 
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problems. First, in Western countries, host country human capital and the quality of 
immigrants’ foreign human capital—predictors in the capitals tradition—are strongly 
associated with natives’ attitudes towards members of different immigrant groups, a predictor 
in the contexts tradition (Li 2001; Reitz 1998). The most successful immigrants in Western 
countries—those from Western Europe, North America, and Oceania—are also those who 
quickly develop (or already hold) host country human capital; these same immigrants also 
have “high quality” home country human capital, and face little or no prejudice from natives. 
Because immigrants to Western destinations tend to be simultaneously advantaged or 
disadvantaged in terms of their capital and the receiving context, measures intended to 
capture individual-level capitals, such as host country language ability or sending country 
GDP, do not cleanly do so, and instead may pick up on the effects of context of integration.  
Second, these recent studies of human capital ignore differences in immigrant 
selectivity by national origin (Feliciano 2005). This is a challenge for studies of human 
capital quality that use sending country level variables such as GDP per capita or student-
teacher ratios as a proxy for the quality of the education that immigrants from that country 
acquired prior to migration (e.g. Li and Sweetman 2014; Kaushal 2011). When the 
motivations and selection mechanisms for emigration vary by sending country, it is 
problematic to assume that sending country level measures describe immigrants from all 
sending countries equally well. 
This paper addresses these twin shortcomings by assessing the relationship between 
fine-grained measures of human capital and economic outcomes for immigrants in the 
context of Japan. Unlike in Western countries, in Japan, the immigrants who face the most 
hostile context of reception—other East Asians—are relatively advantaged in terms of their 
human capital. Immigrants from the West, on the other hand, face a positive context of 
reception, but do not acculturate as quickly. In other words, the collinearities between capitals 
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and contexts that plague analyses of immigrants’ economic assimilation in the West are 
largely absent in Japan. This lack of collinearity means that measures of human capital are 
not “polluted” by context of reception, and make possible a cleaner measurement of capitals’ 
true effects on immigrants’ economic outcomes.  
This study uses an original sample of 524 workers from Japan, other East Asian 
countries, Southeast Asia, and the West. All workers are white-collar professionals employed 
in a homogeneous sample of twelve large Japanese firms. This design mitigates concerns 
about the effects of differential selectivity by country of origin by comparing immigrants 
who, regardless of origin country, are presumably similar to each other in unobserved ways 
(such as level of motivation or ability), because they were hired to work on the same teams at 
the same firms.  
In this context, I find that acquisition of host country human capital and estimated 
quality of education in the sending country do not matter for immigrants’ economic 
assimilation, defined as the achievement of economic parity with natives. Observed 
inequalities, with lower wages for East Asians relative to Japanese and higher wages for 
Westerners, are best explained by natives’ positive attitudes towards Westerners and negative 
attitudes towards other East Asians. Although these results are, of course, specific to the 
Japanese context, they imply that previous research may overestimate the benefits of 
acculturation and “high quality” human capital for immigrants, and underestimate the 
importance of the context of reception and, more specifically, natives’ attitudes towards 
members of different groups.  
  
Why Are There Differences in Economic Attainment between Immigrant Groups?  
Human capital theory explains a great deal of the differences in earnings between 
natives and the foreign-born and among immigrants of different national origins. For 
 54 
 
example, in the United States, members of economically prosperous immigrant groups such 
as Asian Indians are more likely to hold undergraduate or advanced degrees than native-born 
whites (Pew Research Center 2012), and members of impoverished groups, such as 
Guatemalans, are more likely to have very low levels of education (Brown and Patten 2013). 
The positive association between human capital and earnings among immigrants is well 
established and robust across all contexts in which it has been estimated (Chiswick, Lee, and 
Miller 2005). But while these obvious variations in human capital account for some of the 
differences in immigrants’ economic attainment, in many contexts immigrants still earn less 
than natives with similar qualifications (e.g. Chiswick and Miller 2009), and within levels of 
education, members of some immigrant groups still earn more than others (e.g. Portes and 
Rumbaut 2001, 2006). These remaining differences present an enduring empirical puzzle 
(Phythian, Walters, and Anisef 2011), and although scholars have made some progress 
towards understanding the sources of these residual gaps, their results are often causally 
ambiguous.  
One strategy to account for residual earnings gaps is to refine the measurement of 
human capital (e.g. Zeng and Xie 2004). For example, immigrants with more education and 
work experience in the host country experience better economic outcomes than those with 
equivalent years of education and experience obtained in the country of origin. In particular, 
immigrants with more host-county education hold more prestigious occupations (e.g. Akresh 
2006; Kanas and van Tubergen 2009), earn higher wages (e.g. Bratsberg and Ragan 2002; 
Friedberg 2000; Kaushal 2011; Zeng and Xie 2004), and have higher net worth (Painter 
2013) than their immigrant counterparts without only (or primarily) home country education. 
Researchers have replicated these findings for a number of countries, including the United 
States (e.g. Bratsberg and Ragan 2002; Akresh 2006), Canada (e.g. Li 2001; Aydemir and 
Skuterud 2008; Skuterud and Su 2011), the Netherlands (Kanas and van Tubergen 2009), 
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Belgium (Kanas and van Tubergen 2014), Sweden (Duvander 2001; Nordin 2009), Norway 
(Støren and Wiers-Jenssen 2010), and Israel (Friedberg 2000).10  
Why, though, is the payoff to host country education and experience so consistently 
higher? One potential explanation is acculturation. Immigrants who receive their education 
and work experience in their host country are not only more likely to be fluent in the 
language of the host country, but they are more likely to acquire diffuse, unmeasured assets, 
such as knowledge of “business practices, and of norms and institutions of the host country” 
(Kaida 2013). Consistent with this argument, in some studies, wage differences between 
native-born Whites and foreign-born Asian immigrations to the United States disappear after 
adjusting for the place of education (Zeng and Xie 2004).  
At the same time, other studies find that, even after accounting for different 
distributions of home and host country education and experience by ethnic group, group 
differences in the size of the benefit of host country education and experience (or 
disadvantage of a home country education and experience) persist (see Painter 2013 for a 
review). Origin country education is more valuable for some groups than for others (see for 
example, Bratsberg and Terrell 2002). Further, in a few exceptional cases, origin country 
education is more valuable than host country education: for example, among graduates of 
European universities living in Israel (Friedberg 2000), graduates of both Chinese and 
Western universities employed in Japan (Takenaka, Ishida, and Nakamuro 2015), and 
graduates of Japanese universities in the United States (Kim and Sakamoto 2010).  
This unexplained group variation has prompted a further extension of human capital 
theory that focuses on variations across countries in the quality of the education system and 
                                                 
10 Where studies have compared migrants with high levels of educational attainment to those with lower levels, 
research has found greater returns to host country human capital among the more educated group (Bratsberg and 
Ragan 2002; Painter 2013). In other words, for more educated workers, host country human capital provides an 
even larger advantage than for less-educated workers.  
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in prior work experience (e.g. Bratsberg and Ragan 2002; Bratsberg and Terrell 2002; Li and 
Sweetman 2014). When sending countries have better educational systems, home country 
education will be more valuable in the host country labor market, and the relative benefit of 
host country education will be lower. Conversely, when host countries have better 
educational systems, the value of host country education will exceed that of home country 
education. Consistent with these claims, immigrants with schooling from high GDP and high 
test score countries tend to earn more than immigrants from low GDP and low test score 
countries, but these patterns are weaker or non-existent for 1.5 generation immigrants who 
migrated at an early age and thus received most of their education in their new homes (Li and 
Sweetman 2014; Bratsberg and Ragan 2002; Kaushal 2011; Bratsberg and Terrell 2002).  
As promising as these extensions to the basic human capital narrative may be, they 
are susceptible to two potential challenges. First, in the Western contexts where this research 
has been conducted, it is very difficult to distinguish between acculturation and quality 
narratives, and no studies actually attempt to disentangle these two factors in a rigorous 
way.11 Immigrants who are advantaged in terms of (unmeasured) acculturation are also those 
most likely to be advantaged in terms of human capital quality. Consider, as an example, the 
case of European immigrants to the United States. Studies of educational quality rank 
education from Canada, Australia, and Western Europe as the best (Kaushal 2011; Bratsberg 
and Ragan 2002; Li and Sweetman 2014). But because of a shared cultural history between 
these regions and the United States, immigrants from these countries are also most likely to 
have an advantage in terms of unmeasured acculturation. In other words, there is a high 
degree of collinearity between quality and acculturation.  
                                                 
11 To some extent, it is possible to measure acculturation with language ability, but, as discussed above, there 
are aspects of accultulturation such as familiarity with norms, which standard datasets do not measure. 
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Omitted measures of discrimination may also bias estimates of the economic 
advantages of acculturation and educational quality. That is, not only are European 
immigrants the most acculturated and the most likely beneficiaries of a high quality education 
system in their home countries, but they are also the least likely to experience racial or ethnic 
prejudice (Kim 2015; Oreopoulos 2011). Conversely, the same immigrants who would be the 
most disadvantaged in terms of acculturation and human capital quality–those from poor 
Asian, Latin American, and African countries—are also the most likely to experience 
prejudice and discrimination (Bonilla-Silva and Dietrich 2008). 
Studies of human capital quality and acculturation attempt to address the issue of race 
by making within-race or national origin comparisons for the first and 1.5 generations, but 
this circumvention ignores issues of selection bias. When immigrants are educated primarily 
in their home countries and migrate as adults, it is the immigrants themselves who select into 
immigration. Conversely, among immigrants who migrated as children and received their 
education in the host country, it is immigrant parents who have selected into immigration, not 
their children. Some scholars (e.g. Kasinitz et al. 2008; Lee and Zhou 2015) argue that the 
children of immigrants have a special advantage because their parents’ sacrifices motivate 
them to excel. Thus, when researchers use large national surveys to compare outcomes for 
immigrants educated abroad and at home, they may confound the attitudinal advantage of the 
children of immigrants with the effects of host country schooling. Further, because of 
correspondence between race and schooling quality, the advantage to host country schooling 
we observe for the 1.5 generation in some groups but not others could simply reflect that 
those groups are subject to greater discrimination and must signal belonging more strongly 
than European immigrants and their children.  
An alternative solution, which I adopt here, is to estimate the net associations between 
place of schooling, racial and ethnic background, and economic outcomes in a labor market 
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where migrants are not simultaneously advantaged on all three axes—acculturation, quality 
of education in the country of origin, and experience of prejudice or discrimination in the host 
country. Specifically, I estimate these associations in the contemporary Japanese context. Of 
course, the mechanisms identified in the Japanese context do not necessarily generalize to 
other contexts, where institutional factors that influence immigrant integration trajectories 
may differ (Reitz 1998; Kogan 2006). As I shall show, the Japanese case illustrates the 
importance of disentangling these related mechanisms, and of course it is interesting in its 
own right because Japan is a major economic powerhouse in East Asia and the world. 
 
The Japanese Case  
By the year 2060, Japan’s population is projected to decline 32% from 2010 levels; by 
2100, the population may fall by as much as 61% (Toyo Keizai 2016). Despite these 
demographic circumstances, Japanese politicians and bureaucrats have eschewed the 
expansion of low-skilled migration in order to avoid the challenges of integrating those 
immigrants (Törngren and Holbrow 2017). Instead, immigration policy focuses on attracting 
immigrants whom the government believes will be easiest to integrate: ethnic Japanese 
(Shipper 2008), pre-college and college students whose education in Japan helps them 
acculturate (Liu-Farrer 2009; 2011), and skilled workers (Tsukasaki 2008; Oishi 2012; 
Holbrow and Nagayoshi 2016).  
Japan’s efforts to join the “global race for talent” (Shachar 2013) began in the early 
1990s, when the government established one of the most liberal skilled immigration 
programs in the OECD (Fuess 2003; Oishi 2012; Holbrow and Nagayoshi 2016). Unlike the 
United States, Japan has no quota system for skilled work visas, so in principle any foreigner 
who lands a skilled job can obtain a visa. Moreover, there is no mandate for employers to 
identify and employ qualified natives before offering a position to a foreigner, and foreigners 
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can renew their work permits indefinitely. In 2012, the government also introduced a new 
visa for highly skilled professionals (HSP visa hereafter) that gives workers with the requisite 
number of points for experience, income, and educational background a fast track to 
permanent residency and other preferential treatment (Green 2015; Törngren and Holbrow 
2017).  
Figure 2.1 shows the percentage of foreigners in various skilled and unskilled visa 
categories.12 The largest category is permanent residents, their spouses, and the spouses of 
Japanese citizens. Permanent residents make up 81% of this group, and 19% are spouses of 
permanent residents or Japanese citizens. To achieve permanent residency, foreigners must 
live in Japan continuously for ten years and meet other criteria established by the 
government. Long-term visa holders, who are ethnic Japanese who may do either skilled or 
unskilled jobs, have little incentive to switch to permanent residency because they have the 
same rights and privileges as permanent visa holders without the arduous application burden. 
Students and trainees would be unable to accumulate the continuous ten years of residency 
necessary to apply for permanent residency. It thus seems reasonable to assume that most 
permanent residents are skilled foreigners.13 After permanent residents, students and workers 
with skilled work visas take up the largest shares, at 13% each. The only category 
unambiguously dominated by unskilled workers, the technical trainee visa, is 10% of the 
total. 
  
                                                 
12 Special Permanent Residents are excluded from Figure 2.1 and Figure 2.2 because they are not immigrants, 
but third and fourth generation descendants of colonial era migrants to Japan (Chung 2010).  
13 Spouses of Japanese citizens may be more likely to be low skilled because this is one of the only pathways to 
long-term settlement for unskilled workers (Ivory forthcoming).  
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Figure 2.1: Foreign Residents by Visa Type (Excluding Special Permanent Residents) 
 
 In terms of composition and size of the immigrant population, the results of Japan’s 
immigration control have been mixed. On one hand, the government has successfully 
contained low-skilled migration. On the other hand, skilled immigration trails other 
developed countries (Oishi 2012), as do overall levels of immigration. In 2015, Japan had an 
estimated 1.9 million immigrant residents, just 1.5% of the population.14  
 
  
                                                 
14 As above, this does not include Special Permanent Residents. Further, because Japan does not have birthright 
citizenship and counts foreign residents on the basis of nationality, naturalized immigrants are not included in 
this total. Japanese-born, second generation immigrants are.  
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Figure 2.2: Regional Origin of Foreign Residents (Excluding Special Permanent Residents) 
 
This paper will focus on skilled immigrants from three world regions: from the West, from 
East Asia, and from Southeast Asia. As Figure 2.2 shows, immigrants from these three 
regions represent more than 75% of all foreigners in Japan, and over 80% of those on skilled 
work visas.  
The unusually high level of selectivity of immigration to Japan makes it an interesting 
site in which to study economic assimilation. Although human capital theory would predict 
(and government bureaucrats expect) largely positive integration outcomes from such a 
highly selected immigrant population, data to assess workers’ economic assimilation are 
scarce and difficult to access. The government does not release census microdata, and nation-
wide social science surveys do not ask about nationality or ethnicity (Lie 2001). Only a few 
surveys have collected any data about economic outcomes for immigrants to Japan, and none 
have collected data from comparable Japanese citizens, making it difficult to assess whether 
migrants economically assimilate and achieve parity or near parity with natives (see 
Takenoshita 2006; Takenaka, Ishida, and Nakamuro 2015; Holbrow and Nagayoshi 2016).  
Is the highly selective policy successful in generating positive integration outcomes? 
If skilled immigrants achieve economic outcomes similar to those of Japanese natives, we 
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could term the policy a success. On the other hand, if even these highly selected skilled 
workers form a professional underclass who earn considerably less than their Japanese 
counterparts, the policy could be called a failure.  
Japan is also a very useful case in which to study acculturation and human capital, 
because, unlike in the United States, skilled immigrants are unlikely to be simultaneously 
advantaged or disadvantaged in terms of acculturation, human capital quality, and context of 
reception. Consider the three immigrant groups that are the subject of this study. In the 
United States, as Table 2.1 shows, the same groups are advantaged or disadvantaged 
regardless of which predictors of economic assimilation are used. Using measures of human 
capital quality such as GDP, class size, and standardized test scores (see Bratsberg and Ragan 
2002; Li and Sweetman 2014), Westerners come from the regions with the best educational 
institutions, followed by (non-Japanese) East Asians, followed by Southeast Asians. As such, 
home country human capital quality is the highest for Westerners, lower quality for East 
Asians, and lowest quality of all for Southeast Asians.   
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Table 2.1: Predicted Rankings of Labor Market Outcomes for Immigrants by Theoretical Perspective (Japan and the U.S.) 
  Japan USA      
Predicted Ranking  
 
Educational  
Quality  
Acculturation  Ethnoracial Hierarchy 
Educational 
Quality  
Acculturation  Ethnoracial Hierarchy 
1  W 
 EA W W 
 
W W 
2  EA 
 SEA SEA EA  EA EA 
3   SEA   W   EA   SEA   SEA SEA 
EA = East Asian foreign-born, SEA = Southeast Asian foreign-born, W = White Western foreign-born.
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Turning to acculturation and host-country specific capital, Westerners are the most 
likely to speak (or find it easier to learn) the English language. They are more likely to be 
familiar with host country norms and values. In other words, Western immigrants to Western 
countries are also the most likely to quickly acculturate and easily obtain host country 
specific human capital. Because countries in East Asia are more developed and secular than 
Southeast Asian countries, and because the average level of English ability is higher in East 
than in Southeast Asia (Education First 2016), it seems reasonable to assume that 
acculturation would follow the same pattern. Finally, Western immigrants to Western 
countries also face quite positive contexts of reception. Because they are most often white, 
they are least likely of any racial group to face ethnic or racial prejudice and discrimination. 
East Asians, by contrast, are more likely to face racial or ethnic prejudice than whites, but 
less so that Southeast Asians (Jones 2013; Bonilla-Silva and Dietrich 2008). Regardless of 
which predictors one considers, the same ethnic ordering of immigrant groups to the United 
States emerges.  
In Japan, however, no group is advantaged on all three axes. If human capital quality 
is truly a measure of something universal, Westerners will be advantaged along that axis, 
followed by East Asians and then Southeast Asians. However, in terms of acculturation, other 
East Asians—whose languages share an alphabet and many cognates with the Japanese 
language (Reischauer 1974), and who are exposed to Japanese culture through the ubiquity of 
Japanese media in their home countries (Otmazgin 2016), have the greatest advantage. 
Southeast Asians, insofar as they are part of Japan’s sphere of cultural influence (Otmazgin 
2016), will be less acculturated that East Asians, but more so than Westerners.  
In terms of prejudice, Westerners are also highly advantaged. Japan has a long history 
of elevating whiteness, both in attitudes towards racial groups (Oguma 2002; Befu 2001; 
Ivory, forthcoming) and in evaluations of appearance and skin tone (Ashikari 2005; Li et al. 
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2008). East Asians are most disadvantaged in terms of prejudice. Today, around 40% of 
respondents to national surveys say they would not accept an Asian foreigner as a relative by 
marriage (author’s analysis of JGSS), and extremist groups and individuals harass and belittle 
resident Chinese and Koreans, particularly on the internet, but also in the public sphere 
(McLelland 2013; Ryang 2013; Osaki 2016), with little fear of government censure or 
sanction (Murai 2016). Southeast Asians also face prejudice, but perhaps because there are 
fewer of them, they are less likely to be targets of vitriolic attacks and less likely to be 
accused of coming to Japan with criminal intent (NPA 2016). On national surveys, Japanese 
people are equally or more likely to say they would accept a Southeast Asian as a relative, 
coworker, or neighbor, compared to their willingness to accept other East Asians, especially 
Chinese, in these roles (author’s analysis of JGSS).  
Because advantage (or disadvantage) in terms of acculturation, home country human 
capital quality, and native attitudes does not align for immigrants to Japan, measures of 
acculturation and human capital quality are cleaner. In a regression analysis, for example, a 
variable for Japanese language skill is less likely to pick up the effects of home country 
educational quality or of context of reception than a variable for native language skill in a 
Western study context.  Further, residual income differences between ethnic groups after 
controls for human capital are more easily interpreted. In the West, collinearity between 
acculturation, education quality, and context of reception, means that patterns of residual 
income differences are ambiguous. If Western immigrants in Western destinations earn more 
than other immigrants after controls, we could plausibly attribute this advantage to 
unmeasured differences in capitals, or to the context of reception. In contrast, because the 
two capital mechanisms and the context mechanism suggest different stratification orders in 
Japan, residual income differences may themselves suggest which mechanism is at work.  
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Data 
To examine stratification between Japanese and foreign employees, and between 
foreign employees of different national backgrounds, I use a novel employer-employee 
matched dataset that I collected between February and April 2015, called the Survey on 
Workplace Environment and Diversity Management. One reason little is known about foreign 
workers in Japan is that they represent such a small share of the total workforce (Oishi 2012). 
Only a minority of firms hire non-Japanese citizens (Holbrow and Nagayoshi 2016), and as a 
result, surveys that randomly sample either individuals or firms fail to capture many foreign 
workers. To ensure the inclusion of an adequate sample of foreign workers, I sampled firms 
from the Diversity Subcommittee of the Japan Association of Corporate Executives (JACE), 
a major business group of Japanese firms. This is an effective sampling frame for two main 
reasons. First, JACE firms tend to be large and large firms are more likely to hire foreign 
workers (JILPT 2009). However, even among large firms that hire foreign workers, the 
modal number of foreign employees is less than four (Holbrow and Nagayoshi 2016). Firms 
that belong to the Diversity Subcommittee, are particularly likely, even among large firms, to 
hire non-Japanese, and to hire them in greater numbers. JACE sent a research request to the 
CEOs of all 205 sub-committee member firms. Twelve firms (5.8%) allowed me to sample 
their workers.  
Ten of the twelve firms in the sample have more than 1,000 employees, and three 
have more than 10,000. The industries of the twelve firms are diverse. Three are high-tech 
manufacturing firms, five are primarily business service organizations (e.g. finance, trade), 
and four focus on consumer service (e.g. retail). Because firms that deliberately treat foreign 
workers more poorly than native workers would be unlikely to respond to such a survey, the 
integration of foreigners in this sample can be interpreted as a best-case scenario for foreign 
workers in large Japanese firms. 
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I asked each participating firm to select two or more teams with at least one foreign 
worker and to send an electronic survey to all members of these teams. The twelve 
participating firms distributed the survey to 909 employees, for a return of 539 valid 
responses, and a response rate of 59%. 15 16 This response rate is appreciably larger than the 
mean response rate of 52.7% in organizational surveys (Baruch and Holtom 2008). The 
electronic survey was available in Japanese, Mandarin Chinese, and English.  
 For the analyses, I excluded thirteen workers with missing data on income and/or sex 
and two workers from Latin America, yielding a final analytical sample of 524 workers: 427 
Japanese workers and 97 foreign workers. 55 of the foreign workers are from other East 
Asian countries, eleven are from Southeast Asia, and 29 are from Europe, North America, 
and Oceania. Two workers are from India and Uzbekistan, and I include them in the 
Southeast Asia group. 
The survey instrument collected detailed information about respondents’ language 
ability in Japanese, English, Mandarin Chinese, Korean, and up to two other languages 
specified by the respondent. Respondents were asked to list where they were born and, if they 
were born abroad, how old they were when they first lived in Japan and how many years they 
lived in Japan in total. I calculated total years abroad by subtracting years in Japan from 
respondents’ current ages. Respondents born in Japan were asked if they had ever lived 
outside Japan, and if so, in what countries, and for how many years. These respondents’ years 
in Japan are calculated by subtracting years abroad from age.  
Respondents indicated what levels of education they had completed (high school, 
junior college, university, master’s, MBA, and other advanced degree), and, for each level, 
                                                 
15 Response rates varied considerable between firms, with a response rate of 100% at 5 firms, and to a low of 
34% at one firm.  
16 One firm declined to specify how many workers received the survey. To calculate the total response rate, I 
therefore assumed that the response rate at the firm with missing data was equal to the mean response rate of all 
firms (78.6%). Because I received 50 responses from this firm, the estimated number of survey recipients is 64. 
This estimate is included in the response rate denominator of 909 employees.  
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whether they were educated in Japan, another country, or both. I assigned years of education 
for each level and summed them to estimate total years of education, ranging from four (for 
high school grads) to fourteen (for Ph.D.s). I calculate total work experience by adding 
fourteen (the age at which students begin post-primary education) to years of post-primary 
education, and subtracting this from respondents’ current ages.  
I estimate years of post-primary education in Japan/abroad as follows: If respondents 
completed a level of education in Japan alone, I assign all years for that level to Japanese 
education. If a respondent completed a level of education in a foreign country alone, I code 
all those years as foreign education. If the respondent selected that they completed a level of 
education in both Japan and a foreign country, I split the years evenly between foreign and 
Japanese education. When estimated years of foreign education exceed the total number of 
years the respondent reports spending abroad, I replace years of foreign education with the 
total number of years abroad, and assign the remaining years of education as Japanese 
education.  
 The estimate of years of work experience follows a similar logic. For native-born 
respondents whose entire time abroad is accounted for by years of education, I assume that all 
work experience is in Japan, and code foreign work experience as 0. For native-born 
respondents whose time abroad is not accounted for by years of education, I base the 
assignment of additional years abroad on where they completed high school. If native-born 
respondents completed high school in Japan or in Japan and abroad, I assume that all 
remaining years abroad are working years (up to respondents’ total working years). For 
respondents who completed high school abroad, I assign half of remaining years abroad to 
work experience years (up to respondents’ total working years).  
For foreign-born respondents, I assign all working years as Japan years if respondents 
report that they came to Japan to live before completing their educations. If years in Japan are 
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lower than total years of work experience, I replace work years with the number of years in 
Japan not already accounted for by education and assign other work years as foreign work. If 
foreign-born respondents report coming to Japan after completing their educations, I assign 
all years after age of arrival as years of work in Japan up to total number of years in Japan. 
Descriptive data on the sample by national origin appears in Table 2.2.  
As a tool for understanding stratification between and among migrants and natives in 
Japan, this dataset has both advantages and disadvantages. One advantage is the relatively 
precise measurement of host and home country education and work experience described 
above, which is an improvement over existing studies (Skuterud and Su 2011; Kanas and van 
Tubergen 2009). Another is that all employees work in the same sections of the same firms. 
In the Japanese context, workplace cohesion and community are highly valued (Rohlen 
1974), job mobility is low (Ono 2010; Holbrow 2015), and scrutiny of job applicants is 
intense: even entry-level job applicants to large firms typically write essays, take written 
aptitude tests, and participate in two to four in-person interviews (DODA 2016; Mai Nabi 
2016). This intense scrutiny minimizes unobserved differences between native workers and 
migrants (for example in ability or motivation), and between migrants of different 
backgrounds. Unobserved differences by national background in selection into immigration 
are therefore unlikely to have a large impact on the results.   
A disadvantage is that the estimated group differences are by virtue of the study 
design only those that emerge within firms and positions. Social processes that contribute to 
sorting of different groups into different firms or labor market sectors are by definition 
unobserved. Because the current study covers only a relatively small number of elite firms, it 
cannot identify how acculturation, human capital quality, or context of reception affect how 
immigrant and Japanese workers’ sort themselves into different types of firms.
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Table 2.2: Descriptive Statistics 
 Japanese (N=427)  Other East Asians (N=55)  
Southeast Asians 
(N=13)  Westerners (N=29) 
 % or Mean  SD  
% or 
Mean  SD  
% or 
Mean  SD  
% or 
Mean  SD 
General   
Male 70.3 36.4  61.5 79.3 
Years education (post-primary) 8.1 1.4 9.2 1.5  8.5 0.9 9.4 2.3 Age 39.9 9.0 31.8 6.3  30.0 5.3 37.4 8.8 Tenure 11.5 9.5 3.9 4.5  4.3 4.8 5.7 7.8 Weekly work hours 42.4 8.3 47.1 8.1  45.8 8.8 47.3 9.6 Clerical job 11.2 12.7  7.7 3.5 Job class  
Management track 74.5 69.1  100.0 79.3 
Contract job 15.7 12.7  0.0 17.2 
General track 9.8 18.2  0.0 3.5 
Number of subordinates 3.6 6.4 0.7 2.3  1.2 1.7 4.8 8.7 
Host Country Human Capital  Advanced Japanese language 99.3 81.8  76.9 72.4 Years in Japan 38.6 9.4 8.1 7.2  6.9 4.0 16.2 12.3 Years in Japanese education (post-primary) 8.0 1.5 3.9 2.3  3.8 1.0 3.9 3.0 
Years work in Japan 16.8 9.4 7.5 6.3  5.2 3.3 10.1 8.5 
Home Country/Global Human Capital  
Advanced English language 27.6 52.7  100.0 96.6 
Advanced Chinese/Korean language 3.3 94.6  23.1 10.3 
Years abroad 1.3 3.0 23.7 5.4  23.1 7.0 21.2 12.5 
Years in foreign education (post-primary) 0.2 0.7 5.3 2.7  4.6 1.5 5.5 4.5 
Years work abroad 0.9 2.1 1.1 2.1  2.4 5.8 3.9 5.3 
Outcome variables   
Annual income (1000s of yen) 7,939.6   4,241.2   4,829.9   2,385.6   5,393.5   3,714.5   9,707.2   5,500.5 
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Empirical Strategy  
To examine the differences in economic outcomes for members of these immigrant 
groups, I use a series of hierarchical linear models with random effects for teams and firms. 
The outcome variable of these models is annual income, including base salary, bonus, and 
allowances. The focus of the models is whether and when, net of controls, we observe wage 
inequality between Japanese employees and the three immigrant groups under study. Annual 
income is measured in thousands of Japanese yen. The dollar conversion rate for yen is 
approximately 100 yen per dollar, so coefficients are thus easily interpretable in dollar terms 
by multiplying them by ten. 17   
I apply a series of hierarchical linear models (HLM) to these data, where individuals 
are nested within firms. These models produce unbiased beta estimates when standard errors 
are non-randomly clustered (Heck and Thomas 2000) and allow me to compare foreign and 
Japanese employees from the same teams in the same firms. The first HLM models estimate 
earnings for Japanese employees and members of the three immigrant groups as a function of 
standard factors in wage-determination models: sex, years of education, age, age squared, 
tenure, tenure squared and work hours (Model 1). The next set of models add job-level 
covariates (job class, job content, and authority), given migrant disadvantage could occur 
within jobs, between jobs, or both (Model 2). These baseline models show the overall pattern 
of stratification within the firms. Subsequent models use the same baseline controls as Model 
1.  
Model 3 adds covariates relevant to the human capital quality hypothesis. If 
educational quality is a significant predictor of income, we would expect, first, that holding 
total years of education constant, years of foreign education would have a null effect on 
                                                 
17 I do not log transform income because the income distribution does not have a long right tail. This is a 
consequence of Japanese firms’ relatively flat compensation structures, and of the fact that the sample of firms 
includes only large, elite employers.  
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earnings. This is because foreign education is of varying quality, some better or equal to 
Japanese education, and some worse. Model 4 adds an interaction between years of foreign 
education and national background.18 If Western education and Japanese education are of 
equal quality (and equally valued by employers), we would expect insignificant interaction 
coefficients for Westerners, whose foreign education is also from the West, and negative 
interaction coefficients for the East and Southeast Asians, whose education is assumed to be 
of lower quality. On the other hand, if Western education is better than Japanese education, 
we would expect positive coefficients for the effect of foreign education for Japanese (i.e. the 
main effect of foreign education), and a positive interaction term for Westerners with foreign 
education.  
The next set of models tests the role of acculturation or host country specific human 
capital. Variables that measure acculturation directly include total years in Japan, and 
Japanese language skills. If acculturation improves outcomes for immigrants, we expect a 
positive relationship between these variables and immigrants’ relative earnings. Model 5 
includes the main effects for these variables. The main effect for years in Japan is not 
necessarily meaningful on its own, because most of the sample is Japanese. 69% of the 
Japanese sample have never spent any time abroad, and 92% have spent five years or less 
abroad. Thus there is a strong correlation between age and years in Japan for Japanese 
respondents, and the variable cannot be said to represent acculturation among Japanese 
respondents. However, the main effect of Japanese language skills (which is measured as 
binary variable: advanced or not advanced), should be meaningful even if all the people who 
do not speak advanced Japanese are foreigners. Model 6 retains the language variable and 
                                                 
18 Among the 27 Japanese respondents in the sample who report some foreign education, two did not report the 
names of the countries they resided in. 21 reported foreign sojourns only in Western countries (the U.S., the UK, 
Australia, and Germany). Two reported stays in both a Western and a non-Western country, and two reported 
stays only in Asian countries (Malaysia and Singapore).  
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adds an interaction term between national background and years in Japan. Generally 
speaking, we would expect positive interactions between foreign background and years in 
Japan, especially for Westerners and to a lesser extent for Southeast Asians, who may 
initially differ culturally from Japanese people in unobserved ways more than East Asian 
immigrants.  
The third set of models examines the importance of other human capital that 
immigrants have. Previous research suggests that foreign language skills, most notably 
English, are valuable in the Japanese labor market (Ono 2007; Takenaka, Ishida, and 
Nakamuro 2015). Indeed, it is possible that “global capital”—hard and soft skills, including 
language ability, that are useful in international business—could allow immigrants to earn 
even more than natives (Chiswick and Miller 2011). In Model 7, I test how these processes 
contribute to ethnic stratification by adding a variable for years of foreign work experience 
(foreign educational experience is already tested in Models 3 and 4). In Model 8, I add 
variables for English and East Asian language skills (Mandarin Chinese and other Chinese 
dialects, Korean), because these are the languages we would expect to be most valuable for 
Japan’s global trade. Because of collinearity between ethnicity and language skills (i.e. there 
are no East Asian immigrants who do not speak an East Asian language, nearly all fluent 
speakers are East Asian immigrants), I create binary categories for advanced skills in each of 
these language categories. There are Japanese people in the sample who speak advanced 
Chinese, Korean, and English, so this ensures that the language skills variables are not simply 
a proxy for ethnicity. If global capital matters for immigrants’ economic assimilation, we 
should expect a positive relationship between foreign work experience and earnings, and 
between foreign language skills and earnings.  
Finally, in Models 9, 10, and 11, I combine the significant effects from earlier models 
to determine if the overall trends in stratification hold when we adjust for all the known 
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processes affecting immigrants’ economic assimilation. Model 9 uses all significant measures 
from earlier models, and Models 10 and 11 include these variables plus a decomposition of 
time in Japan into years in education (Model 10) and years of work experience (Model 11). A 
summary of the predicted relationships between the variables of interest and immigrants’ 
earnings appears in Table 2.3.  
Table 2.3: Expected Signs of Human Capital Coefficients in Earnings Regression by 
Theoretical Perspective 
Linear Predictions 
Educational 
Quality 
Acculturation  Global Human  Capital 
Japanese language ability + 
Years in Japanese education  + 
Years work in Japan  + 
English language ability + 
East Asian language ability + 
Years in foreign education  0 + 
Years work abroad  + 
Interaction Predictions  
Years in Japan * EA + 
Years in Japan * SEA ++ 
Years in Japan * W +++ 
Years in foreign education * N + / 0 
Years in foreign education * EA - 
Years in foreign education * SEA - 
Years in foreign education * W + / 0     
N = Natives from the ethnic majority, EA = East Asian foreign-born, SEA = Southeast Asian foreign-born, W = 
White Western foreign-born. 
 
None of the models directly test for the effects of prejudice on immigrant 
assimilation. However, after we adjust for known processes that influence immigrant 
integration, we can observe what stratification pattern, if any, emerges. Although in Western 
contexts, the stratification pattern would be difficult to interpret because even after 
adjustments, the same groups would tend to be advantaged or disadvantaged in unmeasured 
ways in terms of acculturation, human capital quality, and context of reception, the same is 
not true in this context, where we can examine which pattern the stratification order best 
matches.  
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Results  
Table 2.4: Baseline Models:  Regression of Human Capital and Job Characteristics on Annual 
Earnings 
 Model 1 Model 2    
Individual level variables  Beta SE Beta  SE 
Male 1,761.05*** 281.71 1,267.68***  272.14 
Years of education (HS and beyond) 293.11** 92.35 133.14  89.05
Age 165.06 130.47 252.43*  122.90 
Age squared 1.05 1.61 -.28  1.52 
Tenure 274.90*** 55.94 185.31***  53.53 
Tenure squared -9.06*** 1.68 -7.01***  1.59 
Weekly work hours 42.13** 16.18 21.34 15.38
Job classa   
Contract job -599.09+  350.27 
General track -1,695.26***  425.66 
Clerical jobb -1,089.51*  450.63
Number of subordinates 137.67***  21.81
National backgroundc   
East Asian -202.16 456.19 -23.85  429.95 
Southeast Asian 560.06 823.68 241.54  770.73
Westerner 1,502.31** 566.39 1,246.91*  532.79 
Constant -7,422.47** 2,652.75 -5,667.77*  2,510.38 
Model information 
Observations 524 524
Number of firms 12 12
Individual-level variance component  7,435,593 6,428,418
Team-level variance component 397,756 498,639
Firm-level variance component 2,826,723        2,835,005      
Results are from ANCOVA with random effects models (HLM). All slopes are fixed.  
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.1. a Reference category is management track b Reference category is 
all other types of jobs c Reference category is Japanese 
 Models 1 and 2 in Table 2.4 estimate the differences in earnings between ethnic 
national origin groups, both between jobs (Model 1), and within them (Model 2).  
There is no evidence that East or Southeast Asian foreigners have different earnings 
than Japanese workers net of baseline adjustment variables. Westerners, however, earn 
significantly more than Japanese employees: an estimated $15,000 more annually between 
jobs, and $12,000 within jobs. Because job class, job content, and level of authority explain 
relatively little of these wage differences, this suggests that ethnic wage gaps are primarily 
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driven by factors other than job sorting. Based on this, I do not use job-level variables in 
subsequent models. However, results are not substantively different in subsequent models if I 
include these variables.  
 
Table 2.5: Human Capital Quality Models: Regression of Place of Education on Annual 
Earnings 
 Model 3 Model 4     
Individual level variables  Beta SE Beta  SE 
National backgrounda    
East Asian -514.44 617.41 -537.06 865.59 
Southeast Asian 264.07 912.56 -66.10 2,610.31 
Westerner 1,184.75+ 705.82 494.86 857.68
Years in foreign education  65.29 87.65 -283.33 206.70 
Years in foreign education * East Asian 343.49 248.46 
Years in foreign education * S. East Asian 406.58 578.58 
Years in foreign education * Westerner 467.03 * 235.15 
Constant -7,190.25** 2,669.66 -7,105.49 ** 2,661.56
Model information 
Observations 524 524 
Number of firms 12 12 
Basic human capital controls Yes Yes 
Job characteristic controls No No 
Individual-level variance component  7,421,109 7,389,636 
Team-level variance component 411,836 351,720 
Firm-level variance component 2,815,388       2,878,079      
Results are from ANCOVA with random effects models (HLM). All slopes are fixed.  
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.1. a Reference category is Japanese 
Model 3 in Table 2.5 shows that there is no significant relationship between years of 
foreign education after junior high/middle school (adjusting for total years of education) and 
earnings. Model 4 tests whether education acquired abroad is more or less valuable 
depending on its origin. As indicated by the negative and non-significant coefficient for 
Japanese, there is no evidence that Western education produces higher returns than Japanese 
education for Japanese natives. Interaction coefficients are positive and significant for 
Westerners, and positive and of similar magnitude (but insignificant) for other groups. This 
pattern does not support the human capital quality hypothesis, which predicts lower incomes 
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for East and Southeast Asians educated in their countries of origin, and equal or higher 
incomes for both Japanese and Westerners educated outside Japan.  
Models 5 and 6 in Table 2.6 examine whether differences in acculturation, as 
measured by Japanese language skills and years in Japan, can account for ethnic differences 
in wages. Surprisingly, the data show no indication that acculturation helps foreigners’ 
income. Advanced speakers of Japanese earn no more that those with poorer language ability. 
Moreover, we see from the interaction terms between national background and years in Japan 
in Model 6 that foreigners do not earn more, relative to Japanese, as they accumulate 
experience in Japan. The interaction effects for Westerners and Southeast Asians are small 
and insignificant, suggesting no earnings premium for acculturation. Further, the interaction 
coefficient for East Asians is negative and significant. The negative main effects for years in 
Japan in Table 2.6 indicate that foreign experience is valuable to Japanese respondents. Either 
foreign experience is even more valuable to East Asians than to Japanese, or there is a 
cumulative disadvantage for East Asians who spend more years in Japan.
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Table 2.6: Acculturation Models: Regression of Japan-Related Experience on Annual 
Earnings 
 Model 5 Model 6     
Individual level variables  Beta SE Beta  SE 
National backgrounda 
East Asian -2,126.06** 779.60 -1,117.01 1,140.21 
Southeast Asian -1,340.23 1,025.70 -2,430.38
 
1,952.12 
Westerner -119.57 770.17 -1,392.07
 
1,429.42
Years in Japan -85.79** 29.92 -93.89** 
 
35.24
Years in Japan * East Asian -141.39* 
 
58.28 
Years in Japan * S. East Asian 138.91
 
204.64 
Years in Japan * Westerner 69.19
 
50.20 
Advanced Japanese language 37.14 687.26 58.48
 
696.27
Constant -6,400.45* 2,723.00 -6,996.54* 2,762.12 
Model information 
Observations 524 524
Number of firms 12 12
Basic human capital controls Yes Yes
Job characteristic controls No No
Individual-level variance component  7,270,557 7,098,328
Team-level variance component 479,558 534,441
Firm-level variance component 2,688,455        2,776,557       
Results are from ANCOVA with random effects models (HLM). All slopes are fixed.  
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.1. a Reference category is Japanese 
 
Table 2.7: Global Human Capital Models: Regression of Global Work Experience and 
Foreign Language Skills on Annual Earnings 
 Model 7 Model 8    
Individual level variables  Beta SE Beta  SE 
National backgrounda    
East Asian -303.51 454.72 -1,599.60* 711.41
Southeast Asian 287.43 824.48 -563.92 845.10 
Westerner 1,127.40+ 579.80 608.16 590.31 
Years work abroad 131.98** 49.88 75.95 52.11 
Advanced English language  930.63** 307.12
Advanced Asian language 1,210.67+ 618.41 
Constant -6,692.84* 2,648.88 -7,000.70** 2,615.10 
Model information 
Observations 524 524
Number of firms 12 12
Basic human capital controls Yes Yes
Job characteristic controls No No
Individual-level variance component  7,330,559 7,110,266
Team-level variance component 427,411  563,005
Firm-level variance component 2,622,756        2,185,313      
Results are from ANCOVA with random effects models (HLM). All slopes are fixed.  
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.1. a Reference category is Japanese
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The next models investigate the associations between global human capital and 
earnings: specifically, the ability to speak languages that are useful to Japanese businesses, 
and international work experience. Model 7 of Table 2.7 estimates a significant, positive 
relationship between years of foreign work experience and wages. (This is unsurprising given 
the negative main effects for years in Japan in Models 5 and 6.) Model 8 adds variables for 
skills in East Asian languages other than Japanese, and English. With the inclusion of these 
variables, foreign work experience is no longer significant. I cannot ascertain whether this 
null relationship is because the advantage of foreign experience comes primarily from the 
language skills acquired during foreign experience, or simply because foreign language skills 
and foreign experience are both indicators of the same underlying ability to do business in a 
global environment. In either case, however, this finding is consistent with the hypothesis that 
global capital helps foreign workers achieve economic success in Japan (Takenaka, Ishida, 
and Nakamuro 2015). Adding the covariate for English language ability causes the magnitude 
of the positive effect of Western background to be reduced by about half and to lose 
statistical significance. At least some of the earnings advantage of Westerners is hence a 
result of their superior English language abilities.  
Models 9, 10, and 11 appear in Table 2.8 and combine the effects we have found 
significant in previous models—foreign (but not Japanese) language skills, years in Japan, 
foreign work experience, and the interaction between national background and years in Japan. 
Because I decompose years in Japan into years of work experience and years of Japanese 
education, and include age and total years of education as controls, I model foreign work 
experience as categorical rather than continuous to reduce collinearity.  
In Model 9, adding the categorical variable for foreign experience reduces the size and 
significance level of the main effect of years in Japan. This is consistent with the 
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interpretation that Japanese employees benefit economically from working in foreign 
countries. However, foreign experience, by contrast, does not appreciably change the 
coefficient of the interaction of years in Japan and East Asian background.  
Models 10 and 11 break down the effect of years in Japan into years in education 
(Model 10), and years of work experience (Model 11), holding foreign language ability and 
foreign work experience constant. Years spent in Japanese education have no negative effect 
on East Asians’ earnings (Model 10), but years of work experience do (Model 11). For 
Westerners, years in Japanese education have a negative effect (Model 10). This is parallel to 
the positive effect for foreign education for Westerners apparent in Model 4. Although total 
years in Japan and years of education in Japan do not appear to benefit Westerners, in Model 
11, years of work in Japan have a positive and significant effect on Westerners’ earnings. In 
other words, East Asians who accumulate more work experience in Japan earn less than 
similar Japanese, while Westerners earn more, net of both groups’ advantages in foreign 
work experience and foreign language skills.  
To illustrate the implications of these findings for mid-career workers, Figure 2.3 
displays predicted annual incomes for mid-career workers, based on Model 11.19 The solid 
bars represent predicted values for workers with only domestic, Japanese experience, and the 
dotted bars represent workers with four to six years international experience. All predictions 
are for male workers, aged 45, with eight years of post-primary education, working 43 hours 
per week. All workers are assumed to speak a non-Japanese language. For Japanese and 
Westerners, this language is set to English, and for East Asian foreigners it is set to 
Chinese/Korean.  
                                                 
19 Similar point estimates for younger workers do not show any significant group differences.  
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Table 2.8: Full Models:  Regression of Foreign and Japanese Experience on Annual Earnings 
 Model 9 Model 10 Model 11  
Individual level variables  Beta SE Beta SE Beta SE 
National backgrounda 
 
East Asian -854.79 1,313.03 -924.99 1,592.15 91.22 880.24
Southeast Asian -1,964.09 1,964.91 206.06 3,534.39 -833.79 1,535.37 
Westerner -74.44 1,510.98 2,977.72 + 1,742.09 -858.25 885.50 
Advanced East Asian language 993.28 612.96 903.85 620.88 835.29 615.74 
Advanced English language 792.46* 311.98 939.37 ** 308.95 829.39** 306.27
Years in Japan -35.79 41.55  
Years in Japan * East Asian -144.80* 57.36  
Years in Japan * S. East Asian 116.17 199.42  
Years in Japan * Westerner 21.60 51.68  
Foreign work experienceb  
1-3 years -646.53+ 364.42 -469.58 361.90 -301.27 413.13 
4-6 years 725.91 539.85 1,016.75 * 510.02 1,338.99+ 751.63 
7 or more years 557.76 679.98 1,219.57 * 599.48 1,833.29 1,202.45 
Years Japanese education  66.62 152.66 
Years Japanese education * East Asian -9.46 224.37
Years Japanese education * S. East Asian -137.86 831.34 
Years Japanese education * Westerner -483.38 + 257.39 
Years work in Japan  67.87 113.97 
Years work in Japan * East Asian  -169.79** 63.52 
Years work in Japan * S. East Asian  82.45 238.41
Years work in Japan * Westerner  169.87** 63.08 
Constant -6,630.02* 2,639.07 -6,037.10 * 2,643.52 -5,684.16+ 3,063.21 
Table continues on next page. 
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Table 2.8, Cont.  
 Model 9 Model 10 Model 11  
Model information 
 
Observations 524 524 524
Number of firms 12 12 12
Basic human capital controls Yes Yes Yes
Job characteristic controls No No No
Individual-level variance component  6,865,549 6,940,715 6,741,773
Team-level variance component 559,137 533,847 625,919
Firm-level variance component   2,453,802       2,222,958        2,451,689      
Results are from ANCOVA with random effects models (HLM). All slopes are fixed.         
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.1   
a Reference category is Japanese         
b Reference category is none  
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For employees with only domestic, Japanese experience (labeled DE), their tenure is set to 20 
years and their years of Japanese work experience is set to 23, their whole working lives. For 
employees with mixed experience (labeled IE), Japanese experience is set to 18 and foreign 
experience is set to four to six years. Their tenures are set to 15. The error bars show the 95% 
confidence intervals for the estimates. 
Figure 2.3: Predicted Annual Earnings by Region of Origin and International Experience 
 
 
DE = domestic experience only, IE = 4-6 years experience outside Japan 
 
Because the point estimates are based on all model parameters, each with its own 
uncertainty, confidence intervals for each group are wide. Nonetheless, the results show that East 
Asian immigrants without international experience have lower predicted incomes than Japanese 
and Western workers with or without international experience. In contrast, Western workers earn 
more than Japanese workers with only domestic experience, regardless of Westerners’ level of 
international experience. The estimated differences between a Westerner with only domestic 
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experience, and a Japanese with only domestic experience is about $30,000, a substantively very 
large gap. In contrast, for an East Asian with only domestic job experience, the predicted wage 
disadvantage compared to a similar Japanese worker is $38,000.  
 
Discussion  
The above analyses have two main goals. The first goal is to understand the stratification 
order in Japanese firms; the second is to illuminate potential mechanisms that undergird this 
order. The stratification order is complicated: East Asian workers earn about the same as 
Japanese, but as workers accumulate experience in Japan, wages for East Asian immigrants 
diverge from those of their Japanese counterparts and fall below the compensation for similar 
Japanese. Westerners, on the other hand, earn more than East Asians, and more even than 
Japanese. Among younger workers, better English ability appears to account for Westerners’ 
advantage, but for workers with more work experience in Japan, wages exceed even those of 
Japanese employees with advanced English ability. 20  
The models are inconclusive as to the place of Southeast Asian immigrants in the 
stratification order. Southeast Asians make up the smallest respondent group, and as such their 
                                                 
20 Another possible explanation for the positive interaction between Western ethnicity and years work in Japan and 
the negative interaction between East Asian ethnicity and years work in Japan is that, even though we are comparing 
very similar workers who have all been hired by the same firms, selection mechanisms are different, with low-
earning Westerners and high-earning East Asians more likely to leave Japan. However, I found no evidence of this. I 
asked respondents what their intentions for the future are. They could select “settle in Japan,” “maintain residences 
in Japan and another country” “return to a country where you lived previously” “move to a country where you have 
never lived before” and “don’t know.” Earning more than expected (i.e. having a positive residual in Model 2) is 
positively and significantly associated with “settle in Japan” for East Asian foreigners but not for Westerners, 
indicating positive selection for East Asians. Similarly, East Asian foreigners but not Western foreigners, are less 
likely to select an option indicating they will leave Japan if their income residuals are high. If anything, therefore, 
the analyses underestimate the ethnic penalty East Asians face, because high earning East Asians are the most likely 
to stay and thus be captured as older, more experienced workers in this cross-sectional sample.  
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earnings are estimated imprecisely. These data offer no indication that their earnings differ from 
those of Japanese employees.  
Turning to the posited mechanisms themselves, I find no support for the acculturation 
hypothesis. Neither Japanese language ability nor years in Japan are positively associated with 
earnings among foreign workers. Similarly, education in Japan is not more valuable than 
education earned abroad. The caveat, however, is that Westerners (and Westerners alone) see an 
income premium for work experience in Japan. As shown in Table 2.3, it is possible that years in 
Japan would be more valuable to Western respondents than to other immigrants, because 
Westerners are initially disadvantaged along unmeasured aspects of acculturation. However, if 
Westerners’ cumulative advantage to work experience represents gains made through 
acculturation, we would not expect the wages of midcareer Westerners to surpass those of 
Japanese workers, as we see in Figure 2.3. Further, if acculturation really helped Westerners do 
better, we would expect that years of education in Japan would also contribute to higher 
earnings. They do not. Because only longer Japanese work experience, rather than Japanese 
schooling and language skills, contributes to higher earnings, this suggests that it is positive and 
subjective value placed on Western culture and people (Owens forthcoming; Befu 2001) that 
generates this pattern. Positive biases towards Westerners may produce small positive 
differences in rewards, which accumulate over the course of workers’ careers until their wages 
are much higher than those of their Japanese counterparts. 
There is also no evidence that “educational quality” improves economic outcomes for 
workers in Japanese firms. As we see in Model 4, the positive effect of foreign education is only 
significant for Westerners, as is its complement in Model 10, a negative effect for Japanese 
education. If Western education were truly superior to Japanese education, we would expect 
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Japanese people who study in Western countries to benefit as well. That we do not suggests that 
the advantages Westerners accrue for earning their educations in the West may also be an effect 
of the positive value the Japanese place on Western culture and people.  
Like previous research (Ono 2007; Takenaka, Ishida, and Nakamuro 2015), I find that 
English ability is a strong predictor of earnings. This paper also shows that ability in East Asian 
language is valuable as well, although the findings are less robust than for English because they 
are not significant in all models.  
 
Conclusion  
In Western contexts, it can be difficult to interpret gaps in the earnings of different 
immigrant groups, because advantaged immigrants tend to be favored in multiple ways. For 
example, in the United States, the most successful immigrants generally enjoy a racial advantage 
as whites, come from countries with high quality education systems, and arrive more familiar 
with U.S. norms, customs, and language. This makes it easy to misestimate every type of 
integration effect: measures of race may actually capture the effects of education systems; 
measures of educational quality may capture the effects of acculturation, and so on. Further, even 
after adjustments for obvious measures like English language ability, these multilayered 
advantages make it difficult to interpret residual gaps for particular groups of immigrants, since 
unmeasured differences in any of the integration processes could explain the gaps for each 
group.  
This paper has examined income inequality in the context of large Japanese firms. In this 
context, immigrant groups are not, for the most part, advantaged on more than one axis of 
integration. It has also controlled for differences in immigrant selection from different countries 
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by comparing immigrants and natives who have gone through the intensive screening process 
used by elite Japanese employers.  
The empirical findings do not support hypotheses that acculturation and human capital 
quality improve immigrants’ economic outcomes. Variables that capture acculturation and 
human capital quality do not consistently predict higher earnings for immigrants. Moreover, the 
residual stratification order after fine-grained adjustments for human capital, with Westerners on 
top, followed by Japanese, followed by other East Asians suggests context of reception as the 
mechanism most likely to generate this outcome.  
What aspects of these findings can be attributed to the research setting in elite firms, or to 
the Japanese context more generally, and how might they give insight into immigrant integration 
elsewhere? 
It would be hasty conclude from the results that acculturation never matters for 
immigrants’ success in Japan, much less in other contexts. Other studies in Japan using more 
heterogenous samples of immigrants (Takenoshita 2006; Holbrow and Nagayoshi 2016) do 
suggest that acculturation, as measured by language skills and time in Japan, is associated with 
higher earnings for East Asian immigrants. The null finding in this study thus may be partially 
attributable to the selectivity of the sample. For respondents who are able to get jobs at elite 
firms, acculturation does not seem to matter, but more acculturated immigrants may be better 
able to obtain such jobs in the first place. Research from Canada and the United States suggests 
that much of immigrants’ positive earnings growth over time is due to mobility between 
establishments and jobs (Ayedemir and Skuterud 2008). If the same is true in Japan, a sample 
drawn from elite firms will miss some of the potential positive effects of acculturation.  
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At the same time, the results clearly indicate that lack of acculturation is not all that is 
holding East Asian immigrants to Japan back, and cast doubt on the master narrative in both 
Japan and the West that unexplained differences in immigrant and native earnings are 
predominately a problem of acculturation. Indeed, the results of the current study are similar to 
findings in the U.S. that foreign-born employees have lower starting salaries, are less likely to 
receive salary increases, and when they do receive increases, receive smaller increases than 
native-born workers (Castilla 2008). As a result, within firm inequality between native-born 
whites and the foreign-born grows over time. Unlike this current study, Castilla has relatively 
little demographic information, and cannot identify foreign-born workers’ countries of origin, 
places of education, or length of U.S. experience. However, that he found results similar to those 
in the current study after adjusting for performance scores lends weight to the hypothesis that 
much U.S. and European research may indeed overestimate the benefits of acculturation for 
immigrants.  
The findings of this study cast even more doubt on research on human capital quality. To 
my knowledge, no existing studies of human capital quality rigorously account for the effects of 
race, and although a few include standard measures of acculturation such as language skills, they 
ignore correspondence between country of origin and unmeasured aspects of acculturation. They 
also ignore differences in immigrant selectivity by sending country and by immigrant generation 
by uniformly assigning average sending country characteristics to individual immigrants. In the 
current study, I reduce concerns about differences in selectivity by comparing the most similar 
immigrants—those who work at the same firms. In this context, there is no discernable effect of 
human capital quality. Of course, this null result could be because the benefits of high quality 
human capital emerge primarily when immigrants sort into places of employment, and the 
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employees at these elite firms all have high quality human capital, whether they were educated in 
their home countries or in Japan. However, there is evidence to suggest this is not the case. 
Oreopoulos (2011) finds that attending a higher ranked foreign school has no effect on callback 
rates for foreign-named applicants to Canadian white-collar jobs. This suggests that employers 
are not necessarily capable of evaluating the quality of human capital obtained in foreign 
countries. Future investigations of human capital quality need to improve measurement of 
schooling quality at the individual level and control more effectively for confounding factors to 
make a convincing case that effects from previous studies are not spurious.  
The effect of “global capital” has been found in other studies of immigrants to Japan 
(Ono 2007; Takenaka 2014). This makes it unlikely that the value of English and other East 
Asian languages is specific to the context of these elite firms. It also suggests that this may be 
neglected factor in other national environments. Some of the effects of English language 
proficiency in English-speaking countries no doubt reflect its status as the language of 
international business. Similarly, in non-English speaking countries, English proficiency may be 
as valuable to immigrants as host country language skills. Other global languages such as 
French, Spanish, and Mandarin Chinese may also have value, although the most disadvantaged 
immigrants with low levels of education are less likely to benefit from these skills than 
immigrants with college degrees. Although earlier research on bilingualism in the U.S. was 
inconclusive or suggested a labor market penalty for bilingualism (see Gándara 2015 for a 
review), more recent research using richer covariates suggests that there is an economic benefit 
(Agirdag 2014; Rumbaut 2014). If the Japanese case is a guide, this type of global capital can 
override some of the economic disadvantages immigrants face. Conversely, omitting measures of 
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bi- or even trilingualism from multivariate models can disguise true economic disadvantage 
among immigrants. 
 This finding echoes the “overachievement” hypothesis of Hirschman and Wong (1984), 
who argue that Asian immigrants to the United States earn more than native whites because of 
greater investments in human capital. While Hirshman and Wong suggest that this is because of 
immigrants’ dedication to self-improvement, and attempts to mitigate the effects of 
discrimination, the Japanese case suggests that the “overachievement” of immigrants is at least in 
part due to retention of their native language, an inadvertent byproduct of the immigrant life 
course rather than a deliberate investment.  
Finally, the current study underscores the need for further research into how the context 
of reception (Portes and Rumbaut 2001, 2006) shapes immigrant earnings in both Japan and the 
West. I argue that East Asian immigrants are at a greater disadvantage (and Westerners at a 
greater advantage) the longer they work in Japan because of the cumulative effects of attitudes 
towards these two groups. Context of reception is by definition a feature of the local and national 
environment of the immigrant receiving country, and consequently, these specific results are not 
generalizable to other countries. They do, however, bolster theoretical claims that context of 
reception is key to understanding immigrant outcomes (Portes and Rumbaut 2001; 2006 Alba 
and Nee 2003), and point to a need for further studies that empirically measure these 
theoretically important processes (see Lewin-Epstein et al. 2003; Kogan 2006; Holbrow and 
Nagayoshi 2016 for existing examples), particularly the effects of prejudice and discrimination.  
There has been some debate about whether immigrants to Japan experience positive 
assimilation (Holbrow and Nagayoshi 2016), meaning that although they may earn less than their 
Japanese counterparts upon arrival, the earnings gap shrinks with time in Japan, or negative 
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assimilation (Takenaka, Ishida, and Nakamuro 2015), meaning that immigrants initially earn 
more than native workers, but that foreign workers’ earnings decline to match those of native 
workers (e.g. Chiswick and Miller 2011). This study, which is the first to investigate the relative 
wages of comparable Japanese and foreign workers, indicates that economic “assimilation,” 
whether positive or negative, does not adequately capture immigrants’ earnings trajectories in 
Japan. In elite firms, neither East Asian nor Western immigrants’ earnings converge with 
comparable Japanese, and ethnic wage gaps appear to be the smallest at the beginning of 
workers’ careers, when foreigners’ time in Japan is by definition the shortest. Owing to lack of 
data, it is not possible to say with certainty whether these results hold for self-employed 
immigrants or immigrants in other types of firms. However, because the firms in this sample are 
all committed to diversity and were willing to give me access to their employees, have dedicated 
staff human resource staff who manage diversity issues (see Kalev, Kelly, and Dobbin 2006), 
and hire and promote relatively large numbers of foreign workers, it seems unlikely that 
conditions for foreign workers are worse in this study setting than in other Japanese employment 
contexts.   
What are the implications of these results for evaluating Japanese immigration policy? 
First, they indicate that assumptions about the relationship between human capital and immigrant 
economic assimilation are broadly correct. Even within the highly selected sample of immigrants 
I study here, human capital matters to outcomes. But it is not necessarily the human capital that 
immigration policy privileges that best facilitates immigrants’ economic assimilation. The new 
point system and HSP visa prioritize host country specific human capital, by awarding points for 
Japanese language skills and Japanese university degrees (Ministry of Justice 2013). However, at 
least within elite firms, these types of human capital appear to be irrelevant for immigrants’ 
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economic outcomes. Rather, it is foreign language skills which, for younger East Asian workers, 
shrink or close the pay gap with natives, and for Westerners, strengthen their earnings advantage.  
Although the results do not suggest that foreign workers as a group form a kind of 
underpaid professional underclass, it is clear that immigrants’ high levels of human capital do 
not obviate all concerns about inequity. Indeed, that inequity persists even among the most 
successful skilled immigrants should be an issue of concern for the government. When East 
Asians earn less than similar coworkers, they are more likely to say they wish to leave Japan. 
Further, income levels are one of the most important contributors to immigrants’ eligibility for 
the fast-track to permanent residency available through the HSP visa. East Asian immigrants 
may have less access to this desirable visa than Westerners not because they are less productive 
or integrated, but simply because their employers discriminate against them. By allowing wage 
inequity to persist, the government may therefore stymy its own efforts to attract and retain more 
skilled immigrants.  
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CHAPTER 3 
THE ROLE OF ETHNIC BIAS IN WAGE INEQUALITY 
Introduction 
The public is divided on whether bias and discrimination continue to limit economic 
opportunities for minorities (Pew Research Center 2016), and social science does not provide 
straightforward answers. In developed countries, significant racial and ethnic wage gaps remain 
after adjustments for human capital (for the United States, see Wilson and Rodgers 2016; Neal 
and Rick 2014; Kim and Sakamoto 2010; for Europe see Adsera and Chiswick 2007). But do 
employers’ racial and ethnic biases cause these gaps, or are they attributable to pre-labor market 
processes and structural features of the labor market?  
Data from the United States indicate that racial bias has declined, albeit at a slowing pace 
since the 1990s (Bobo et al. 2012). On one hand, this may indicate that bias and discrimination in 
the labor market exert a shrinking influence on racial and ethnic inequality. On the other hand, 
true levels of bias may be higher than standard surveys suggest, especially because majority 
group members are unwilling to admit to racist views (Feagin 1999; Kuklinski et al. 1997). 
Indeed, field experiments show that some employers do discriminate: North American employers 
are less likely to call back or offer jobs to blacks (Pager, Bonikowski, and Western 2009; 
Bertrand and Mullainathan 2004), Hispanics (Pager, Bonikowski, and Western 2009), and 
Asians (Oreopoulos 2011; Gaddis 2015), even when their qualifications are identical to those of 
whites; in Europe, Muslims are similarly disadvantaged (Rooth 2010; Andriessen et al. 2012).  
However, skeptics are quick to point out that even if bias is stronger than standard 
surveys imply, institutions may effectively restrain employers from acting on it (Tetlock and 
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Mitchell 2009). Further, point-of-hire discrimination observed in audit studies could have a 
relatively minor impact on overall wage inequality, if members of disadvantaged groups avoid 
biased employers (Heckman 1998), or bias’s effects diminish after the hiring stage (Pager and 
Shepherd 2008). Given these ambiguities, current research cannot answer whether labor market 
bias and discrimination have a large or a small effect on observed racial and ethnic inequalities in 
earnings (Lucas 2009).  
This paper takes a novel approach to investigating the economic impact of bias on 
inequality beyond the callback and hiring stage, in a novel setting. I use a sample of white-collar 
workers at twelve large, bureaucratic firms in Japan, and I employ a vignette experiment to 
examine whether there is bias against Asian and Western foreign workers at these firms. I then 
aggregate responses to the vignette experiment to identify firms with higher and lower levels of 
bias and examine whether wage inequality between foreign and Japanese workers is higher when 
levels of bias are higher. While previous studies have shown modest associations between bias 
and discriminatory behavior in laboratory settings (Greenwald et al. 2009; Greenwald, Banaji, 
and Nosek 2015) and at the callback stage in real employment settings (Rooth 2010), we know 
little about whether and how the effects of bias persist past the point of hire. If a more biased 
work environment results in more discrimination, inequality will be greater at firms with higher 
levels of bias. Conversely, if other situational factors intervene, including, for example, positive 
interpersonal relationships that develop through equal-status contact among coworkers 
(Pettigrew and Tropp 2006; Merton 1949), or accountability structures (Kalev, Kelly, and 
Dobbin 2006; Castilla 2008, 2015), levels of bias should not be associated with pay inequality. 
My paper is, to my knowledge, the first to examine the impact of bias on post-hire outcomes, and 
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the first to test whether biased labor market actors exacerbate inequality in real-life 
organizational settings.  
 
Linking Bias to Discrimination and Inequality  
According to Gordon Allport’s classic definition, bias is an “antipathy based on faulty or 
inflexible generalization” towards groups or members of a group (Allport 1954: 9). As 
schematized in Figure 3.1, the relationship between bias and labor market inequality is complex 
(Merton 1949; Bonilla-Silva 1997; Quillian 2006).  
 
Figure 3.1: Relationship Between Bias and Inequality 
 
 
As this figure shows, norms, rules, and laws have a direct effect on inequality (line A). For 
example, laws define who has the right to work, under what conditions, and with what access to 
legal protection; the different rights and privileges granted to classes of workers by law can 
create more economic opportunities for members of some groups than for others (e.g. citizens 
versus work visa holders versus undocumented immigrants), even in the absence of bias. 
However, norms, rules, and laws do not emerge in a vacuum (line B), and may reflect bias of 
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lawmakers or their constituents. Historical examples of laws that enshrine racial or ethnic bias 
include the Chinese Exclusion Act, which prohibited naturalization for persons of Chinese 
descent, and Jim Crow laws enforcing racial segregation (Alba and Nee 2003). However, even 
laws and rules that are not explicitly racial or ethnic in content may be motivated by bias and can 
have a “disparate impact” on outcomes for members of different groups (Pager and Shepherd 
2008; Soss, Fording, and Schram 2011). 
Bias also affects inequality more directly, mediated by extra-legal or unsanctioned 
discrimination (lines C and D). Extra-legal discrimination is differential treatment towards 
members of different groups that is not mandated by laws or rules. As the diagram shows, unless 
actors engage in extra-legal discrimination, bias will not affect inequality, except through the 
creation of biased laws and rules. At the same time, whether or not laws and rules are biased, 
they moderate actors’ ability and willingness to engage in extra-legal discrimination (line E). For 
example, fines for employers who treat employees differently by race can potentially prevent 
bias from leading to extra-legal discrimination and inequality (Tetlock and Mitchell 2009). 
Similarly, norms of equal treatment or fear of confrontation may also prevent people from 
discriminating even when they are unconstrained by formal laws and rules (Merton 1949; 
Kutner, Wilkins, and Yarrow 1952; Pager and Quillian 2005).  
 Scholars in sociology, political science, and psychology have all shown an abiding 
interest in these relationships. Recent research in sociology, for example, examines the effects of 
corporate policies and practices on minorities’ representation in management (Kalev, Kelly, and 
Dobbin 2006) and on wage inequality between minorities and whites (e.g. Bielby 2011; Castilla 
2008), corresponding to line A in Figure 3.1. Scholarship on the effects of law, particularly 
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affirmative action policies, on minority representation in the workforce goes back much further 
(see Kurtulus 2014 for a review).  
Work in political science and political psychology has also explored the relationships 
represented by line B, linking prejudice to support or opposition for progressive policies such as 
affirmative action (e.g. Kuklinski et al. 1997; Sears and Henry 2005; Huddy and Feldman 2009; 
Soss, Fording, and Schram 2011), and to support or opposition for immigration policies (Knoll 
2013).  
Social scientists, particularly in psychology, have also examined the link between 
prejudice and discrimination (line C). Over time, the techniques for measuring prejudice have 
evolved, and so has this strand of research. Early studies (LaPiere 1934; Kutner, Wilkins, and 
Yarrow 1952) sent minority auditors to service establishments to see if they would be served; 
they later followed up by asking whether such establishments would be willing to serve 
minorities. These studies found little relationship between proprietors’ actual willingness to serve 
minorities and their stated willingness to do so. In fact, nearly all service personnel served 
minority customers in person, whereas majorities in both studies refused or expressed reluctance 
to do so in theory.  
In a more recent study inspired by these classic papers (Pager 2003; Pager and Quillian 
2005), a researcher sent black and white auditors to low-wage employers to apply for work, and 
measured how auditor race affected the likelihood of a callback. The researcher then surveyed 
employers to ask if they would hire someone fitting the auditor’s description. As in earlier 
studies, the researcher found little correspondence between stated willingness to hire a minority 
and actual callbacks. In a reversal of these earlier studies, however, employers were much more 
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likely to say that they would hire a black applicant than they were to actually call black 
applicants back.  
Other recent studies rely on contemporary psychological measurement of prejudice, 
particularly the IAT, to assess bias and its relationship to discrimination (line C). The IAT can be 
used to compare attitudes towards two classes of people, objects, or concepts (Greenwald et al. 
1998). In the black-white race IAT, respondents classify positive words (e.g. “delightful,” 
“cherish”) and negative words (e.g. “poison,” “despise”) together with photographs of black and 
white faces. Bias is measured by differences in classification speed when respondents pair black 
faces together with positive words (and white faces together with negative words) compared to 
white faces together with positive words (and black faces together with negative words). These 
studies have been conducted almost exclusively in laboratory settings, and have used many 
measures of discrimination, including subtle non-verbal behaviors such as smiling or body 
positioning, or more overt measures such as a stated preference for a partner of a particular race 
in a group activity (see Oswald et al. 2013 for descriptions of typical outcomes). In contrast to 
field studies that compare stated behavioral intentions with actions, which have found no 
relationship between intention to discriminate and actual discrimination, lab studies have found 
small to moderate relationships between bias and discriminatory behavior (see Greenwald et al. 
2009; Oswald et al. 2013 for reviews and meta-analyses). In a rare exception to this lab-based 
work, Rooth (2010) conducted a resume audit study in Sweden using paired resumes with 
randomly varied Swedish and Arabic names, and measured the callback rates by ethnicity. In a 
follow-up, he administered an IAT comparing attitudes towards ethnic Swedes and ethnic Arabs 
to the hiring managers for the positions in the audit study. Higher bias scores on the IAT were 
associated with a decreased likelihood of a callback for the Arabic-named applicant.  
 108 
 
In sum, there is considerable research addressing line A, line B, and line C in Figure 3.1. 
However, studies that holistically address the role of bias on inequality are much rarer (for 
exceptions, see Charles and Guryan (2008) and Carlsson and Rooth (2016), discussed in greater 
detail below). Hence both sides of this debate speak in the language of hypotheticals and 
probability: levels of bias could have “societally significant” labor market effects (Greenwald et 
al. 2009; Greenwald, Banaji, and Nosek 2015), but the actual existence of such effects is 
“unknown” (Oswald et al. 2013, 2015) and “unproven” (Tetlock and Mitchell 2009). 
 
Context of the Current Study 
The current study measures bias and wage inequality within the same organizations, 
using samples of workers from twelve large, bureaucratic Japanese firms. Specifically, I measure 
bias against non-Japanese Asians and Westerners among employees in two or more teams at 
these firms, and examine whether higher levels of bias correlate with greater wage inequality for 
the immigrant workers in each firm, all else equal. The study design addresses many of the core 
concerns of bias skeptics.  
 The first advantage of this study is that it can examine the relationship between bias and 
inequality in post-hire wages. Although studies have documented ethnic biases in HR personnel 
(Rooth 2010) and discrimination in pre-hire processes, particularly callbacks (e.g. Pager 2003; 
Bertrand and Mullainathan 2004; Oreopoulos 2011; Kang et al. 2016; Gaddis 2015), bias 
skeptics suggest the impact of bias and discrimination on wage inequality may be minor. The 
first reason for this is Becker’s theory (1957) of “the marginal discriminator” (Charles and 
Guryan 2008), which suggests that wage inequality is determined not by the mean level of bias 
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in society, but by the most prejudiced employer who nonetheless hires members of 
disadvantaged groups and is also an employer acceptable to members of this group. 
Discrimination observed in pre-hire audit experiments identifies the mean but not the marginal 
level of discrimination and thus does not permit us to speculate about relationships between bias 
(or discrimination) and wage inequality determined at the margin (Heckman 1998). The current 
study includes only firms that hire foreign workers, and thus measures bias only in relevant 
places of employment.  
 Theories of statistical discrimination also prompt bias skeptics to question whether 
discrimination documented in audit studies is relevant for understanding the role of bias in post-
hire outcomes. According to models of statistical discrimination, employers with preconceptions 
about average group-level productivity avoid hiring members of certain groups and prefer to hire 
members of high-productivity groups. These preconceptions could fully explain discrimination at 
the pre-hire stages. However, once an employee enters an organization, employers observe his or 
her productivity directly and need not make assumptions based on group membership. Hence, 
biases that lead to racial differences in hiring may theoretically have a no effects on post-hire 
outcomes, including wages. By examining the relationship between firm-level bias and wages 
within firms, this study can address the claims springing from models of statistical discrimination 
that bias is largely irrelevant to post-hire outcomes.  
A second advantage of this study is the realistic organizational settings in which it was 
conducted. As discussed above, dozens of lab studies have shown that bias is associated with 
differential treatment for preferred and non-preferred groups. However, these studies are 
vulnerable to criticisms about their external validity (Bagenstos 2007; Tetlock and Mitchell 
2009). For example, many studies use outcome variables such as smiling or body positioning, the 
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relevance of which to employment decisions is unclear. Moreover, even when studies simulate 
more realistic employment scenarios (e.g. Ziegert and Hanges 2005), bias skeptics suggest that 
the “cacophony of competing cues of real life” could drown out similar effects in actual 
workplace interactions (Tetlock and Mitchell 2009, 16). On real teams, bias skeptics argue, 
“positive team spirit, norms of reciprocity, [and] team-based in-group definition” (Tetlock and 
Mitchell 2009, 16; Pettigrew and Tropp 2006) may override conscious and unconscious biases 
towards minority group members. The current study examines the effects of bias in real-life 
relationships where all these competing cues are also present. 
 Besides these interpersonal processes, critics also believe that bureaucratic, deliberative 
aspects of organizational life can constrain the effects of bias (e.g. Elvira and Graham 2002). 
Like the interpersonal dynamics described above, organizational bureaucracy is thus an 
additional moderating factor that can alter and perhaps block the link between bias and 
discrimination. The current study, conducted inside twelve large, bureaucratic businesses is thus 
a useful tool to observe whether higher levels of bias result in higher levels of inequality even 
within bureaucratic organizations.  
 In addition to addressing these concerns of the bias skeptics, this study also extends 
research by economists that has more directly addressed relationships between bias and 
inequality. As discussed above, with the exceptions of Charles and Guryan (2008) for blacks in 
the United States and Carlsson and Rooth (2016) for immigrants in Sweden, few studies examine 
the relationship between bias and inequality directly. These two studies estimate distributions of 
prejudice within regions, and set region-specific marginal levels of prejudice at the percentile of 
the prejudice distribution equal to share of minority workers in that region (i.e. if minorities 
compose 20% of the labor force, the 20th percentile of the prejudice distribution represents the 
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marginal level of bias). Both studies find that regional wage inequality is strongly associated 
with regional variation in the marginal level of bias.  While these studies generally support the 
hypothesis that bias continues to cause inequality, the high level of aggregation in both studies 
(U.S. states in Charles and Guryan; municipalities in Carlsson and Rooth) has drawbacks. These 
aggregations rely on the assumptions that within regions attitudes towards both minorities, and 
minority workers themselves are evenly distributed. However, other research shows that level of 
aggregation may significantly alter regional estimates of bias (DellaPosta 2013). Potential 
clustering of both biased workers and minorities in particular firms, labor markets, or cities 
makes it difficult to assess how meaningful the estimates of marginal bias at the state or 
municipal level are. Also, neither study can show that it is bias among employers that matters. 
Bias could affect wages through many mediating processes, including in schools, in the criminal 
justice system, and in customer attitudes. The current study measures bias among immediate 
coworkers of minority workers and thus does not have to make assumptions about distributions 
of bias or sorting patterns of minority workers.  
 
Data and Methods 
Data Source 
The data from this study come from the Survey on Workplace Environment and Diversity 
Management (SWEDM). I conducted this survey through the Diversity Subcommittee of the 
Japan Association of Corporate Executives (JACE), a major business group of Japanese firms. 
Twelve members of the subcommittee agreed to participate. All twelve firms have highly 
bureaucratized human resource systems and personnel responsible for diversity and inclusion. 
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Ten of these twelve firms have more than 1,000 employees, and three have more than 10,000. 
The sample of firms includes three high-tech manufacturing firms, five business service firms 
(e.g. finance, trade), and four consumer service organizations (e.g. retail).  
I asked each participating firm to select two or more white-collar work teams with at least 
one non-Japanese member. HR personnel at these firms emailed a web link to an online survey 
to all members of the selected teams, requesting that they complete the survey. Respondents 
could take the survey in Japanese, Mandarin Chinese, or English. They were assured of 
anonymity; employers could not see individual response status or the content of individual 
responses.  
Employees took the survey between February and April 2015. At each firm, the survey 
was open for a two to three week period, depending on preferences of HR staff. During the 
survey period, HR employees sent periodic messages to all members of the target teams, 
reminding them to complete the survey if they had not already done so. In total, the firms 
distributed the survey to 909 employees for a return of 539 valid responses and a response rate of 
59%. 21 22  
 
Control and Outcome Variables 
The main outcome variable of interest in this study is annual income. The survey asked 
respondents to report their pay divided into two components: their past month’s income, 
including base pay, overtime, and allowances (e.g. commuting and housing allowances); and the 
                                                 
21 One firm declined to specify how many workers they received the survey. To calculate the total response rate, I 
therefore assumed that that the response rate at the firm with missing data was equally to the mean response rate of 
all firms (78.6%). Because I received 50 responses from this firm, the estimated number of survey recipients is 64. 
This estimate is included in the response rate denominator of 909 employees.  
22 Response rates varied considerable between firms, with a response rate of 100% at 5 firms, and to a low of 34% at 
one firm.  
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total amount of bonus payments received over the previous calendar year. Respondents selected 
income ranges and their responses were coded at range mid-points. To determine annual income, 
I multiplied past month’s income by twelve and added annual bonus amounts. The survey also 
collected standard information used in earnings analyses, including sex, age, tenure, education 
level, work hours, job content, contract type, and level of supervisory authority.  
 
National Background 
The independent variables of interest are respondents’ national backgrounds and the level 
of bias among their coworkers. The standard way to measure national background in Japan is to 
ask about citizenship (Lie 2001). This was, however, undesirable in this case, as foreigners 
working in large Japanese firms tend to be highly assimilated (Liu-Farrer 2011), and may even 
take Japanese citizenship (even though this practice remains rare in the foreign population 
(Chung 2010)).  I therefore impute national background from a series of questions about place of 
birth and language skills. Respondents were classified as Japanese if they were born in Japan and 
report Japanese as their native language. Similarly, respondents born in China or Korea are 
classified as Chinese or Korean if they selected Chinese or Korean as their native language. 
Approximately 88% of the sample could be classified in this straightforward manner.  
The remaining 12% consisted predominately of people born in Japan who did not report 
native fluency in Japanese or reported native fluency in more than one language. These people 
were classified by their strongest language, or as Japanese if they reported equal fluency in 
Japanese and another language. After this classification, the sample includes 437 Japanese, 55 
Chinese, Taiwanese, and Koreans, 13 people from other Asian countries, 32 people from West, 
including Europe, North America, and Oceania, and two people from Latin America. I drop the 
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Latin Americans from the sample, and aggregate the other non-Japanese into two categories: 
Asians and Westerners. All company samples include at least one respondent with a non-
Japanese Asian background; Nine companies have at least one respondent with a Western 
background (see Table 3.2 in the Results section for details).  
 
Measuring Bias  
The most challenging task of the survey is the measurement of bias. Bias or prejudice are 
fundamentally unobservable mental states that researchers inevitably measure with error 
(Quillian 2006; Charles and Guryan 2008). There are three main measurement techniques in 
widespread use today: explicit attitudinal survey methods (as in the GSS: Bobo et al. 2012 for a 
description), randomized survey experimental methods (Emerson, Chai, and Yancey 2001; 
Kuklinski et al. 1997), and latency methods (the IAT) (Greenwald, McGhee, and Schwartz 
1998). Below I discuss the strengths and weaknesses of these approaches, and describe the 
approach of the current study.  
 Explicit attitudinal measures ask respondents to report racial and ethnic attitudes directly. 
Common types of questions include feeling thermometers, where respondents report feelings of 
warmth or coolness towards a particular group (Iyengar et al. 2011), questions about 
endorsement of particular stereotypes, such as about blacks’ work ethic (Bobo et al. 2012; Sears 
and Henry 2005) or Asians’ trustworthiness (A. Kim and Yeh 2002), and questions about 
willingness to live beside, work with, or marry a person of a person of a particular race or 
ethnicity (Bobo et al. 2012). The main advantages of these questions are that they are easy to 
administer and that it is possible to identify the content of negative stereotypes about different 
groups. The main disadvantage is that they are obtrusive. Because respondents may wish to hide 
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bias, both from researchers and even from themselves, they often either refuse to answer 
questions about racial attitudes (Barreto et al. 2015) or deliberately give false answers (Krysan 
1998; Kuklinski et al. 1997; Janus 2010).  
 In response to concerns about social desirability bias in responses to explicit survey 
questions, researchers have developed more unobtrusive measurement techniques. One such 
method is the vignette experiment (Alexander and Becker 1978; Wallander 2009). Vignettes 
describe realistic, detailed scenarios and ask respondents to evaluate and respond to them. One or 
more attribute of the vignette, such as the race or ethnicity of the persons described, is randomly 
varied. Researchers then compare how recommendations or assessments differ depending on 
these subtle changes to the vignette. Because all other aspects of the vignette are held constant or 
statistically controlled, researchers can estimate a population-level race effect, for example in 
managers’ judgements about the type of job that would be most appropriate for a black/white job 
candidate with matching qualifications (Braddock et al. 1986) or in social workers’ 
recommendations of sanctions for black/white/Hispanic welfare recipients who have violated 
welfare rules (Schram et al. 2009). By including a wealth of details, vignettes grant individual 
respondents plausible deniability that their judgements reflect racial sentiment, reducing social 
desirability bias, compared to traditional survey questions (Schachter 2016). Moreover, attitudes 
that respondents express in surveys are notoriously unstable and subject to framing effects 
(Gaines, Kuklinski, and Quirk 2007). If we can assume that attitudes and bias are complex and 
multivalent, vignette experiments have the advantage that they can tap into the attitudes and 
beliefs that are most relevant in real decision-making situations where discrimination may occur. 
Further, unlike list experiments or direct questions about racial stereotypes, they may reveal the 
presence of preferences and antipathies that do not reach the level of conscious thought. A 
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disadvantage is that reasons for racial and ethnic effects are not always clear, and may be 
influenced by other conscious and unconscious attitudes such as sympathy for members of 
disadvantaged groups. At a population level, respondents to a criminal justice vignette (as in 
Applegate et al. 1994) may include a mix of individuals who reduce the sentences for black 
offenders compared to white offenders in response to blacks’ perceived societal disadvantages, 
and prejudiced individuals who exaggerate sentences for black offenders because they judge 
black offenders more harshly for the same crime.  
A final method for measuring bias, employed mainly by psychologists, is the IAT 
(Greenwald, McGhee, and Schwartz 1998), described earlier. Compared to explicit attitude 
measures, the IAT is less affected by social desirability bias because its outcome measure—
response time in the classification exercise—is measured in intervals too small for the 
respondent to consciously control it. However, critics of the IAT have brought up some of same 
criticisms that apply to vignette studies. Like vignettes, the IAT may measure a number of 
underlying attitudes other than bias. Plausible underlying attitudes and associations include 
familiarity with out-group members, awareness of general societal inequities and stereotypes, or 
sympathy (Tetlock and Mitchell 2009). Another disadvantage of the IAT is that, unlike vignettes, 
it is obvious to respondents that attitudes towards members of different racial or ethnic groups 
are the subject of its study.  
Social desirability pressures to conceal prejudice are presumably very strong in this 
research context. First, the survey respondents are all educated professionals, the group where 
social desirability bias in survey responses is the highest (Krysan 1998; Janus 2010). Second, the 
Japanese respondents in this study engage with foreign coworkers on a daily basis in workplaces 
that emphasize the value of diversity. Third, although the respondents did not interact with the 
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researcher before or during the study, they would have been able to see from the consent form at 
the beginning of the survey that the lead researcher has a non-Japanese name. Concerns about 
appearing biased would almost certainly nearly eliminate the expression of prejudice in explicit 
questions and lead to non-response and survey break-offs if either the IAT or explicit measures 
had been used. As the most unobtrusive measure of bias, vignettes are the most appropriate 
measure of bias for this survey. 
 
Vignette Methodology of SWEDM 
The current survey used four vignettes to measure bias. Two vignettes describe an 
employee who had done something praiseworthy—helped a coworker swamped with work, and 
negotiated a cost-saving contract with vendors—and two vignettes describe an employee who 
had done something blameworthy—been absent and tardy without explanation, and falsified 
records. The negative vignettes appeared in succession, as did the positive vignettes, but the 
order within and between the negative pair and the positive pair varied randomly. Following 
each positive/negative vignette, the survey asked respondents to recommend rewards or 
punishments for the employee.   
In response to employee malfeasance in the negative vignettes, respondents selected 
appropriate penalties from a list, which included penalties without any immediate financial 
consequences (informal discussion, a warning from HR), penalties with short-term financial 
consequences (unpaid leave; one-time reduction in salary), and penalties with long-term financial 
consequences (demotion, dismissal). Respondents could combine formal and informal penalties 
(e.g. informal discussion with demotion), but they could not select more than one formal penalty 
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(e.g. employees who selected demotion could not also select dismissal or one-time salary 
reductions). If respondents selected a one-time pay reduction, they were also asked to specify the 
amount in percentage terms. If respondents selected an unpaid leave, they were asked to specify 
the length of the leave in weeks.  
In response to laudable behavior in the positive vignettes, respondents selected 
appropriate rewards, including rewards without immediate financial consequences (public or 
private praise), rewards with short-term financial consequences (one-time bonus increase), and 
rewards with long-term financial consequences (promotion). In the case of the positive vignettes, 
respondents could select any combination of rewards, because managers could realistically use 
all such rewards together. If respondents selected a bonus increase, they were asked to specify 
the size of the increase in percentage terms. 
The name of the employee in each vignette varied randomly. In keeping with standard 
practices in Japanese workplaces, the vignettes refer to the employee by his last name alone, 
which appeared as either a typical Japanese, Chinese, Korean, or English last name. This design 
permits measurement of whether rewards or penalties recommended for Japanese employees 
differ from those recommended for employees with other national or ethnic backgrounds. The 
full text of the vignettes, the names used, and the follow-up questions appear in Appendix 1.  
There are several possible ways to analyze the results and compare them by national 
background. One is to convert all responses to an ordinal scale. However, this is not ideal, 
because response categories do not represent equidistant points on some hypothetical axis of 
punishment or reward (i.e. demotion and firing are significantly worse outcomes than unpaid 
leave, while unpaid leave is only somewhat worse than a formal warning). Another technique is 
to convert the recommendations to a continuous scale, for example as a percentage of monthly 
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salary lost or gained. This is preferable to the ordinal method, because it can capture the size of 
the gap between short-term economic penalties or benefits and the punishments or rewards that 
involve no economic gain or loss at all. Nonetheless, even with this method, it is still difficult to 
quantify the relative gap between the effects of short-term economic actions like a one-time 
bonus payment or pay cut, with the effects of actions like promotion, demotion, and firing that 
have career-long effects.  
Because these long-term economic rewards and punishments are both quantitatively and 
qualitatively different from the other rewards and punishments, in this paper I focus on the 
relative likelihood of assigning rewards or punishments with long-term economic effects to 
employees of different national or ethnic backgrounds. 
Although vignette experiments reduce social desirability bias, they do not eliminate it 
entirely. To further mitigate its risks, I took several other steps. First, the survey section 
containing the vignettes was introduced using the following language:  
Vignettes are short paragraphs that describe a situation or occurrence. In this 
section, you will be asked to read several vignettes about things that might happen 
at your workplace. You will be asked to think about the vignettes, and choose 
how you think other people would or should respond to the situation. We ask for 
your judgments on the vignettes because they will help us to understand the 
environment and culture of your firm, department, and section. 
 
This language stresses that the researcher’s interest is in firms’ culture, rather than in the 
attitudes of individuals, and does not trigger respondents to think consciously about ethnicity or 
bias.  
Second, this section also included six “non-sensitive” vignettes meant solely to elicit 
employees’ attitudes towards personnel practices and working styles. For example, one non-
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sensitive vignette describes an employee whose career aspirations clash with his managers’ 
views of how he can provide the best value to the firm, and asks how the employee should 
respond to the conflict. Language in non-sensitive vignettes described employees with Japanese 
names, and all respondents viewed the same version. The “sensitive” vignettes used to measure 
bias appeared in a block after an initial non-sensitive vignette. I embedded the bias vignettes with 
other questions about appropriate personnel management and employee behavior in order to 
minimize respondents’ self-consciousness censoring around racial and ethnic attitudes. 
Finally, to further minimize self-censoring, it seemed prudent to avoid long sequences of 
vignettes with foreign names. Within pairs of bad and good vignettes, I programmed the 
randomizer to eliminate the nine combinations that include only non-Japanese names, out of the 
total 16 combinations of ethnicity possible across two vignettes. Thus, respondents viewed one 
of seven possible combinations of ethnicities within the bad and good vignette pairs. Across all 
four vignettes, respondents viewed a maximum of two vignettes (one bad and one good) with 
non-Japanese names, and for each individual vignette the likelihood of viewing a Japanese name 
was four in seven, and the likelihood of viewing a foreign name was three in seven, or one in 
seven respectively for Chinese, Korean, and English names.  
 
Analyses 
The analysis proceeds in three stages. First, I look at simple differences in the proportion 
of respondents who recommended the harshest punishments for Japanese, Chinese, Korean, and 
English-named people in the vignettes. I run these results excluding all foreigners, excluding all 
Asian foreigners, and excluding all Western foreigners. I look for evidence that respondents are 
 121 
 
more likely to recommend the harshest punishments and less likely to recommend the highest 
rewards for foreign-named respondents, particularly for non-coethnics. A pattern of harsher 
penalties and/or lower rewards would be indicative of bias.  
The second stage of the analysis compares levels of bias between companies. To create 
company-level measures of bias, I take the proportion of respondents within each company who 
recommend the harshest punishment for a Japanese-named employee and subtract this from the 
proportion of respondents at that company who recommend the harshest punishment for foreign-
named employees. For rewards vignettes, I reverse this calculation, such that positive numbers  
always indicate a preference for Japanese over foreigners.  
Of course, attitudes towards foreigners of different backgrounds are not necessarily 
similar (e.g. Kobayashi et al. 2015). However, national surveys such as the JGSS suggests that 
attitudes towards Chinese, Taiwanese, and Koreans are highly correlated. In the company-level 
bias calculations, I therefore combine vignette responses for Chinese and Korean-named 
employees to more precisely estimate within-company bias against other Asians. When I 
calculate the level of anti-Asian bias at each firm, I exclude responses from non-Japanese East 
Asians, and from Southeast Asians, many of whom are ethnically Chinese. I calculate anti-
Western bias at the company level separately, using the responses to the vignettes for English-
named persons. In the calculations of anti-Western bias, I remove responses from employees 
with Western backgrounds. 
The third stage of the analysis is a series of hierarchical linear models in which company-
level bias measures of bias calculated at the second stage are interacted with respondents’ 
national backgrounds to predict wages, net of adjustment variables typically used in wage 
regressions. Because of small sample size within firms, respondents are classified into three 
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groups: Japanese, other Asians, and Westerners. These models use random effects for firms and 
teams, and fixed effects for sex, years of education, age, age squared, tenure, tenure squared, 
work hours, Japanese language ability, and English language ability. A negative and significant 
interaction between the bias measure and national background indicates that wage inequality is 
greater where bias is greater. Because bias could influence numerous employment decisions, 
including performance evaluations, job assignments, and promotions, I do not use job categories 
or level of supervisory authority as controls.  
 
Results  
Punishments and Rewards  
Table 3.1 shows the percentage of respondents with different backgrounds who 
recommended the harshest punishments (demotion or firing) in the negative vignettes, and the 
highest rewards (promotion, either alone or in combination with other rewards) in the positive 
vignettes, as well as the number of respondents who viewed each vignette-ethnicity pair. The 
first pair of columns shows the percentage and denominator for Japanese respondents alone, the 
second two columns show these quantities for Japanese and Western respondents together, and 
the third pair of columns displays results for Japanese and other Asian respondents together. 
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Table 3.1: Punishments and Rewards by Vignette Name and Respondent Background 
  Japanese Respondents  
 Japanese and Western Respondents  Japanese and Other Asian Respondents      
  
% highest pun. 
or rew.  
Denominator 
N  
% highest pun. 
or rew.  
Denominator 
N 
% highest pun. 
or rew.  
Denominator 
N 
Vignette name - records 
falsification     
J  29.0 263 29.2  276 28.8 304 
K  31.7 64 35.2  72 28.6 71 
C  34.5 56 35.7  57 32.8 68 
E  27.5 54 31.1  64 23.7 63 
Vignette name - tardiness      
J  1.7 241 1.6  260 1.5 277 
K  1.5 68 1.4  71 2.7 77 
C  0.0 63 0.0  69 0.0 74 
E  3.2 65 3.1  69 2.7 78 
Vignette name - saving money     
J  16.2 254 17.4  273 17.4 288 
K  17.9 58 17.5  66 21.2 68 
C  16.4 63 15.9  65 20.0 77 
E  27.6 62 26.2  65 31.9 73 Vignette name - helping 
coworkers      
 
J  16.5 245 16.9  263 16.7 289 
K  11.6 70 13.7  74 11.7 78 
C  11.5 61 13.4  67 11.8 68 
E   15.3   61   16.1   65   15.9   71 
J=Japanese, K=Korean, C=Chinese, and E=English 
Denominator N refers to the number of respondents of each background who viewed vignettes with particular names.  
 124 
 
The first obvious pattern is that respondents viewed records falsification as a much more serious 
offense than tardiness. Almost no respondents (2% overall) recommended the harshest 
punishments for the tardy employee, whereas for the employee who falsified records, 
approximately one third did so.  
The responses to the two positive vignettes are much more similar to each other than the 
responses to the two negative vignettes, as is apparent from the relatively equal rates at which 
respondents recommended promotion in both the saving and the helping vignettes. This 
similarity emerges at the individual level as well. There is a moderate correlation (Pearson’s 
r=0.53) between respondents’ recommendations in the saving vignette and their 
recommendations for the helping vignette. In contrast, the correlation for responses in the 
negative vignettes is negligible (Pearson’s r=0.11). Relationships between responses to the 
tardiness vignette and the two positive vignettes, and between responses to the records 
falsification vignette and the two positive vignettes are also very small, all between -0.1 and 0.1.  
 Next, I consider the response patterns by the ethnicity of the name that respondents 
viewed in the vignette. In the records falsification vignette, both Japanese respondents and 
Western respondents were marginally more likely to recommend the harsher punishments when 
they viewed a Korean or Chinese name. For example, among Japanese respondents, the rate of 
harsh punishment is 3% higher for Korean names relative to Japanese names, and about 5% 
higher for Chinese names relative to Japanese names. When Western employees’ responses are 
included, both Korean and Chinese names have a 6% higher likelihood of being assigned the 
harshest punishment relative to Japanese. These differences are not statistically significant at the 
0.1 level. However, they are comparable in magnitude to the 6% gap in positive responses for 
Latino and white applicants to low-skilled entry level jobs in a New York City audit study 
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(Pager, Bonikowski, and Western 2009), and to the 3-5% difference in callbacks for Asian 
ethnics with Canadian education and experience and similar Anglo applicants to entry-level 
white collar jobs in Canada (Oreopoulos 2011).  
 There are no interpretable patterns for the Chinese and Korean names in the tardiness 
vignette. Only eight respondents in the entire sample recommended the harshest punishments to 
names of any ethnicity. Because of this lack of variation, I do not analyze the results of this 
vignette further. If there is bias against ethnic minorities, it is apparently not activated in the 
context of this relatively mild infraction.  
 In the saving vignette, differences in recommended rewards for Chinese and Koreans on 
one hand and Japanese on the other are negligible (less than 2%), whether we consider attitudes 
of Japanese alone or attitudes of Japanese and Westerners together.  
In the helping vignette, Japanese respondents are less likely to recommend the highest 
rewards for Koreans or Chinese than they are for their own co-ethnics, a difference of about 5%. 
The direction of this effect is the same, but it is attenuated to about 3% when Westerners’ 
responses are included. As with the records falsification vignette, these differences do not reach 
statistical significance at the 0.1 level.  
In sum, there is some evidence of bias against Korean and Chinese ethnics in this study 
as demonstrated by a greater likelihood of harsh punishment in the falsification vignette and a 
smaller likelihood of promotion in the helping vignette. However, it is possible that these 
differences do not represent bias. The sizes of the effects are small, and may represent random 
noise. Further, even if differences are real and not the result of random variation, they suggest 
that bias is not very severe in this population of firms, is not consistently activated in personnel 
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management decisions, and/or is counterbalanced by competing motivations and concerns 
depending on the decision-making context.  
The results for English-named employees present a different picture. In all vignettes, the 
likelihood of an English-named employee receiving the harshest punishment or the most 
generous reward is within two percentage points of the recommendations for Japanese-named 
employees (as in the tardiness and helping vignettes), or is actually more lenient or generous (as 
in the saving and falsification vignettes). The results are particularly striking for the saving 
vignette, where the magnitude of the English name advantage over the Japanese name is quite 
large (11% for Japanese respondents and 14% when Japanese are combined with other Asian 
respondents). In both cases, this difference is statistically significant at the 0.05 level. In other 
words, the results provide no evidence of negative bias against Western (English-named) 
employees.  
 
Firm-Level Bias Calculations 
 Table 3.2 presents the estimates for bias within each firm based on the records 
falsification, saving, and helping vignettes. Positive numbers in this table indicate favorable 
treatment for Japanese relative to the target non-Japanese ethnic group.  
Because sample size within each firm is relatively small, these estimates are imprecise. 
As a gauge of this imprecision in the company-level estimates, I include the number vignettes 
referring to foreign-named persons that respondents viewed at each firm in Table 3.2. The 
estimates of bias against English-named persons are more imprecise than the estimates of bias 
against Chinese/Korean-named persons, because the likelihood of seeing either a Korean or 
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Chinese-named vignette was two in seven compared to one in seven for the English-named 
vignette.  
 The records falsification vignette identifies harsher treatment for Chinese and Koreans 
relative to Japanese in eight out of twelve firms. In four out of twelve firms, the differences in 
punishment recommendations are particularly large, with differences of greater than 10% in 
respondents’ recommendations for other East Asians’ punishments compared to Japanese. We 
would naturally expect more extreme bias estimates in firms with smaller sample sizes, but these 
four high estimates do not come from the firms with the most imprecise estimates (Firms J and 
L).  
In the saving vignette, firms are almost evenly split between those where generous 
treatment is recommended for other East Asians more often than for Japanese (values below 0), 
and those where it is recommended more often for Japanese than for other East Asians (values 
above 0). Moreover, most of the values are clustered close to 0. This is the pattern we might 
expect if responses towards Japanese and other East Asians do not vary.  
Patterns for the vignette on helping show a disadvantage for other East Asians in nine out 
of twelve firms. There are, however, fewer firms with differences greater than 0.1, compared to 
the records falsification vignette. The range of bias values is larger than in the records 
falsification vignette, but this is due to the very low outlying estimate for Firm L, the most 
imprecise estimate. Without this outlier, the range of firm-level bias is smaller in the helping 
vignette than in the records falsification vignette.  
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Table 3.2: Estimates of Firm-Level Bias 
 Company Samples Falsified Records Saved Money Helped Coworkers 
 NTotal NAsian NWestern CK-J NCK E-J NE J-CK NCK J-E NE J-CK NCK J-E NE 
Company name   
A 32 5 2 0.20 7 0.61 3 0.03 7 -0.20 4 0.23 9 -0.31 4 
B 43 12 1 -0.32 6 -0.27 5 -0.03 7 -0.15 7 0.03 11 -0.04 5 
C 35 2 6 0.18 10 -0.37 2 0.05 9 -0.02 5 -0.16 9 0.20 6 
D 50 8 0 0.20 9 -0.06 6 0.15 11 -0.06 6 0.02 14 -0.07 7 
E 30 4 0 -0.09 8 -0.05 5 0.00 7 -0.08 5 0.07 7 -0.13 4 
F 81 9 2 0.09 21 -0.15 11 0.08 21 -0.13 11 -0.06 18 -0.02 11 
G 27 2 0 0.05 8 0.40 3 0.00 8 -0.18 4 0.06 7 0.06 4 
H 39 11 5 -0.07 7 -0.09 4 -0.08 7 -0.07 4 0.23 10 0.06 5 
I 142 7 8 0.05 38 -0.05 18 0.02 39 -0.13 20 0.09 40 0.08 18 
J 23 7 1 -0.17 3 -0.20 3 -0.18 5 0.15 3 0.02 5 -0.18 3 
K 29 1 7 0.23 9 0.36 3 -0.31 8 -1.00 2 0.01 10 0.20 3 
L 10 2 2 0.08 3 NA 0 0.00 3 -0.50 2 -0.50 2 0.20 1 
Counts of Firms by Bias Level 
N < -0.1    2 4 2  7 2 3 
N < - 0.1a    1 2 2  5 1 2 
N < = 0.0    4 8 7  11 3 6 N > 0.0 8 3 5 1 9 6 
N > 0.1 4 3 1  1 2 3 
N > 0.1a       4   0   1   0   2   1   
Information in “Company Samples” columns refers to number of respondents. Asian refers to non-Japanese Asians. Subcolumns under “Falsified Records,” 
“Saved Money,” and “Helped Coworkers” columns refer to 1) Difference in the rate that the harshest punishment/most generous reward was recommended for 
Chinese or Korean-named persons, compared to a Japanese; 2) the number of Japanese and Western respondents at each company who viewed the vignette with 
a Chinese or Korean name; 3) difference in the rate that the harshest punishment/most generous reward was recommended for an English-named person 
compared to a Japanese; 4) the number of Japanese and East Asian respondents at each firm who viewed the vignette with the an English name. In subcolumns 1) 
and 3)  positive numbers indicate recommendations that favor Japanese-named persons.  
a Counts in these rows exclude firms with the most imprecise estimates: those where estimates are based on fewer than four minority-named vignettes.
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As in the across-firm results, both the records falsification and the helping vignette 
suggest some negative bias against Chinese and Koreans, at least in some firms. An important 
question for the next stage of the analysis is whether measurements in these two vignettes 
capture the same underlying construct. To investigate this possibility, I look at the correlation 
between the two firm-level measures that appear to detect some negative bias. The Pearson’s R 
for the correlation is -0.15. This is a very low correlation, and it is in the opposite direction of 
what we would expect. There are two ways of interpreting this finding. It may indicate that the 
firm-level estimates of bias are too imprecise to produce a reasonable ordering of more and less 
biased firms. Alternatively, it may indicate that the two vignettes tap into two entirely different 
types of stereotypes and beliefs about members of different ethnic groups. In either case, the low 
correlation suggests that it is better to consider separately the effects on ethnic wage inequality of 
estimated firm-level bias derived from each of these vignettes.  
With regards to anti-Western bias, the firm-level results support the conclusions from the 
overall analysis that anti-Western bias is not widespread, or at least is not activated by the type of 
personnel decisions described in these vignettes. The records falsification vignette reveals more 
negative judgements towards English-named persons in just three firms. Moreover, the three 
firms with values above zero all have very small sample sizes, casting doubt on whether these 
positive numbers truly indicate anti-Western (English-named) bias. A similar but even stronger 
pattern is apparent in the firm-level analysis of the saving vignette for Westerners. There is only 
one firm with an estimate above zero, and this firm is once again one of those with more 
imprecise estimates. In seven firms (five, excluding those with the smallest sample sizes) there is 
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a 10% or greater likelihood that English-named employees will be recommended for promotion, 
compared to Japanese-named employees.  
The helping vignette does not indicate any preference between Japanese-named and 
English-named employees. Firm-level values are distributed evenly above and below zero, and 
most are within 0.1 of zero.  
 Two out of the three vignettes, the records falsification vignette and the money saving 
vignette, thus suggest some preference for or favorable treatment of English-named persons. 
Once again, these positive attitudes at the firm level are not correlated in the way we would 
expect. Pearson’s R for firm-level bias towards Westerners measured by these two vignettes is 
−0.56. Once again, the order of firms may be unreliable because estimates are imprecise, or these 
two vignettes may capture completely different attitudes. Because estimates of bias are more 
imprecise for Westerners than for East Asians, the former possibility is more likely in this case 
compared to the case of attitudes towards East Asians.  
 
Inequality Analyses 
The next series of analyses investigates whether firm-level bias is associated with wage 
inequality. Models 1 and 2 in Table 3.3 examine the interaction between firm-level bias against 
non-Japanese East Asians and annual income. Model 1 uses the measure of bias derived from the 
records falsification vignette; Model 2 uses the measure from the vignette on helping coworkers. 
In Model 1, there is a negative interaction between being from a non-Japanese Asian country and 
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the level of bias. This negative interaction is significant at the 0.1 level. In other words, there is 
some evidence that East Asians experience a larger wage gap in firms with more bias.  
As discussed above, it is possible that this is a spurious result. Because the estimates of 
bias at each firm are imprecise, the ordering of firms from least biased to most biased is likely to 
be inaccurate. To test whether this result is spurious, I reran the model (results available on 
request) without the two most imprecisely measured firms (Firms J and L). The magnitude of the 
interaction effect increases slightly and reaches significance at the 0.05 level after removing the 
two most imprecisely measured firms. To further reduce spurious order effects, I grouped 
together firms with bias measured at or below 0.05 (Firms B, E, G, H, I, and J) and bias 
measured above 0.05 and interacted this binary bias measure with national background. I chose 
this cutpoint as a conservative test, because firms with observed bias above 0.05 are more likely 
than other firms to have true levels of bias greater than zero. The resulting binary measure of 
bias also has a significant (at the 0.1 level) and negative interaction with non-Japanese Asian 
background.
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Table 3.3: Regression of Firm-Level Anti-Asian Bias and National Background on Annual 
Earnings 
 Model 1 Model 2    
Individual level variables  Beta SE Beta  SE 
Male 1,772.89*** 275.50 1,832.58***  275.29 
Years of education 302.53*** 90.81 279.48**  91.25 
Age 184.74 128.22 181.93   128.43 
Age squared 0.77 1.58 0.81   1.58 
Tenure 270.43*** 55.04 260.35***  55.09 
Tenure squared -8.77*** 1.65 -8.49***  1.66 
Weekly work hours 35.22* 16.07 34.87
 
16.05 
Advanced English 1,140.27*** 287.88 1,042.78***  289.47 
Advanced Japanese -331.43 644.94 -649.57   653.40 
National backgrounda    
Non-Japanese Asian -587.60 437.46 -741.20+  449.34 
Westerner 295.94 695.22 666.44   617.37 
Firm level variables     
Anti-Asian bias (records falsification) 4,360.13 2,706.47    
Anti-Asian bias (rf) * Asian -3,957.00+ 2,138.31   
Anti-Asian bias (rf) * Westerner 5,663.37 4,143.39   
Anti-Asian bias (helping coworkers) -5,252.83* 2,552.43 
Anti-Asian bias (hc) * Asian 3,756.23  2,682.84 
Anti-Asian bias (hc) * Westerner 4,235.74 3,615.46 
Constant -7,659.45** 2,700.87 -6,793.01* 2,688.83 
Model information   
Observations 525 525    
Number of firms 12 12    
Individual-level variance component  7124386 7128433    
Team-level variance component 475935 556818    
Firm-level variance component   1862972        1755657      
Results are from ANCOVA with random effects models (HLM). All slopes are fixed.  
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.1 
a Reference category is Japanese
 
In other words, there is evidence that in firms with higher levels of bias, non-Japanese 
Asians are at a relative disadvantage, and this finding does not appear to be a spurious result of 
imprecision in the measurement of bias. To contextualize the magnitude of this effect, consider 
Figure 3.2, which plots predicted incomes for Japanese and other Asian employees by firms’ 
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level of bias based on Model 1. Predicted income is measured in millions of yen, equivalent to 
tens of thousands of dollars. In firms where respondents recommend the harshest punishments 
for Chinese or Korean-names persons 10% more often than for Japanese-named persons, the 
predicted annual income gap is about 1 million yen or $10,000.  
Figure 3.2: Predicted Annual Income for Japanese and Other Asians by Level of Anti-Asian Bias 
 
 
Turning to Model 2, there is no evidence of a wage penalty for East Asians in firms 
judged to be more biased using the helping vignette. The interaction coefficient is non-significant 
and its sign is positive, the opposite of what we would expect if East Asians earned less than 
Japanese in more biased firms. The main effect for bias is positive and significant, suggesting 
wages for everyone are higher when anti-East Asian bias is higher, but this result disappears if 
the interaction term is removed from the model.  
Models 3 and 4 in Table 3.4 test the effects of attitudes towards English-named persons 
on wage outcomes for those with European, North American, and Oceanian backgrounds. Model 
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3 uses the measure of bias from the records falsification vignette and Model 4 uses the measure 
from the saving vignette. The sample sizes are lower in these two models because they do not 
include three firms that have no Western employees in the sample (Firms D, E, and G). In 
addition, Model 3 excludes Firm L, because no non-Western respondents viewed the records 
falsification vignette with an English name, making it impossible to use this vignette to estimate 
bias there. 
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Table 3.4: Regression of Firm-Level Anti-Western Bias and National Background on Annual 
Earnings 
  Model 3  Model 4 
         
Individual level variables  Beta SE Beta  SE 
Male 2,080.42*** 324.21 2,039.00***  315.84 
Years of education 295.86** 112.52 275.65*  110.14 
Age 261.30+ 156.01 260.13+  154.25 
Age squared 0.15 1.92 0.08  1.89 
Tenure 279.35*** 63.55 288.96***  63.05 
Tenure squared -9.45*** 1.97 -9.64 1.95 
Weekly work hours 34.13+ 18.28 34.06+  18.16 
Advanced English 1,280.47*** 321.87 1,250.60***  315.55 
Advanced Japanese -792.74 760.20 -713.88  731.33 
National backgrounda   
Non-Japanese Asian -395.55 526.73 -795.64  588.11 
Westerner 830.29 663.21 -472.16  772.42 
Firm level variables   
Anti-Western bias (records falsification) -2,421.64 1,732.49  
Anti-Western bias (rf) * Asian 603.63 1,774.36   
Anti-Western bias (rf) * Westerner 4,760.68* 2,214.41   
Anti-Western bias (saving money) 1,182.86 1,682.76 
Anti-Western bias (sm) * Asian -2,916.94 2,384.71 
Anti-Western bias (sm) * Westerner -4,441.20** 1,662.12 
Constant -8,748.71** 3,293.65 -8,265.13*   
Model information  
Observations 414 423  
Number of firms 8 9  
Individual-level variance component  7,685,458 7,600,426  
Team-level variance component 791,736 751,233  
Firm-level variance component   1,752,346        1894,567      
Results are from ANCOVA with random effects models (HLM). All slopes are fixed.  
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.1 
a Reference category is Japanese
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Surprisingly, there is a positive interaction between bias and wages for Westerners in 
Model 3. The model suggests that Westerners are at a wage advantage in firms where more 
people recommend harsh punishment for Westerners. However, concerns about measurement 
error and firm ordering are even more pertinent here than in the analysis of Asians, because 
bias against English-named persons is estimated more imprecisely than bias against East 
Asians. Moreover, removing the most imprecise estimates—those based on just two or three 
vignettes—is not a feasible robustness check. Removing firms with only two or three 
vignettes on English-named persons leaves just four firms for analysis, and excludes the only 
two firms (Firms A and K) where any anti-Western bias is detected and where any Western 
employees appear in the sample. However, as above for anti-East Asian bias, it is possible to 
create a binary variable representing more or less anti-Western-biased firms, and to interact 
this binary variable with employee ethnicity. To create this binary variable, I use a cutpoint of 
-0.05, the highest cutpoint that allows me to include firms other than Firm A and Firm K in 
the biased group. The interaction between the binary measure of bias and Western ethnicity is 
positive, but it does not approach statistical significance (p=0.20). In other words, the 
evidence that anti-Western bias is associated with higher wages for Westerns is not supported 
by the robustness checks. Indeed, further examination of the data shows that this effect is 
entirely fueled by firms A and K, where estimates of bias are particularly imprecise.  
Model 4 examines anti-Western bias as measured by the saving money vignette. The 
interaction coefficient is significant and negative, indicating that Westerners do earn less 
when anti-English-named bias is stronger. To test the robustness of this result, I once again 
create a binary variable. Here I used a cut point of -0.06. I use this cut point (as opposed to + 
or - 0.05 used above) in order to include three rather than two firms in the bias group. 
However, because I detect anti-Western bias in only one firm (Firm J), it is more appropriate 
to interpret a value of 1 for this binary variable as a sign that pro-Western bias was not 
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detected, or is measured only at low levels, rather than to interpret it as a measure of anti-
Western bias. A negative interaction between national background and the binary measure of 
bias therefore means that Westerners earn less when pro-Western bias is low, not when anti-
Western bias is high. When this binary variable for bias is used, the interaction coefficient 
between bias and Western background remains negative and significant at the 0.05 level. In 
other words, unlike the counter-intuitive results from the records falsification vignette, the 
evidence that Westerners earn relatively less when pro-Western bias is weaker is also 
supported in the robustness checks.  
Figure 3.3: Predicted Annual Income for Japanese and Westerners by Level of Pro-Western 
Bias 
 
To understand the magnitude of this difference, I depict the predicted incomes for 
Japanese and Westerners in pro-Western biased firms and other firms in Figure 3.3. I use the 
binary interaction to show the magnitude because outlying bias values in imprecisely 
estimated firms K and L could have an outsized impact on predictions in the linear model. 
Westerners have a sizable advantage of over 3 million yen, or $30,000, in firms with pro-
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Western bias and no detected advantage in firms where this pro-Western bias was not 
detected or was detected only at low levels.  
 
Discussion  
In the context of large, bureaucratic Japanese firms, I find that non-Japanese Asians 
earn less than Japanese when coworkers are more biased, as measured by a vignette about 
records falsification. I also show that in firms with pro-Western bias, measured through a 
vignette about saving money, Westerners earn more than Japanese coworkers. A vignette 
about helping coworkers suggests some bias against East Asians, but firm-level bias 
measured by this vignette does not predict wage inequality. Similarly, the records 
falsification vignette suggests some pro-Western bias, but firm-level results do not reliably 
predict wage inequality. In this section, I will consider first, why some vignettes detected 
bias, but not others; and second, why some vignette results predicted inequality, but not 
others.  
A rich history of vignette studies shows that the effect of racial or ethnic cues on 
responses depends heavily on other contextual signals in the vignette (Applegate et al. 1994; 
Soss, Fording, and Schram 2011; Schachter 2016). In particular, “stereotype consistent” cues 
have been shown to exaggerate the effects of racial minority status (Schram et al. 2009). A 
large body of research in Japan suggests that Japanese people tend to hold positive 
stereotypes of people from the West and negative stereotypes about other Asians (see Long 
2010 for a review), and that these stereotypes emerge as early as the elementary school years 
(Toriyama and Shiota 2015). Widespread positive associations with Westerners may explain 
why English-name effects appear much more clearly in the money saving vignette than in the 
records falsification vignette. It does not explain why we do not observe these same effects in 
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the helping vignette, although we can speculate that perhaps the concept of “negotiating skill” 
triggers these positive associations more than the concept of “helpfulness.” It is also clear 
why we might detect anti-Asian bias in the records falsification vignette. Asians from other 
countries living in Japan are often stereotyped as criminals (Rankin 2012). Even though 
Asian foreigners are less likely to commit crimes than Japanese, crimes by Asians receive 
wide press coverage and outsized attention from the National Police Agency (Arudou 2013; 
National Police Agency 2016). Of the four vignettes, the records falsification story is most 
likely to trigger these associations. However, there is no equally obvious stereotype to 
explain why the helping vignette generated less generous rewards for East Asians.  
It is significant for understanding the link between bias and inequality that not all 
employment vignettes consistently captured pro-Western or anti-Asian biases. A strength of 
the vignette methodology is that it allows researchers to capture unobtrusively what cues 
produce racial or ethnic effects. Identifying these cues in Japanese organizational settings was 
not the focus of this research. Nonetheless, one implication of the findings is that negative 
stereotypes about East Asians and positive stereotypes about Westerners do not uniformly 
penalize or benefit employees with those backgrounds. Depending on the information 
employers are considering, bias may or may not be activated.  
Researchers have questioned why laboratory studies of the bias-discrimination link do 
not produce consistent results (Blanton et al. 2009; Oswald et al. 2015). Although null results 
may occur because errors in the measurement of bias are too great, the results of the current 
study, like other vignette studies (e.g. Schram et al. 2009), indicate that null results may also 
occur because the cues that activate bias are not present in the experimental setting (Pager 
and Quillian 2005).  
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The results also raise the questions, why did bias measured by the saving vignette (but 
not the falsification vignette) predict higher wages for Westerners; and why did bias 
measured by the falsification vignette (but not the helping vignette) predict lower wages for 
non-Japanese Asians? I believe the answer lies in who holds bias against members of 
different groups (see Table 3.1) and how bias is aggregated at the firm level in the inequality 
analyses. Recall that I combined answers to vignette questions from Japanese and Western 
respondents to create the firm-level measures of anti-Asian bias and that I combined answers 
from Japanese and other Asian respondents to create the firm-level measures of anti-Western 
bias.  
Consider responses to the records falsification vignette. For an English-named records 
falsifier, Japanese respondents alone recommend the harshest punishment at rates slightly 
below those for Japanese-named records falsifiers. A more sizable gap in recommendations 
only emerges when we consider the responses of all Asian respondents, including non-
Japanese. But given the marginalization of non-Japanese Asian employees, who face negative 
bias from Japanese, it is not clear that their more pro-Western attitudes would actually have 
an impact on wages. Asian employees are also less likely to be managers and have shorter 
tenures than either Japanese or Western employees (see Chapter 2 for details). Hence, when 
their attitudes differ from those of Japanese employees, they may have little or no effect on 
employment outcomes. In comparison, in the saving vignette, there is a sizable pro-Western 
bias even among Japanese employees alone. In this vignette, the responses of non-Japanese 
Asians contribute less to the overall measure of pro-Western bias. Because attitudes of 
Japanese are more likely to be influential in employment outcomes, this could explain why 
the savings vignette predicts inequality while the falsification vignette does not.  
With regards to the anti-Chinese or Korean bias in the records falsification vignette, 
we find it slightly more extreme among Western respondents compared to Japanese 
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respondents alone. In contrast, in the helping vignette, including Western responses 
attenuates the anti-Chinese and Korean effect. Because of the pro-Western bias among 
Japanese respondents, it is possible that Westerners’ attitudes do have a significant effect on 
decision-making in the workplace. Western employees also have a structural advantage in 
that they are much more likely than non-Japanese Asian employees to have supervisory 
authority (38% of Westerners in the sample supervise at least one employee, compared to 
21% of non-Japanese Asians). It is perhaps because Westerners’ anti-Asian bias is triggered 
only by the falsification vignette that only the falsification vignette predicts inequality.  
 
Conclusion  
Does bias continue to affect personnel outcomes past the hiring stage? This question 
is of interest to scholars of inequality and to policymakers wishing to design effective 
workplace affirmative action and inclusion policies. However, because it is difficult to 
measure bias and to gain access to organizational settings, scholars’ answers have relied 
heavily on theory without complementary empirical testing in real-life employment 
situations.  For example, researchers predict that bias will have little or no effect on post-hire 
wages because market-based sorting mechanisms will allocate minority workers to the most 
unbiased employers (Becker 1957; Heckman 1998; Tetlock and Mitchell 2009). Others argue 
that biases are most salient in low-information environments (Petersen and Saporta 2004; 
Pager, Bonikowski, and Western 2009). This implies that even if bias matters in hiring when 
employers have little information about applicants, it will matter less post-hire when 
employers have rich information about employees. Finally, scholars suggest that even though 
bias is present, countervailing interpersonal mechanisms such as person-positivity bias and 
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equal status contact in the workplace, or organizational and legal mechanisms like 
punishment for discriminatory behavior will limit its influence (Tetlock and Mitchell 2009).  
 This paper is, to my knowledge, the first to empirically examine these predictions 
about the role of workplace bias in post-hire outcomes. Contrary to the hypothesis that the job 
allocation process sorts minorities out of firms with levels of bias that are consequential for 
career outcomes, either because biased employers refuse to hire minorities, or because 
minorities avoid positions with biased employers (Pager and Pedulla 2015), these findings 
suggest minorities do work in firms where bias is strong enough (or unconstrained enough) to 
influence post-hire outcomes. This is a particularly significant finding given Japan’s 
workplace demography. Skilled foreign workers make up a slim percentage of workforce, 
and their share is smaller in Japan than in any other developed country (Oishi 2012; Holbrow 
and Nagayoshi 2016). However, attitudes towards immigrants are not less welcoming in 
Japan than in major Western countries; if anything, they are slightly more positive (Kage, 
Rosenbluth, and Tanaka 2016). If minorities anywhere are able to sort away from firms in 
which bias is strong or unconstrained enough to affect employment outcomes, we would 
expect this to occur in Japan. These results indicate it does not. Even in this sample of firms, 
all of which have dedicated staff focusing on diversity, and all of which have CEOs who have 
made diversity a cornerstone of their employment strategy, we observe biases among 
employees that predict outcomes for minorities employed in those firms.  
In addition, contrary to the hypothesis that the information-rich relationship between 
employees and employers eliminates the impact of bias on decision-making post-hire, or that 
interpersonal mechanisms such as team loyalty and positive intergroup contact override it in 
real-life employment scenarios, it appears that bias has effects with long-term impacts post-
hire. Naturally, other factors thought to moderate the relationship between bias and 
inequality, such as the content and enforcement of anti-discrimination law, are quite different 
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in Japan, the United States, and other developed countries (e.g. Dobbin 2009; Hasegawa 
2013). This research cannot speak to the effects of particular moderating factors in Japan or 
elsewhere; but it does demonstrate that bureaucratic organization and intergroup contact that 
could theoretically short-circuit the bias-inequality link in any large organization are not 
enough to prevent its negative effects. The results of this research thus cast doubt on several 
of the major objections that critics have expressed towards claims that bias has post-hire 
effects on wage inequality.  
At the same time, this research also has limitations. At the callback stage of the 
employment process, researchers may use quasi-experimental methods to test for 
discrimination (Pager and Quillian 2005; Pager, Bonikowski, and Western 2009) and the link 
between bias and discrimination (Rooth 2010). However, real-life post-hire employment 
decisions are not amenable to experimental manipulation. Thus, as with other observational 
research designs, an unobserved factor may hypothetically drive the relationship between 
attitudes and wage inequality we have observed here. Perhaps the most likely suspect is 
performance: true, unobserved performance gaps by ethnic group that vary by firm could 
cause both differences in attitudes towards these groups (as predicted by status construction 
theory: see Ridgeway and Correll 2006) and differences in wages. 
It is very unlikely, however, that variation in performance explains the full 
relationship between bias and inequality that we observe. First, bias is measured based on 
recommendations for punishments and rewards for hypothetical, differently named 
employees who have done the exact same thing. For differences in punishment or reward 
recommendations in these vignettes to emerge based on performance of actual employees 
with corresponding ethnicities, respondents must be generalizing stereotypes to a case where 
they do not necessarily apply. As such, even if performance differences are affecting both the 
dependent and independent variables, it is likely that at least some (although arguably not all) 
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of the observed wage inequality is caused by similar generalizations in actual employment 
decisions made by these same actors.  
Second, for performance variation to explain the observed bias-inequality 
relationships, we would have to assume that Western employees outperform both Japanese 
and other Asian employees in nearly all firms. Although performance is unobserved, this 
pattern is unlikely. If anything, Asian immigrant employees should have better performance 
that Western employees because Western employees are less likely to speak good Japanese 
and are more culturally distant from Japanese than Asian immigrants (see Chapter 2) and 
because Asian immigrants have fewer opportunities in other developed countries and are thus 
more motivated or “hungry” to make it in Japan (Career Connection 2014). Not only would 
we expect Asian employees to enjoy a performance advantage over Westerners, but we 
would also expect both groups to have a performance disadvantage compared to Japanese 
because immigrants may lack soft and hard skills that are valued in the Japanese labor 
market. Thus unobserved performance differences are also unlikely to fully explain the 
results.  
To further disentangle these processes, future research might adopt several strategies. 
For example, in a longitudinal design, researchers might measure managers’ bias at Time 1. 
At Time 2, researchers could then examine how managers rate the performance of employees 
of different races and ethnicities who were not their subordinates at Time 1, and determine if 
managers’ T1 bias has a relationship to ratings for new employees. Researchers might also 
reverse this and measure employee evaluations at Time 1. After employees transfer or change 
jobs, researchers could then measure bias of employees’ new managers and coworkers at 
Time 2, to determine if T1 performance of subordinates predicts coworkers’ attitudes, 
indicating whether or not people update their attitudes based on recent workplace 
experiences.  
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  A second limitation of the current study is that, assuming the relationship between 
bias and inequality is causal, I cannot identify the mechanisms through which bias among 
immediate coworkers generates inequality. As shown in Figure 3.1, bias may affect wage 
inequality both through the creation of biased rules and by increasing the likelihood that 
individuals will engage in discrimination above and beyond that codified by rules. This 
research design does not permit me to assess whether or in what combination rulemaking and 
unsanctioned discrimination produce the observed inequalities. However, features of the 
design suggest that the bias detected in this study primarily affects minority workers through 
unsanctioned discrimination. Bias is measured at the local level among respondents’ 
immediate coworkers; these coworkers and supervisors have the opportunity for unsanctioned 
discrimination, particularly in performance reviews and allocation of rewards. However, 
immediate coworkers and supervisors do not usually determine policies that are 
consequential for workers’ career progression, such as requirements for promotion or pay 
scales for different types of jobs. If the views of the employees surveyed here perfectly 
represent those of the workforce at their companies as a whole, or, if not representative, at 
least deviate only in some predictable way, then it would be plausible that the bias I detect 
among immediate coworkers is correlated with discriminatory rule-making at the firm level, 
which in turn affects inequality. However, these assumptions about representativeness are 
unnecessary to link local-level attitudes towards local, unsanctioned discriminatory behavior. 
This mechanism would be consistent with status construction theory, which suggests that 
group stereotypes can lead members of the dominant group to devalue the contributions and 
accomplishments of disadvantaged group members (Ridgeway and Correll 2006). Measuring 
global biases at the firm level, the biases of immediate coworkers, and the biases of strategic 
actors like CEOs or HR managers and the relationships between inequality and bias at these 
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different levels could help answer questions about the mechanisms through which bias affects 
wages.  
Unobtrusive measures of bias, such as vignette studies or the IAT, find persistent 
differences in how Americans interpret and respond to people’s actions based on race. Audit 
studies in employment contexts also demonstrate racial and ethnic discrimination at the 
callback stage. Critics question, however, whether employer bias or discrimination really 
matter for post-hire wage inequality. This study suggests that low levels of bias are a poor 
justification for optimism that bias has a minimal impact on post-hire outcomes. Levels of 
bias detected here are equivalent or smaller to those detected in audit and vignette studies in 
the United States, and the minority population is much smaller. And yet, minorities still work 
with biased coworkers, with serious implications for their post-hire earnings, to the detriment 
of East Asian immigrants and to the benefit of Western ones.  
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CHAPTER 4 
CONCLUSION: SLOW DOWN OR SLOW DAWN? 
Japan’s population is rapidly contracting. If current trends continue, its population 
will fall to just one third of its 2010 peak by as early as 2095, with even faster declines in the 
working age population. These numbers are shocking, but they are not unique.  Other 
countries also face below replacement birthrates and are poised to experience similar 
population collapses.  Japan is noteworthy, however, in that it has reached the point of 
demographic decline much sooner than other major economies. Its place at the forefront of 
this demographic shift therefore makes Japan the ideal laboratory in which to investigate the 
social and economic implications this unprecedented transition.  
Scholars are unsure how population contractions will maintain or disrupt patterns of 
inequality. On one hand, inequality may rise if these changes sap demand and place an 
unsustainable tax burden on the shrinking pool of working adults (e.g. Guest and Swift 2008; 
Reher 2011). On the other, growth in the global economy may offset local economic 
stagnation, and companies’ labor demand may outpace labor supply, creating new 
opportunities for disadvantaged people (Alba 2009). In Japan, higher tax burdens, reduced 
opportunities, and growing economic uncertainty could prompt Japanese men, who have 
historically monopolized the best jobs, to tighten their grip on high-status, stable 
employment. Alternatively, labor shortages may disrupt men’s historical monopoly and open 
new doors for female and foreign workers’ advancement. 
 To illuminate patterns of inequality in the context of negative population growth, this 
dissertation analyzes original survey data gathered from 539 white-collar foreign and 
Japanese workers employed in twelve large Japanese firms. The findings present both cause 
for optimism and cause for concern.  
As a cause for optimism, I find little evidence that firms restrict women’s access to 
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jobs on the prestigious management track or that they shunt ambitious women into less 
remunerative contract or general track jobs. Although there are many women who work in 
contract jobs and in general track jobs, there is no indication that these women do so 
unwillingly; female employees in contract or general track jobs rate their job quality as highly 
as do women who have “made it” in management track positions.  
Increasing government pressure on firms to include women in the best jobs in the 
economic core undoubtedly contributes to women’s new access to management track jobs. 
For example, in 2014, the Cabinet Office introduced a website publicizing statistics about 
women’s representation in management and ratios of applicants to hires for men and women 
at thousands of firms (Ministry of Health, Labor, and Welfare 2016). This greater 
transparency likely discourages firms from discriminating in hiring and job placement 
(Castilla 2008; 2015). At the same time, however, firms that wish to skirt regulation and 
scrutiny often develop sophisticated strategies for doing so (Mun 2016; Abe 2014).  If firms 
wished to maintain or strengthen men’s preferential access to the management track, they 
would undoubtedly be able to do so, despite government counterpressure. Women’s 
apparently unimpeded access to the management track thus implies that negative population 
growth does not necessarily lead advantaged persons to cling more tightly to their 
prerogatives.  
A second cause for optimism is the high level of attainment of Westerners at Japanese 
firms.  In these sample firms, Western employees earn more than Japanese people with 
similar jobs and skills, an advantage that widens over the course of their careers. Indeed, 
Japanese employees believe that Westerners deserve higher rewards for the same behaviors 
than do Japanese or other Asian employees. These findings stand in contrast to the popular 
wisdom of the 1980s and 1990s about prospects for Westerners in Japanese firms. During this 
period, Japanese firms operating in the United States settled lawsuits with Americans who 
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claimed that their employers had discriminated against them on the basis of nationality 
(Kilborn 1991). Contemporary observers suggested that, because Japanese management 
culture was insular and suspicious of outsiders, Japanese firms had constructed a “rice paper 
ceiling” limiting advancement opportunities for Americans and other non-Japanese (Kopp 
2000). Either concerns about discrimination against Western employees in the 1980s and 
1990s were overblown (e.g. Rapp 2002), or conditions for Western employees in Japanese 
firms have markedly improved since that time.  
Both status construction theory (Ridgeway and Correll 2006) and intergroup contact 
theory (Allport 1954) predict that if women or ethnic minorities move into more powerful 
positions, attitudes towards members of these groups will become more positive. 
Consequently, in a best case scenario of declining population, formerly excluded persons will 
move into more powerful roles, perhaps simply due to labor shortages. Subsequently, 
however, their increased representation in elite jobs can also overturn mental models and 
hierarchies that lead people to categorize members of some groups as lower status, perhaps 
reaching a tipping point where discrimination no longer so disproportionally affects members 
of these groups, even if labor demand slackens. In this case, demographic decline may not 
just provide new opportunities to women and minorities, but may also fundamentally reshape 
the status hierarchy.  
These analyses, however, give little reason to believe that Japan or other shrinking 
societies will follow this path. For example, within the management track, women continue to 
earn significantly less than men. Their performance is assessed more poorly, but even taking 
their lower (assessed) performance into account, they still earn considerably less than men 
with similar human capital characteristics. In fact, women’s lower wages within tracks 
account for a greater share of the gender pay gap in this context than does women’s 
overrepresentation in female-typed jobs. Discrimination against women thus persists in other 
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parts of the employment process, including in how performance is rewarded, and perhaps 
also in how it is assessed, even though firms do not exclude women from the management 
track, and the majority of women in the sample (57%) work in management track jobs. This 
implies that traditional gender status beliefs continue to have a major impact on employment 
outcomes.  
The experience of East Asian foreign workers at Japanese firms also undermines 
optimism for the best case scenario. Although there is equal status contact between Japanese 
and other East Asian workers in these firms, Japanese and Westerners continue to hold anti-
East Asian biases. Firm level aggregates of these biases show that coworker bias is also 
associated with relatively lower wages for East Asians, whose wage disadvantage compared 
to Japanese with similar human capital compounds with the length of time they work in 
Japanese firms. In Japan, bias against other East Asians has a history stretching back at least 
to the nineteenth century (Befu 2001; Oguma 2002). Current geopolitical tensions may 
exacerbate it as well (Kobayashi et al. 2014). Equal status contact in the white collar 
workplace has not undermined the influences of these more global processes.   
It is possible, of course, that women’s and East Asians’ attainment of more 
prestigious positions in Japanese firms simply has not progressed far enough to overturn 
long-held attitudes towards members of these groups. The share of female managers in the 
study firms ranges from 3% to 34%. Clearly, even though women are not excluded from the 
management track, they still lag behind men in occupational attainment and in many cases 
have only token representation in the managerial ranks. In this case, as their structural 
attainment continues to improve, they may still be able to disrupt mental models of group 
status in the future. Alternatively, women’s and East Asians’ current levels of structural 
attainment may be high enough to change attitudes, but either the pace of attitudinal change is 
slow relative to disadvantaged groups’ structural attainment, or not enough time has passed 
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for this attitudinal change to erase the impact of past discrimination.  
Although these outcomes are possible, however, there are two reasons why this best 
case scenario still appears unlikely. The first is Western workers’ surprisingly rapid 
incursions into the ranks of top management. On the face of it, their relatively poor Japanese 
skills, lack of familiarity with the Japanese context, and small share of the foreign population 
in Japan should make Westerners unlikely candidates for structural advancement in Japanese 
firms. That they have advanced so quickly and that their wages exceed even those of their 
Japanese counterparts suggests they have benefitted from existing attitudes among Japanese 
that privilege Western peoples and culture (see Oguma 2002), or perhaps have been able to 
use as leverage the promising employment opportunities that they enjoy in their home 
countries. Since Japanese women and East Asians are much less likely to have better 
employment options elsewhere, and since neither enjoys the same racial or ethnic privilege as 
Westerners, their opportunities have been relatively less. This pattern suggests that, even 
when negative population growth creates labor shortages, the most advantaged or high status 
(but not necessarily the most qualified) outsiders stand to benefit the most. This trend would 
tend to limit how quickly members of more disadvantaged groups can advance, and the 
consequent likelihood of fundamental status reordering.  
A second reason to question the best case scenario applies mainly to women.  Even if 
most women work in historically male positions, and women’s managerial authority 
continues to grow, their overrepresentation is likely to persist in low status clerical jobs, 
simply because more women than men are willing to trade lower opportunities for greater 
flexibility (Zou 2015; Nemoto 2016). Although research on status construction focuses more 
on women’s representation at the top of the occupational hierarchy, women’s representation  
at the bottom may be equally or perhaps even more important to how people perceive 
women’s status. Persistent female overrepresentation in low status jobs will thus lead to 
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continued devaluation of women’s accomplishments even in more prestigious jobs and work 
against the countervailing pressures that could destabilize the gender hierarchy.  
Together, the three papers of this dissertation address questions about patterns of 
inequality in the context of demographic decline. Will population decline slow opportunities 
for  advancement for women and minorities, exacerbating inequality? Or will a shrinking 
population bring a new dawn of greater mobility for disadvantaged groups, perhaps even 
disrupting existing hierarchies? The analyses suggest that even a demographic cliff such as a 
Japan’s does not lead insiders to hoard opportunities for themselves.  Indeed, “good jobs” 
appear increasingly accessible to women and minorities. At the same time, however, the best 
of these dawning opportunities do not go to the groups who have historically faced greater 
disadvantage—in this context, women and East Asians—even when they are highly qualified.  
Further, existing status hierarchies continue to impact earnings even for those who work in 
high level positions. The most likely scenario is therefore that demographic decline will open 
new opportunities to women and minorities, but rejigger rather than upend the status ordering 
of pre-decline times.  
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APPENDIX 1 
DESCRIPTION OF VIGNETTES 
Negative Vignettes 
Tardiness 
Names: Suzuki (Japanese), Pak (Korean), Li (Chinese), Brown (English)23 
_______-san is an employee with 5 years of seniority. Recently, he did not 
come to work for two days, without requesting permission or informing 
anyone in advance. Now he is back at work. He apologized, but has not 
explained why he was absent. Since returning to work, he has been late to 
several departmental meetings, and to one meeting with clients. 
 
Records Falsification 
Names: Takahashi (Japanese), Pak (Korean), Li (Chinese), Brown (English) 
Sato-san and _______-san are responsible for entering the sales records of 
employees in their department into a computer database. Supervisors use the 
information in the database when they evaluate employees. One day, Sato-san 
needs to look up information that _______-san entered the week before. He 
finds that _______-san's entries do not match records kept elsewhere. Sato-san 
decides to check some of _______-san's other work. He finds that, in fact, all 
_______-san's entries for the past 8 weeks, and possibly even longer, are false. 
It appears that _______-san exaggerated his own sales records and those of his 
friend. Sato-san tells his supervisor what he has discovered. 
 
  
                                                 
23 Because respondent viewed, at most, one negative and one positive vignette with a non-Japanese name, I used 
the same non-Japanese names across the tardiness and records falsification vignettes, and the same non-Japanese 
names across the helping and saving vignettes. To avoid the same name appearing twice for one respondent, I 
used unique Japanese names in each of the four vignettes. 
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Follow-up Questions to Negative Vignettes  
Q1 How should the supervisor respond? 
Check what the supervisor should do. You may check more than 1 item. 
The supervisor should not do anything. 
The supervisor should have a discussion with _______-san about his behavior. 
The supervisor should have a discussion with other employees in his section about 
_______-san's behavior. 
The supervisor should have a discussion with other managers or HR about _______-
san’s behavior. 
 
Q2 Should the supervisor or HR issue a formal warning or punishment for _______-san? 
No 
Yes 
 
[Viewed by respondents who chose “Yes” for Q2] 
Q3 What type of formal warning or punishment would be the most appropriate for _______-
san? 
Warning 
One-time salary reduction  
Unpaid suspension from work   
Demotion  
Firing  
Other, please specify: 
 
[Viewed by respondents who chose “One-time salary reduction” for Q3] 
Q4 By what percent should _______-san's base salary be reduced, when he receives the one-
time salary reduction? 
Write the percentage below. 
 
[Viewed by respondents who chose “Unpaid suspension from work” for Q3] 
Q5 How many weeks unpaid suspension from work should Smith-san receive as punishment? 
Write the number of weeks below. 
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Positive Vignettes 
Saving Money 
Names: Tanaka (Japanese), Kim (Korean), Wang (Chinese), Smith (English) 
_______-san has been assigned to negotiations with vendors that his company 
uses for business services. Recently, business costs have been rising, and his 
supervisor tells _______-san that he should do his utmost to control the costs, 
even if it means breaking off relationships with long-term vendors and finding 
new ones. However, _______-san successfully negotiates with his company’s 
two largest existing vendors to lower their prices by 5%, while keeping the 
level of services the same. This keeps overall costs in control and means that 
employees at _______-san’s firm can continue working with the familiar 
vendors. 
 
Helping Coworkers  
Names: Ikeda (Japanese), Kim (Korean), Wang (Chinese), Smith (English) 
It is the busiest season in the human resources department. Everyone is 
desperately trying to complete their work. However, _______-san notices that 
Fujiwara-san, the newest member of their group, is really struggling. _______-
san offers to help Fujiwara-san, even though he is very busy himself. At first, 
Fujiwara-san tries to decline _______-san's help, because he doesn’t want to 
be a burden. Nonetheless _______-san insists, and eventually, Fujiwara-san 
gratefully accepts his help. 
Once the busy season is over, his supervisor congratulates Fujiwara-san on 
how well he did. Fujiwara-san explains that although he worked hard, it is 
really thanks to _______-san that he was able to complete his job. 
 
Follow-up Questions to Positive Vignettes  
Q1 How should the supervisor respond? 
Check what the supervisor should do. You may check more than 1 item. 
The supervisor should not do anything. 
The supervisor should privately tell _______-san he did a good job. 
The supervisor should praise _______-san to other members of the section. 
The supervisor should praise _______-san to managers in other departments or to HR. 
The supervisor should recommend _______-san for a higher than usual bonus. 
The supervisor should recommend _______-san for a promotion. 
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[Viewed by respondents who chose “The supervisor should recommend _______-san for a 
higher than usual bonus.” for Q1] 
Q2 By what percentage should _______-san's bonus be increased? 
Write the percentage below. 
 
 
